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Bandwidth is Political 
 
 
Abstract - Summary thesis statement 
 
The global public Internet faces a growing but little studied threat from the use of 
intrusive traffic management practices by both wholesale and retail Internet 
service providers. Unlike research concerned with bandwidth and traffic growth, 
this study shifts the risk analysis away from capacity issues to focus on 
performance standards for interconnection and data reachability.  
 
The long-term health of the Internet is framed in terms of “data reachability” – the 
principle that any end-user can reach any part of the Internet without 
encountering arbitrary actions on the part of a network operator that might block 
or degrade transmission. Risks to reachability are framed in terms of both 
systematic traffic management practices and “de-peering,” a more aggressive 
tactic practised by Tier-1 network operators to resolve disputes or punish rivals. 
 
De-peering is examined as an extension of retail network management practices 
that include the growing use of deep packet inspection (DPI) technology for 
traffic-shaping. De-peering can also be viewed as a close relative of Net 
Neutrality, to the extent that both concepts reflect arbitrary practices that interfere 
with the reliable flow of data packets across the Internet. In jurisdictional terms, 
 v
however, de-peering poses a qualitatively different set of risks to stakeholders 
and end-users, as well as qualitatively different challenges to policymakers. 
 
It is argued here that risks to data unreachability represent the next stage in 
debates about the health and sustainability of the global Internet. The study 
includes a detailed examination of the development of the Internet’s enabling 
technologies; the evolution of telecommunications regulation in Canada and the 
United States, and its impact on Internet governance; and an analysis of the role 
played by commercialization and privatization in the growth of risks to data 
reachability. 
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Introduction: A New Internet Era 
 
The reliability of data transmission across the global public Internet is being 
compromised by the expanding use of traffic filtering, traffic-shaping and de-
peering (techniques for managing network traffic), used by network operators at 
both wholesale and retail levels. These and other traffic engineering practices are 
contributing to a phenomenon known as data unreachability, namely a loss of 
connectivity that unexpectedly disrupts the ability of an Internet service provider 
(ISP) or end-user to communicate in sanctioned ways over the public Internet. 
Data unreachability has important and growing political, commercial and 
technical ramifications that to date have received little systematic attention from 
the academic research community. 
 
Traffic management practices are a mixed blessing, as evidenced by the 
voluminous filings and testimony that became part of the record in the 
proceeding on ISP traffic management practices held by the Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) over the course of 2009 
(CRTC, 2008b). In many situations, ISPs, especially those offering retail 
broadband connectivity to residential customers, use traffic management controls 
to enhance network security by eliminating or reducing unwanted traffic, such as 
spam and malware.  
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On the other hand, traffic management controls have become contentious, 
because many incumbent ISPs have made routine use of deep packet inspection 
(DPI) and similar tools to slow down or block altogether traffic they allege is 
adding to congestion of their networks, often by targeting particular protocols, 
especially the BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol. De-peering is another action that 
may be undertaken by network operators that puts reachability at risk. De-
peering is the practice by commercial backbone providers of unilaterally severing 
interconnections with other commercial backbone providers as a means of 
enforcing contracts, punishing rivals and expanding market share. De-peering 
does not fall within the generally accepted meaning of traffic management, but 
produces the same end result. 
 
Although not yet commonplace, data reachability is an important object of study 
for reasons related to the promotion of both the public interest and scholarly 
inquiry. Except under network topologies that provide for redundant 
interconnections, the abrupt and arbitrary decision by one bandwidth provider to 
refuse data traffic being exchanged with another bandwidth provider can have 
damaging and disruptive effects on many other bandwidth stakeholders, 
including thousands or even millions of end-users.  
 
Several persistent structural factors make the risks involved in de-peering, as 
well as disruptive traffic management practices, of more than passing interest to 
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industry stakeholders and the research community. First, de-peering and traffic 
management are planned and deliberate actions, not the result of accidental or 
unforeseen circumstances. Second, the commercial activities of backbone 
providers, while dependent on standards overseen by technical bodies such as 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and Internet Architecture Board 
(IAB), are entirely unregulated, and fall outside the jurisdiction of international 
organizations otherwise involved in Internet governance, including the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU).1 Third, the formal business arrangements 
made among backbone providers through contracts or service level agreements 
(SLAs) are rarely open to outside scrutiny and usually subject to rigorous non-
disclosure agreements (see Appendix B – Tier-1 networks – Definition). 
 
The Commercialization of Bandwidth Stakeholders 
 
The issues examined in this chapter flow from a series of historical developments 
that saw the Internet grow from a publicly funded, non-commercial service to a 
global platform whose bandwidth facilities are now controlled by large private 
corporations. From 1988 to 1995, NSFNET, the network operated on behalf of 
the National Science Foundation, acted as the principal Internet backbone, 
eventually replacing the original Advanced Research Projects Agency Network or 
                                            
1
  Many of the commercial entities that own and/or operate large backbone facilities are 
telecommunications carriers, some of whose activities are subject to scrutiny by regulatory bodies 
such as the FCC. 
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ARPANET. By the time NSFNET was shut down in April 1995, Internet 
connectivity was being provided by a growing number of commercial operators, 
using new software protocols and interconnection methods. The 
commercialization of the Internet was also accelerated by related events such as 
the Netscape initial public offering (IPO), which took place in August 1995, just 
months after the closure of NSFNET. These historical events are examined in 
detail below, in Chapter III. 
 
For purposes of this investigation, the most significant shift precipitated by 
commercialization of the public Internet was from universal reliance on 
settlement-free peering (i.e. exchange of traffic without payment) to a mixed 
system in which paid transit came to play a crucial role. In general terms, peering 
is the “voluntary interconnection of two independent networks that exchange 
traffic on a settlement-free basis” (Cukier, 1997, p. 1), whereas transit is the 
provision of Internet access by one provider to another for payment. Although the 
distinction may appear to be straightforward (what was once free now comes at a 
cost), we will demonstrate in this chapter that the introduction of paid 
interconnection alongside traditional peering marked a radical shift in the 
behavior of the bandwidth marketplace. This shift was in part a result of the sheer 
growth and mainstreaming of the Internet over the course of the 1990s. It 
reflected a new set of priorities under which large firms, especially incumbent 
telecommunications carriers, were more likely to be concerned with protecting 
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their financial interests than with maintaining reliable interconnections across the 
Internet. As we explain at length in later chapters, the issue of reachability raises 
concerns of accountability and transparency because business arrangements 
made between networks are almost invariably subject to non-disclosure 
agreements and thus inaccessible to third parties.  
 
One of the most compelling signs of lack of transparency in this market lies in the 
difficulties involved in merely identifying the major bandwidth stakeholders, 
especially the Tier-1 networks (as distinct from Tier-2 and Tier-3 networks). A 
Tier-1 network is commonly taken to be a network that fulfills two conditions: i) it 
can reach every other network on the Internet; and ii) it can do so without 
purchasing IP transit or paying settlements (Norton, 2001, p. 2). Operating on a 
settlement-free basis - a type of bill-and-keep arrangement familiar from inter-
carrier compensation models - is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
claiming status as a Tier-1 network. Tier-1s are often loosely termed “ISPs” – 
Internet service providers - as a result of the fact that the Tier-3 resellers of 
residential Internet access are primarily owned and operated by the incumbent 
carriers that own the Tier-1 networks. 
 
A Tier-2 network typically operates on a mix of settlement-free peering with 
certain networks, while paying one or more other networks for transit facilities to 
reach at least some parts of the Internet. A Tier-3 network is one that operates 
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strictly on a transit basis, paying one or more upstream providers for Internet 
access. As for the Tier-1 networks, their number and identity change from time to 
time, and there are typically discrepancies from one industry list of Tier-1 
networks to another. Tier-1 network operators are typically based in the United 
States, among them AT&T, Level 3 Communications, Qwest, Sprint, Verizon, 
XO, Abovenet and Cogent. The few non-US-based Tier-1 networks include 
TeliaSonera International, based in Stockholm; NTT in Japan; Global Crossing, 
based in Bermuda; Teleglobe, owned by India’s Tata Group; and China Telecom 
(Brown, Hepner & Popescu, 2009, p. 5; Zmijewski, 2008b). 
 
The stakeholder hierarchy just described poses serious problems for both 
participants and researchers - and describing these problems is one of the 
principal purposes of this chapter. These problems can be described as follows. 
First, it is difficult to establish definitively which firms are operating true Tier-1 
networks. Second, networks that have not achieved Tier-1 status may be 
motivated for marketing purposes to claim they are Tier-1 operators - and such 
claims can be made with impunity, particularly since Tier-1 status is not 
determined simply by reach, bandwidth capacity or number of customers. Third, 
since every Tier-1 network must by definition peer with all other Tier-1 networks, 
individual networks have no means of establishing redundancy or backup 
arrangements for their peering interconnections with other Tier-1 networks. This 
top-level peering structure means that a de-peering incident may abruptly 
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partition off one section of the Internet from other sections, and when such an 
incident takes place, there are currently no international provisions in place for 
either regulatory oversight or third-party dispute resolution. 
 
Reachability and Net Neutrality 
 
One of the goals of the research presented here is to shift the locus of analysis 
away from capacity-related issues (i.e. the bandwidth available to ISPs and end-
users in given markets), in favor of an emphasis on performance standards for 
interconnection and data reachability. In the last two to three years, much of the 
public debate and research literature on the health of the Internet has been 
confined to capacity issues. Regulators and lawmakers in a number of countries, 
including Canada and the United States, have wrestled with the question of what 
rules, if any, should be put in place to manage both the sanctioned network 
management activities of ISPs and the unsanctioned activities of file-sharing 
sites that may facilitate copyright infringement. The common denominator in all 
these discussions is the fear, real or misplaced, that both Internet backbones and 
last-mile connections are running out of capacity, raising the possibility of 
“brownouts.”  
 
Current discussions on network capacity and ISP gatekeeping have crystallized 
around the concept of Net Neutrality - the case made by public-interest 
advocates and others that broadband ISPs should be required to offer non-
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discriminatory access to their last-mile facilities, particularly for the benefit of 
paying subscribers in jurisdictions where incumbent providers can practise 
monopoly or near-monopoly leveraging of their facilities. ISPs operating in North 
America have responded by claiming that intrusive network management 
practices are necessary because the volume of Internet traffic has been rising 
too sharply for bandwidth providers to keep up (Hunter, 2006a, p. 11). 
 
It is argued here that data unreachability especially created through traffic 
engineering practices, including de-peering, represents the next stage in debates 
about the health and sustainability of the global Internet. De-peering can be 
viewed as an extension of retail network management practices that include the 
growing use of deep packet inspection (DPI) technology for traffic-shaping. De-
peering can also be viewed as a close relative of Net Neutrality, to the extent that 
both concepts reflect arbitrary ISP practices that may interfere with the reliable 
flow of data packets across the Internet. In jurisdictional terms, however, de-
peering poses a qualitatively different set of risks to stakeholders and end-users, 
as well as qualitatively different challenges to policymakers. Whereas Net 
Neutrality is treated as a national issue in countries such as Canada and the 
United States, data reachability is international in its scope. 
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Dominant Role of the United States 
 
One of the few ways in which information about market share and the business 
dealings of Tier-1 providers has become public is through the ad hoc review of 
mergers and acquisitions by legal authorities, often as part of the enforcement of 
anti-trust legislation. Over the last decade, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) 
has issued orders preventing or amending certain mergers and acquisitions, 
including the proposed merger of MCI-WorldCom and Sprint, which was 
disallowed in 2000. Prior to that, the DoJ had ordered WorldCom to divest 
InternetMCI, the backbone provider owned by MCI, as a condition the acquisition 
of MCI by WorldCom (MCI, WorldCom merger gets green light from DoJ, 1998, 
p. 1). 
 
Several aspects of this legal environment as it affects large bandwidth 
stakeholders are explored in this chapter. The first of these concerns the fact that 
the enforcement actions of the DoJ have been carried out with very little 
regulatory guidance from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). 
Second, because of the global reach of US companies, the European Union (EU) 
has also taken legal action in anti-trust cases such as those just cited. Third, and 
notwithstanding the involvement of competition regulators in jurisdictions such as 
the EU, the United States continues to have a unique and compelling interest in 
the behavior of Tier-1 and other bandwidth stakeholders.  
 
 10
This interest flows from the level of Internet-related activity in the US and the 
unusual political role of the US government in Internet governance. 
Notwithstanding claims made by US government officials, the administration of 
the domain name system (DNS) was not “privatized” with the establishment of 
ICANN in 1998. Despite the global nature of its technical mandate, the 
international deployment of the DNS root servers and debates over the years 
about its multilateral responsibilities, ICANN has always operated under the 
aegis of the US Department of Commerce - a relationship that has been the 
source of much conflict at international forums such as the World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS). On the other hand, we argue in this paper that the 
strong focus in public debates on the Internet’s naming functions and the role of 
ICANN should not be allowed to divert attention from the growing problems 
associated with data routing and reachability across the global Internet. 
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Literature Review 
 
Relatively few scholars have addressed the issue of unreachability of data in the 
Internet. We begin with a glance at the best known studies. 
 
Peering and the consequences of severing Internet interconnections were 
examined in Neil Cukier’s 1997 paper, Peering and fearing: ISP interconnection 
and regulatory issues presented at the Harvard Information Infrastructure Project 
Conference on the Impact of the Internet on Communication Policy. This paper 
was an early warning on the topic of network peering policies and Internet traffic 
control. Cukier raised the issue immediately after passage of the 1996 US 
Telecommunications Act, suggesting that large networks seemed to have 
changed peer relationships into supplier-customer relationships. 
 
The 2002 FCC Network Reliability and Interoperability Council V Report to the 
Nation (Network Reliability and Interoperability Council V: The future of our 
nation’s communications infrastructure) is an important document regarding 
peering policy primarily because Focus Group 4 – Broadband, recommended 
that peering policies be made public information (Network Reliability and 
Interoperability Council, 2002a). Additionally, J. Scott Marcus is a former FCC 
senior adviser on Internet technology who authored a 2006 declaration in 
Hepting et al. v. AT&T, on behalf of the Electronic Frontier Foundation's class-
action lawsuit against AT&T for collaboration with the warrantless domestic 
 12
spying program. Marcus included the same FCC NRIC report as exhibit R in his 
2006 declaration, as the report provides a clear definition of peering and 
infrastructure (Marcus, 2006). 
 
William Norton is an author and technical specialist on Internet infrastructure and 
peering. His 2003 paper, “The Evolution of the U.S. Internet Peering Ecosystem,” 
provides excellent background for this discussion. Norton went on to work for 
Equinix, an Internet interconnection company funded by Cisco, Microsoft and 
private equity funds. The problems caused by de-peerings were addressed by 
Brown, Hepner and Popescu of Renesys Corporation in a presentation entitled 
Internet Captivity and the De-peering Menace at the 2009 meeting of NANOG, 
the North American Network Operators Group. The NANOG email listserv (and 
archives) provide a valuable record of topical issues of concern to the system 
administrators who help run the Internet. Although these discussions are limited 
by mandate to technical issues, the participants often address the larger 
dilemmas associated with their work as Internet technologists. 
 
Ars Technica is a Conde Nast Web site which describes itself as “a premier 
destination for technology news, analysis, and in-depth information. With 6 
million monthly readers, Ars Technica is in the Top 20 of all IT News and Media 
sites online according to Hitwise, and ranks in Technorati's Top 10” (Ars 
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Technica, 2009). Rudolph van der Berg’s information on connectivity and van 
Beijnum’s information on de-peering are particularly good. 
 
Technological, economic and regulatory factors that shape this field are surveyed 
in great detail by Nuechterlein and Weiser in Digital Crossroads: American 
Telecommunications Policy in the Internet Age.  
 
Two research projects, one Canadian and one American, address the issue of 
filtering data crossing the public Internet, but neither of them examines 
reachability failures caused by de-peerings. For example Anderson, Katz-
Bassett, Krishnamurthy and Madhyastha from the Hubble project at the 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Washington are 
actively studying unreachability in the public Internet. In their paper “Studying 
Black Holes in the Internet with Hubble” presented at the 2008 USENIX 
Symposium on Networked Systems Design & Implementation (NSDI) in San 
Francisco, they discussed their software tool entitled Hubble which finds Internet 
reachability problems resulting in “blackholes”, where routes exist to a destination 
but packets are unable to reach the destination. 
 
The OpenNet Initiative at the Munk Centre, University of Toronto, is focussed on 
research into Internet practices and polices of Internet filtering and surveillance. 
In a 2008 publication entitled Access denied: The Practice and Policy of Global 
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Internet Filtering, the editors include an essay by Murdoch and Anderson on 
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) filtering practices and technology (Deibert, 
Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, Ed. 2008, p. 57). The OpenNet Initiative research 
concentrates on state political controls designed to block or restrict Internet 
traffic. The present study concentrates more strictly on failures of reachability of 
data by examining: traffic filtering, routing interconnection policies of networks, 
de-peering (or the severing of connectivity between networks) and the resulting 
effects upon reliability and persistence of data for end-users. 
 
Balakrishnan and Feamster’s Interdomain Internet Routing describes 
autonomous systems, peering, transit and importing and exporting routes. The 
complexity of software and hardware used in interdomain routing is explained. 
They also touch on the difficulties faced by small entities to multi-home their 
connectivity. Yochai Benkler’s 2006 book, The Wealth of Networks, explores the 
idea that policies employed in the technical administration of the Internet are 
related to other areas of public policy. 
 
Reflections on Internet Transparency is the title of a 2007 Internet Architecture 
Board report edited by Aboba and Davies. This report discusses filtering of 
Internet traffic in the context of upgrading the Internet to make more IP 
addresses available. The report reviewed previous IAB statements on Internet 
transparency, discussed new transparency issues, noting that IETF documents 
 15
have touched on the issues of transparency as well. “Far from having lessened in 
relevance, technical implications of intentionally or inadvertently impeding 
network transparency play a critical role in the Internet’s ability to support 
innovation and global communication” (Aboba & Davies, 2007, p. 1). The report 
is an assessment of Internet traffic engineering policies. The report emphasizes 
the importance of the end-to-end principle, which stipulates that in the design of 
the Internet, intelligence is concentrated at the edges of the network, while the 
network itself is dedicated solely to delivering packets: 
 
A network that does not filter or transform the data that it carries may be 
said to be “transparent” or “oblivious” to the content of packets. Networks 
that provide oblivious transport enable the deployment of new services 
without requiring changes to the core. It is this flexibility that is perhaps 
both the Internet’s most essential characteristic as well as one of the most 
important contributors to its success. (Aboba & Davies, 2007, p. 1) 
 
In his Rochester Institute of Technology masters dissertation, The Evolution of 
Internet Interconnections, Sean Butler claims that industry self-regulation will fail. 
Robert Cannon echoes Sean Butler’s claim in “The Legacy of the Federal 
Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries” (Federal Communications 
Law Journal, 2003). Cannon provides an overview of the Computer I, II and III 
Inquiries. The Computer Inquiry II established the important “basic” versus 
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“enhanced” dichotomy and created the regulatory provision called “comparatively 
efficient interconnection” or CEI. CEI established a set of rules whereby a telco 
offering basic voice service would be permitted to enter into enhanced (i.e. data) 
services markets without first creating a structurally separate entity, conditional 
upon their making available to competitors the same terms of interconnection as 
they enjoyed. This was based on the idea that the telcos would voluntarily 
divulge their network plans to competitors. Cannon notes that the commercial 
Internet exchange (CIX), which was set up in 1991 as the first exchange point for 
traffic between commercial Internet backbones, was skeptical about the 
feasibility of voluntary compliance.  
 
[CIX…] objected to the movement to non-structural safeguards in 
Computer Inquiry III arguing that this created a problem with enforcement. 
Recognizing validity to the CIX objection, the Commission stated: ‘We 
believe that competitive ISPs will themselves monitor CEI compliance 
vigilantly, and will call the Commission’s attention to any failure by a BOC 
to follow through on its CEI responsibilities … The Commission will not 
hesitate to use its enforcement authority, including the Accelerated Docket 
or revised complaint procedures, to review and adjudicate allegations that 
a BOC is falling short of fulfilling any of its CEI obligations’. Note, however, 
that this does create certain structural oddities. First, an unregulated 
industry, with little knowledge of the FCC, is asked to watch a regulated 
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industry. Second, small companies are asked to watch the largest 
corporations in the United States. Third, ISPs are placed in a position of 
filing complaints against their sole supplier of a crucial facility. Fourth, 
contrary to normal jurisprudence, the party that lacks the information has 
the burden of moving (normally, all things being equal, the party with the 
information has the burden of moving—in this case, the burden is on the 
ISPs, because the information is held by the BOCs. (Cannon, 2003, p. 
203) 
 
Adam Thierer, previous director of telecommunications studies for the CATO 
Institute in Washington DC in June 2007, provided the present author with an 
unpublished CATO research paper by Jennifer DePalma, “Maturation in a Fee 
Market: The Changing Dynamics of Peering in the ISP Industry.” The paper 
provided a useful survey of commercial de-peering concluding that the level of 
unreachability produced was not sufficient for alarm. Other important resources 
for this research include Who Controls the Internet? (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006), 
which addresses tiered levels of service on the Internet by distinguishing 
between content and capacity-based traffic controls. Legal scholar Rob Frieden 
raises the problem of Internet balkanization, but does not directly address 
peering or Internet infrastructure (Frieden, 1998). 
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Chapter I. Peering, Transit and Bandwidth Stakeholders 
 
This chapter is fundamentally concerned with the technical and commercial 
arrangements that ensure data traffic is transmitted between the administratively 
separate networks that make up the public Internet. Reduced to the simplest 
terms, these networks exchange traffic with other networks in one or both of two 
ways: unpaid, what is termed a settlement-free arrangement, or paid, at 
negotiated commercial rates. The first of these is known as peering, the second 
as transit. 
 
Peering and Transit in Practice 
 
The single most important consideration in determining whether data 
transmission will be settlement-free or paid concerns the amount of traffic 
handled by the networks in question. In this respect networks operate like many 
other businesses that find it advantageous to exchange goods or services on a 
“contra” basis, without money changing hands - an arrangement that 
presupposes one party has something to offer roughly equal in value to what the 
other party has to offer. In the telecommunications industry, where compensation 
paid by one carrier to another for terminating voice calls may take a number of 
forms, such deals are referred to as “bill-and-keep.” 
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In the business of long-haul data transmission over the Internet, networks enter 
into peering relationships with other networks for the purpose of exchanging 
symmetric or near-symmetric volumes of data traffic between the customers of 
each network.2 On the other hand, most networks, except the largest bandwidth 
providers, must pay for access to at least some of the routes on the Internet, 
under the commercial arrangement known as transit. In a typical transit 
relationship, one network operator (usually a smaller one) pays a fee to another 
network operator (usually a larger one) for the asymmetric exchange of data. The 
smaller entity pays to have its traffic handled by the larger entity because it has 
more to gain from interconnection of the two networks in question. 
 
The main operational bandwidth stakeholders can be defined according to 
whether they use peering or transit, or a mix of the two, to service their 
customers. The key stakeholders are the Tier-1, Tier-2 and Tier-3 networks. A 
Tier-1 network operates strictly by peering with other Tier-1 networks, meaning it 
can reach every other network on the Internet without paying for transit. A Tier-2 
                                            
2
  The terms “symmetric” and “asymmetric” are used commonly in networking parlance, 
especially to describe a two-way connection. In a symmetric network or connection, the 
bandwidth available in one direction is equal or nearly equal to the bandwidth available in the 
other direction; in an asymmetric network or connection, the bandwidth available in one direction 
is significantly greater than the bandwidth available in the other direction. Residential broadband 
connections (i.e. high-speed Internet connections) have historically been designed by both 
telephone and cable providers to be highly asymmetric, i.e. provisioned to offer much more 
bandwidth in the downlink than in the uplink. The ramifications of this design principle are 
discussed elsewhere in this paper. By extension, network engineers and others in the business of 
providing bandwidth use “symmetric” and “asymmetric” more generally, as in the case of 
“symmetric or near-symmetric volumes of data traffic between the customers of each network.” 
This phrase refers to peering relationships in which the amount of data transmitted by carrier X 
and accepted by carrier Y is roughly the same as the amount of data transmitted by carrier Y and 
accepted by carrier X. 
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network typically operates on a mix of settlement-free peering and paid transit 
while Tier-3 networks, which usually operate generically as xSPs (Internet 
service providers, Internet access providers, Internet storage providers, Internet 
application providers, Internet hosting providers and other services for end-users) 
rarely if ever have peering relationships unless there is a need to overcome the 
vagaries of geographical boomerang in connecting with a higher level network. 
This means they purchase access or bandwidth for their customers strictly on a 
transit basis.  
 
In standard arrangements, the high-level networks known as Internet backbones 
or Tier-1 networks are transit-free (see Appendix B). These high-level networks 
do not have direct contact with end-users except insofar as they own local Tier-3 
ISPs. Local, retail-level Internet service providers – Tier-3 ISPs, are the resellers 
that provide their end-users transit-based access to the global Internet. 
Historically, Internet service providers have always paid for upstream transit and 
began operating long before the deployment of commercial network backbones. 
In the early days of the Internet, retail Internet service providers operated banks 
of modems that provided local dial-up access. Today, most local Internet service 
providers purchase backbone access from a single upstream provider. Local 
ISPs tend to serve only residential users, while national and regional providers 
(Tier-2) serve businesses as well as residential users. 
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Peering 
 
As noted above, peering is typically settlement-free, meaning that neither 
network operator pays the other for exchanging traffic. It must be noted, 
however, that such cost-free arrangements apply only to the data exchanged 
between customers of the two networks in question. Furthermore, peering 
arrangements between two networks are not always settlement-free. There is, in 
other words, a paid variant of unpaid peering.  
 
In one type of situation, paid peering may come about as the result of changes 
made to a previously settlement-free peering relationship, in particular when the 
larger of two networks determines on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis that it 
deserves to be paid for handling the other network’s traffic (van der Berg, 2009). 
In other situations, “near high-level networks” may choose to buy their way into 
the top echelon of Internet backbone networks by paying to peer with a larger 
network, since paid peering tends to be less expensive than transit. There are 
numerous “near high-level networks” that offer service combining some transit 
and some full or partial paid peering (van der Berg, 2009). For some authorities, 
the use of the term “paid peering” is a misnomer often applied in marketing 
strategies and distinctly different from “true” - i.e. settlement-free - peering. 
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Transit 
 
Technically speaking, a transit agreement means the purchaser is paying 
another provider for connectivity to Internet locations outside of its own network. 
Transit may be based on a flat monthly charge or on a volume basis (Mbit/s per 
month). Full transit includes access to all the routes on the supplier network, as 
well as to those of the supplier’s peers and the supplier’s own upstream transit 
suppliers (van der Berg, 2009). As a variant of full transit, partial transit 
arrangements include access to a supplier’s peers but exclude its transit 
suppliers. Partial transit has been traditionally more common in Europe than in 
the US, where peering and full transit have been more dominant (Williamson, 
2003, pp.16-17). Residential end-user customers are by definition transit 
purchasers since they buy Internet access or IP transit from an ISP that in turn 
purchases transit from a larger upstream provider. That larger upstream provider 
may purchase full transit from its own provider or partial transit and partial 
peering combined - or alternatively it may be in a position to acquire access 
upstream from one or more high-level networks as a full-fledged peer. 
 
Interconnection: Border Gateway Protocol & Autonomous 
System Numbers 
 
Over and above the business efficiencies achieved by peering, network 
operators have an important technical goal in wishing to offer peering as a 
solution to routing, the process of selecting paths in a network along which to 
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send traffic. Routing is an especially complex engineering challenge in a packet-
switched network such as the public Internet, since the underlying rationale for 
the use of packet switching technology lies in its ability to offer many different 
paths for a given transmission, with a view to maximizing overall network 
efficiency and promoting best-effort delivery of packet transmission. The crucial 
task of routing packets between networks is accomplished by a core Internet 
routing technology – Border Gateway Protocol or BGP – which has been in 
widespread use by network operators since the mid-1990s. End-users do not 
interact directly with BGP, despite its important role in determining the 
reachability of data packets in peering and transit interconnections (Medhi & 
Ramasamy, 2007, p. 239). 
 
Each entry in the BGP routing table lists a distinct path from which the router (a 
programmable device to route Internet traffic) will choose one path to use (Medhi 
& Ramasamy, 2007, pp. 31-2, 59). Routing advertisements “pull” or attract data 
traffic rather than traffic being “pushed” around the Internet.  
 
BGP works by maintaining global routing tables of IP networks, which designate 
network reachability among networks called “autonomous systems” or ASes. An 
AS is an “Internet domain’” or collection of IP sub-networks and routers under the 
control of one entity (such as a university, a commercial enterprise, government, 
or other enterprise) that presents a single border gateway routing policy to the 
 24
global Internet. This common policy is the “administrative boundary” for an 
aggregated collection of blocks of IP addresses (Barrolli, Durresi, Iyengar, 
Kannan & Paruchuri, 2004, p. 6). Blocks of Internet addresses associated with an 
AS number are aggregated into “prefixes” which contain a range of one or more 
IP addresses (Huston, 2003, p. 3). A routing table contains all the routable IP 
prefixes, each of which is followed by a series of AS numbers indicating the AS 
path to that prefix: 
 
A Global Routing Table lists every single prefix on the Internet, the 
different available paths to that prefix, and other information that lets the 
AS make forwarding choices based on the available paths. (Faratin, Clark, 
Gilmore, Bauer, Berger & Lehr, 2007, p. 6) 
 
When an originating AS announces prefixes that have been allocated to it by a 
regional Internet registry (RIR), the announcement ordinarily propagates to all 
other ASes in the Internet. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN) allocates AS numbers to the RIRs through the Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which then sub-assigns the AS numbers 
(as well as sub-assigning blocks or prefixes of IP numbers) to ASes within their 
region. The five global five regional Internet registries are: Asia - Asia Pacific 
Network Information Center (APNIC); North America – American Registry for 
Internet Numbers (ARIN); EU and Middle East - Réseaux IP Européens Network 
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Coordination (RIPE NCC); Africa - African Network Information Coordination 
(AfriNIC); Latin American and Caribbean - Latin American and Caribbean 
Network Interconnection Coordination (LACNIC).  
 
As an illustration of the scope of the technical data associated with an 
autonomous system (AS) number, French network operator Bouygues Telecom 
states on its Web site (Bouygues Telecom, n.d.) that its “AS Number is AS5410 
registered at the RIPE NCC authority, is a French network operator and a RIPE 
Local Internet Registry (LIR).” This statement means that a large-scale IP 
network in Europe, called Bouygues Telecom, has the autonomous system 
number AS5410; is registered at the EU and Middle East regional Internet 
registry RIPE NCC; operates a network; and can assign IP numbers to 
customers that have been allocated to it by RIPE NCC.  
 
Autonomous system numbers are divided into two ranges. Public AS numbers 
ranging from 1 to 64511 are used on the Internet. Private numbers in the 64512 
to 65534 range may only be used internally within an organization. On a daily 
basis the Asia-Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC) automatically sends a 
fairly accurate report to all the other regional Internet registries regarding Internet 
connectivity from its point of view. This report is distributed weekly on the 
NANOG mailing list (see example, Appendix C, the Weekly Routing Table 
Report). The Analysis Summary of this particular report states, “Total 
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autonomous systems present in the Internet Routing Table: 31449”. This means 
that of 65536 possible 16-bit AS numbers (actually 64511 possible public IP 
numbers) 31449 AS numbers are actively in use, as far as the Asia - Asia Pacific 
Network Information Center (APNIC) can see (Routing Analysis Role Account, 
2008). 
 
BGP manages the routing among the AS routers by selecting the best path for 
the traffic flow based on many factors. Peering information is typically described 
using the Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL) in preparing commands 
used to configure the routers. Primarily the management of the routing system by 
the Border Gateway Protocol needs only an autonomous system set (AS-SET) 
defining the ASes which an AS peers with, or which purchases partial peering or 
transit. The AS-SET is called a “peer set”; it lists the peers that the network 
exchanges route announcements with, and is somewhat closely guarded 
information in the commercial context of contracts and agreements. Even though 
this peering information is closely guarded, it is available on the Internet in 
technical form (Medhi & Ramasamy, 2007, p. 313). Some public posting of this 
AS-SET peering information on the Internet is voluntary and the format of the 
information is difficult for a lay person to understand. 
 
Traffic performance is optimized for customers by reducing the routing hops 
taken by a data packet or set of packets. A hop is an intermediate connection in 
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a string of connections linking two network devices, typically routers, whose task 
is to send packets along paths it has selected by means of routing algorithms 
(McPherson, Sangli & White, 2005, p. 15). As Medhi & Ramasamy put it: “[A] 
router in the Internet is also a host [read server] and is assigned an IP address” 
(Medhi & Ramasamy, 2007, p. 18) emphasis added.  Each time a packet is 
forwarded from one router to the next, a hop occurs, and on the Internet, most 
transmissions go through several routers - and therefore several hops - before 
they reach their final destination (Medhi & Ramasamy, 2007, p. 52). The more 
hops, the longer it takes for data to go from source to destination. When 
networks interconnect, they agree to exchange traffic and routing information 
called “routing advertisements” - information that allows each network to compute 
traffic routes (Balakrishnan & Feamster, 2005, p. 5, 6). When two networks 
interconnect as peers this produces fewer hops than arrangements with other 
networks would otherwise have permitted. 
 
Many other factors affect level of service in the hand-off of data traffic from one 
network provider to another. One of the most important of these concerns the 
various facilities around the globe at which networks are physically brought into 
contact with other networks. Bandwidth providers usually have dedicated 
connections at one of two kinds of public peering points: either metropolitan-area 
exchanges (MAEs) or network access points (NAPs) (Halabi, 1997, p. 8). Since 
bandwidth stakeholders of any size can exchange traffic through these publicly 
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accessible facilities, all or most of the Internet access service providers in a given 
area may end up putting all their traffic through the same interconnection point, 
with correspondingly negative effects on level of service (Halabi,1997, p. 13). 
 
The original government-funded network access points are now usually referred 
to as Internet Exchanges (IX’s). A few exchange points, particularly in the United 
States, are operated by facilities carrier hotel operators such as Telx, and there 
are also carrier-neutral third parties, such as Equinix (Blake, 1999, p.18; Telx 
opens the most network rich, interconnected colocation center in NYC metro 
area, 2009). Operators of these carrier-neutral facilities often go to great lengths 
to promote their services and encourage new peering.  
 
As a result of such efforts, groups of otherwise distinct and unrelated networks 
may all agree to interconnect at an Internet Exchange under identical multi-lateral 
peering agreements (MLPAs), which are paying commercial arrangements 
(Medhi & Ramasamy, 2007, p. 293). These arrangements may be seen in sharp 
contrast to the pre-1996 practice of open, settlement-free peering at public 
interconnection points. Even though such multi-party agreements have been in 
place for many years, there is no general consensus on how to calculate an 
economic value for the working partnerships created by these agreements. This 
represents another example of how commercialization, in addition to creating 
potential technical efficiencies, has also created an uncertain business 
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environment for networking and the potential for conflicts that have no easy or 
obvious framework for third-party resolution. 
 
While most networks have a single AS number, a limited number of large entities 
such as Google have multiple AS numbers or Internet domains in order to have 
administratively different policies regarding routing reachability (see Appendix D, 
RFC:1930 - Guidelines for creation, selection, and registration of an Autonomous 
System.) An AS is assigned a number that uniquely identifies the particular 
network or system on the global Internet. Until 2007, AS numbers were 16-bit 
integers, which allowed for a maximum of 65536 autonomous systems globally. 
As AS numbers are seen as a diminishing resource, in early 2007, in order to 
provide for more autonomous systems in the future, the RIRs started to issue 32-
bit AS numbers. Commencing 1 January 2010, all RIRs will cease to make any 
distinction between 16-bit AS Numbers and 32-bit AS Numbers (ARIN Number 
Resource Policy Manual, 2009). 
 
Whether or not there is a real need to move to 32-bit AS numbers is not 
completely clear. In a March 2009 discussion on the NANOG mailing list it 
became apparent that the level of assigned AS numbers, reaching 53,000 
numbers at the time, was largely due to many of them being stagnant or not in 
use. This issue has arisen because of takeovers and other developments (Brilus, 
2009). Discussions also suggested that a mere $100-per-year charge for an AS 
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number levied by ARIN dissuaded the return of unused allocations (Schiller, 
2009) and that there is no mechanism in place to decide if an AS number is not 
used or needed (Huston, 2009). Thus in March 2009 there was a significant 
number of ASNs allocated but not visible in the public Internet. It is not known to 
what extent these numbers may be still in use in various forms of private or semi-
private networks (Huston, 2009). 
  
Emergence and Development of Bandwidth Stakeholders  
 
The predecessor to the Internet, the ARPANET, was originally designed in the 
late 1960s on the basis of peer-to-peer architectures, a concept which over the 
last decade has drawn a great deal of attention, although more for legal and 
social reasons than for technical ones. In December 1969, in one of its earliest 
implementations, four computers, located at UCLA, UC Santa Barbara, the 
Stanford Research Institute (SRI) and the University of Utah were connected and 
the first packet-based messages were shared among them (Halabi, 1997, p. 3). 
The primary motivation behind the funding of the ARPANET by the US 
Department of Defense was two-fold: to allow academic and military researchers 
to share computing resources with their peers across the country; and to do so 
through the use of innovative hardware and software that would enable 
communication among machines using entirely different operating systems and 
architectures.  
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The twin models for the exchange of Internet traffic under discussion here - 
peering and transit - began to emerge over the decade from 1986 to 1995. This 
was the period during which the NSFNET, the backbone network created by the 
National Science Foundation, gradually opened up the cloistered and strictly non-
commercial world of networking and military research to hundreds of other 
networks, and eventually, millions of mainstream users. 
 
Thus, for a quarter of a century, the platform that became the public Internet ran 
on a primary backbone: first ARPANET and subsequently NSFNET. The 
prodigious growth of the Internet over this period precipitated changes of many 
kinds. The visible signs of growth included sharp increases in the number of 
networks, hosts, backbones and users that were becoming part of the new 
Internet. For example, from 1986, when NSFNET went online, to April 1995, 
when it shut down, the number of Internet hosts (computers with a registered IP 
address) grew from about 4,000 to over four million (Zakon, n.d.). Other visible 
and later, politically important changes, included commercialization, globalization 
and mainstreaming, consisting of widespread adoption of the Internet by 
members of the general public. 
 
Less visible were the changes going on in enabling technologies, particularly the 
way networks connected with each other and the way data packets were 
delivered. These technical changes also turned out to have significant political 
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and commercial ramifications. First of all, in the early period of the Internet’s 
development, the architecture was designed around a single backbone, using the 
resources of the two government agencies just described. Under this design, all 
other networks allowed to participate were connected with one another via the 
single Internet backbone. At the same time, routing information was conveyed 
between the backbone and the other smaller networks using a long outmoded 
routing technology called the exterior gateway protocol, or EGP (Halabi, 1997, p. 
9). 
 
Today the Internet no longer has a single backbone in the traditional sense. 
Rather, it has many, comprised of the individual backbones of Tier-1 commercial 
bandwidth stakeholders (see Appendix B). These modern backbones represent a 
significant shift in the number and type of stakeholders; their commercial 
priorities; and the number and types of locations where they interconnect, called 
peering points. In addition, the EGP has long since been replaced by the crucial 
routing technology known as the Border Gateway Protocol, or BGP. One of the 
most compelling reasons for deployment of the BGP is that it facilitates 
completely decentralized routing - an important feature as the Internet moved 
away from the central authority model with the decommissioning of the NSFNET 
(Halabi, 1997, p. 5). 
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Meanwhile, a parallel transition to commercialization was taking place at the 
retail level, in the local loop. During the 1980s, small groups of Internet hobbyists 
dotted around North America developed and ran computer bulletin board 
systems (BBSs) which were typically free, local operations that used the 
telephone network to share access. Their most striking feature in the context 
being described here was that BBSs did not depend for their connectivity on any 
third-party provider, in particular the commercial ISPs owned by the large 
telephone and cable companies (which in turn owned and controlled the physical 
access facilities in the residential last mile). Gradually, beginning in the late 
1980s, ISPs began to offer dial-up access to the Internet. From the early 1990s 
onward, the thousands of small ISPs that sprang up across North America, often 
referred to colloquially as “Mom and Pop” operations - were steadily bought up 
by larger ISPs, or forced out of business (Keshav, 1997, p. 43).  
 
In this chapter, several perspectives are developed on the structure of the 
bandwidth industry and its stakeholders, especially the classification of networks 
as Tier-1, Tier-2 or Tier-3 operators, as described earlier. Tier-1 operators run 
the Internet’s backbone networks; Tier-2 operators (in the United States) are 
mostly comprised of the old RBOCs (Regional Bell Operating Companies) now 
called ILECs (incumbent local exchange carriers); and Tier-3 operators, a 
heterogeneous group comprised of CLECs (competitive local exchange carriers) 
and other digital service providers – a category that includes not only 
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conventional Internet service providers, but also companies that provide a wide 
range of access, content, applications and hosting services. 
 
Regional Peering Practices 
 
Outside of the US, most major peering points operate on well established and 
transparent policies. These peering points include Amsterdam-based AMS-IX 
(the world's largest); London’s LINX; Frankfurt’s DE-CIX; and PaNAP, Paris 
(Bouygues Telecom, n.d.). In Canada, TORIX (Toronto), which has grown 
substantially; VANIX (Vancouver); and QIX (Montreal) all utilize the multi-lateral 
peering approach to engage in public peering interconnection (PPI). 
 
Within these Internet exchanges, several different types of network operators 
function alongside the Tier-1 networks; these include hosting providers (Web 
hosting services), access providers and content providers (cache servers and 
application providers). Tier-1 networks impose contractual requirements and 
bandwidth minimums at a level that usually prevents smaller entities from peering 
with them. For those stakeholders that can meet such requirements, 
arrangements are typically made through a private peering link known as a 
private network interconnection (PNI); such entities are then considered to be 
Tier-1 operators.  
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The physical facilities that house major Internet exchange points, known as 
carrier hotels, operate on two different connection principles: exchanges that 
utilize the large, purpose-built switches intended for multiple users; and the 
private network interconnections, or private peering just described. Often one 
network that another network operator wants to peer with might not be available 
at the exchange switch even though they are in the carrier hotel. The only way 
for such a network to interconnect is to peer privately with the other network 
(Davidson, 2008).  
 
Here too there are differences in regional practices. Writing about a visit to the 
Palo Alto Internet Exchange (PAIX), Paul Vixie noted that private network 
interconnections at that exchange outnumbered switch connections by more than 
100 to 1. He went on to say that “at exchanges where the Internet Systems 
Consortium (ISC) has a presence, there will generally be between two and 
twenty private network interconnections, compared to only one or two switch 
connections” (Vixie, 2008). The balance between the two connection types is 
reversed in other global regions, such as Africa. Users of the Kenyan Internet 
Exchange Point (KIXP), for example, are required to maintain a BGP-compliant 
router at the facility and all connections are carried out through the exchange 
switches. As one observer noted in 2008, “at this facility there is no demand for 
cross-connects or private network interconnections, and no such services are 
offered as yet” (Mwangi, 2008). 
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The most important considerations from the perspectives of both the provider 
and the end-user concerning how interconnection is negotiated are: the cost of 
interconnection in terms of network resources (the bandwidth expended to carry 
traffic from another network to another); the perceived value of the connectivity; 
and latency. For most stakeholders, the motivations for pursuing peering in 
addition to transit arrangements are financial and technical.  
 
The financial benefits of peering are compelling. Peering decreases reliance on 
and therefore the cost of purchased Internet transit (this is the single greatest 
operating expense which networks seek to minimize in telecommunications 
costs). Internet transit is expensive, so networks seek out peering relationships 
with others (at zero or reduced cost) that provide more direct traffic exchange 
and reduce the load on expensive upstream transit services. Packet loss and 
latency slow traffic consumption, so a service such as peering which improves 
either of these will increase traffic efficiency. Engineering or technical 
considerations also encourage peering. Peering lowers inter-network traffic 
latency, because traffic exchanged between two peering entities is necessarily 
taking the lowest latency path (Halabi, 1997, p. 44). 
 
Following the 1995 divesture of the National Science Foundation network and the 
passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, large backbone networks had 
begun to alter their interconnection terms. The goal for most was to change peer 
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relationships into supplier-customer relationships (Aronson & Cowhey, 2009, p. 
226). This change meant that many peering agreements which had been 
reciprocal and free became transit agreements requiring legal contracts and fees. 
Paying for transit from an upstream provider gives the customer access to all 
network routes in the upstream provider’s routing table and in return the 
upstream provider receives and announces the customer’s IP routes on all of its 
peering and transit interconnections.  
 
Transit may be based on a flat monthly charge or on a volume basis (Mbit/s per 
month). As traffic volume rises, this type of arrangement can become costly, 
although some service providers prefer a transit relationship with their upstream 
provider since service level agreements (SLAs) often accompany transit 
interconnection contracts rather than peering. These service maintenance 
agreements offer some guarantees of performance above a simple “best effort" 
(Medhi & Ramasamy, 2007, p. 294). Regardless of the size of the network, in a 
peering relationship there are often no SLAs to guarantee rapid resolution of 
problems; a transit customer relationship generally has more contractual teeth, 
since money is changing hands. 
 
Some networks began private peering agreements in 1996, shortly after control 
of the public peering sites (metropolitan-area exchanges and network access 
points) were divested by the US government. Private peering is based on 
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dedicated circuit connections established between two networks, each managing 
one end of the connection. Two networks in a private peering arrangement will 
typically enjoy improvements in service since reductions in the number of router 
hops means that fewer packets will be dropped. Fees are generally not charged 
when these connections are set up because they are mutually beneficial. 
Providers with large traffic volumes tend to peer without charge with other large 
providers, while charging for interconnection with smaller entities. 
 
Why might a network decline to participate in peering? One consideration is 
traffic asymmetry, i.e. if the traffic exchanged by two networks is not roughly 
equivalent in volume, the network that has to bear higher costs is likely to decline 
to participate. A second factor is the need for Tier-1 networks to compete on the 
basis of performance. Peering with other networks improves the performance of 
any given network, possibly making it a more powerful competitor. As 
commercial entities, most large networks are unlikely to peer if they believe they 
can instead sell transit to other, smaller entities. As large networks began to 
realize their value as peering partners for smaller players, they began to charge 
for transit. In 1999, Telephony Online reported that “[s]ome charge that the 
dominant backbone providers – UUNet, Sprint and Cable & Wireless – have 
used peering to retain what amounts to an oligopoly. Combined, those three 
providers control approximately 75% of backbone traffic” (Blake, 1999, p. 15). 
 
 39
This completes a brief overview of the basic concepts and industry players that 
will be referred to frequently through the rest of this paper. In the next chapter, a 
detailed examination is undertaken of the crucial contrasts between the highly 
centralized, legacy networks built by the incumbent carriers, and the packet-
switched, decentralized networks that make up the global Internet. The chapter 
looks not only at the underlying technologies, but also at the regulatory treatment 
of networks in both Canada and the United States. The main purpose of this 
examination is to assess the effects of deregulation on data reachability and the 
behavior of the companies that provide both retail and wholesale access 
services. 
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Chapter II. Conflict and Confluence: Legacy Telephone 
Networks and the Emergence of the Internet 
 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to describe the historical development of 
communications networks, especially in the United States. The focus is on 
explaining how technological convergence and concentration of ownership, 
combined with deregulation, have allowed a small number of firms to exercise 
wide-ranging control, i.e. gatekeeping power, over Internet backbone facilities 
once funded and operated by public-sector institutions, particularly universities 
and government agencies such as ARPA (later DARPA, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency) and the NSF, National Science Foundation. It is 
argued in the following pages that the risks to data reachability can be traced 
directly to these historical developments. It is also argued that ISP gatekeeping 
powers have been exercised in recent years in the residential Internet access 
business and that ISP behaviors at both wholesale and retail levels pose 
essentially the same risk to end-users - data unreachability - though usually for 
different reasons. 
 
The outline of events offered here centres on two distinctly different and originally 
competing types of communications network: the circuit-switched telephone 
networks built and operated by telecommunications carriers beginning in the late 
19th century, based on engineering solutions conceived for telegraph networks 
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but optimized for voice telephony; and IP-based, packet-switched networks, 
which were optimized for data transmission and first developed under the 
auspices of the US government in the late 1960s, later forming the foundation of 
what became the global public Internet. 
 
We distinguish throughout this paper between “voice-centric networks,” the 
principal purpose of which is the carriage of voice traffic, both nationally and 
internationally; and “data-centric networks,” whose principal purpose today is the 
provision of Internet bandwidth through peering and transit arrangements made 
among Tier-1, Tier-2 and Tier-3 networks (referred to collectively as bandwidth 
providers). 
 
Several historical factors played a role in shaping the contemporary 
telecommunications marketplace. We have singled out three that are of particular 
significance to the present discussion: the dominant role played by the United 
States in the development of networking technologies; ISP gatekeeping powers 
and the debate over Net Neutrality; and the cultural clash between “Netheads” 
(the engineering and academic community associated with development of the 
Internet) and “Bellheads” (the engineering and business community associated 
with the interests of the developed world’s major telecommunications carriers). 
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U.S. Role and Influence 
 
First, despite the presence of both legacy telephone networks and access to the 
Internet in most countries around the globe, the history that concerns us unfolded 
primarily in the United States - although we also touch on related events in 
Canada. This consideration applies not only to the Internet itself, whose enabling 
technologies were originally developed by American researchers funded by the 
US government, but also to the commercial carriers that have come to dominate 
the Internet’s physical transport infrastructure. At this writing, six of the top 
carriers considered to be Tier-1 providers are American: AT&T - Dallas, Texas; 
Level 3 Communications - Broomfield, Colorado; Qwest - Denver, Colorado; 
SAVVIS - Town and Country, Missouri; Sprint - Overland Park, Kansas; and 
Verizon Business - Ashburn, Virginia (Thussu, 2006, p. 92; Brown, Hepner & 
Popescu, 2009, p. 5). 
 
Furthermore, American carriers do business in many other parts of the world, 
both directly through owned and operated corporate divisions, and indirectly 
through affiliations and agreements with other carriers. Some have made efforts 
to influence policymaking in other jurisdictions, one recent example in March 
2009 being the use of material originally drafted by AT&T in regulatory 
documents prepared by the European Commission: 
 
 43
Six MEPs [Members European Parliament] have taken text supplied by 
the American telecoms multi-national, AT&T, and pasted it directly into 
amendments tabled to the Universal Services directive in the Telecoms 
Package. The six are Syed Kamall, Erika Mann, Edit Herczog, Zita 
Pleštinská , Andreas Schwab, and Jacques Toubon. 
 
AT&T and its partner Verizon, want the regulators in Europe to keep their 
hands-off new network technologies which will provide the capability 
for broadband providers to restrict or limit users access to the Internet. 
They have got together with a group of other telecoms companies to lobby 
on this issue. Their demands pose a threat to the neutrality of the network, 
and at another level, to millions of web businesses in Europe. 
 
The Universal Services directive is supposed to set out the rights of users 
and consumers of telecommunications services in Europe. It should seek 
to guarantee their rights to access content, services and applications on 
the Internet, and to a clear channel connection to the open Internet. These 
damaging amendments seek to do the opposite, and close off the Internet 
by limiting rights. 
 
As previously reported on iptegrity.com, and also in the International 
Herald Tribune, a lobbyist for AT&T has being pushing these 
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amendments around Brussels for several months. The text has been 
widely circulated. It therefore does astonish me that MEPs would so 
blatantly table it. (Horten, 2009) 
 
The disproportionate transnational influence of American-based backbone 
providers has an important bearing on global interconnection, because the wave 
of deregulation that followed passage of the 1996 US Telecommunications Act 
combined with increased concentration of ownership, provided the major US 
carriers opportunities to exercise their market power. 
 
Gatekeeping and Net Neutrality 
 
There are significant parallels between the ability of the Tier-1 carriers to 
exercise gatekeeping powers at the backbone or wholesale level, and the ability 
of carriers that control last-mile facilities to exercise retail gatekeeping powers. In 
the retail sector, North America’s incumbent ISPs enjoy a strong advantage over 
unaffiliated service providers in competing for customers at the application layer. 
Moreover, because retail Internet access rates are not regulated in the US and 
Canada, and there is little or no facilities-based intramodal competition in either 
jurisdiction, the incumbents (both telcos and cable MSOs) are able to manipulate 
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both the amount and type of data traffic initiated by their broadband subscribers, 
3
 by means of the practice known as traffic-shaping. 
 
The most salient parallel between the behavior of Tier-1 providers and incumbent 
residential ISPs concerns the risks posed by gatekeeping to the fundamental 
principle of free, open access to the public Internet and the reasonable 
expectation by end-users that, whatever the nature of their data or purpose of 
their transmission, they will not be prevented from communicating over the 
Internet by willful, arbitrary actions taken by bandwidth providers that are harmful 
to end-users. In the US, there is another factor that ties together wholesale and 
residential gatekeeping: common ownership. Thus among the American firms 
assumed to be Tier-1 providers, three of them - AT&T, Qwest and Verizon - also 
have corporate divisions that provide residential Internet access (DSL over 
copper lines, as well as high bandwidth services over fiber-optic lines; Verizon 
calls its FTTx (Fiber to the home, office or other location) service “FiOS” (Fiber-
                                            
3
  In this research, “narrowband” and “broadband” refer to the rate at which bits of data are 
physically transferred through a network per unit of time, typically one second. This measure is 
known as the bitrate, informally as the channel “speed.” Narrowband refers to the bandwidth of a 
dial-up Internet connection, restricted to 56,000 bits per second (56 Kbit/s). The term “broadband” 
is used to refer to a family of retail access technologies, particularly digital subscriber line (DSL), 
high-speed cable (DOCSIS or Data Over Cable Service Interface Specifications), and wireless 
platforms such as WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access, providing wireless 
transmission of data). The most important feature shared by these platforms is they provide a 
persistent connection, i.e. they eliminate the need to dial in to an ISP for each online session. A 
prominent issue for regulators is the speed at which a connection is deemed to be “broadband.” 
In June of 2008, the FCC raised the minimum downlink speed qualifying a service as “broadband” 
from 200 Kbit/s to 768 kbit/s. In Canada, the CRTC continues to maintain a distinction between 
high-speed Internet access service, which includes speeds at or above 128 Kbit/s and broadband 
service, which includes speeds at or above 1.5 Mbit/s (CRTC, 2009c, p. 213, notes 229, 230). 
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Optic Service), while AT&T operates a residential service called “U-verse” that is 
a mix of VDSL (Very high bit-rate DSL) and FTTx. 
 
Retail gatekeeping issues of the kind just noted were first analyzed in depth by 
Tim Wu in the paper “Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination” (Wu, 2003). 
The principle of Net (or Internet) neutrality rests on the assumption (contested by 
certain interested parties, including many large ISPs) that a useful public network 
- typically understood to be the Internet - should carry all data traffic in a non-
discriminatory fashion, while users of the network, especially the customers of 
last-mile broadband ISPs, should enjoy non-discriminatory access to the content 
and services of their choosing. This principle reflects both the traditional behavior 
expected of true common carriers and the end-to-end design principle underlying 
the structure of the Internet. Although Net Neutrality has been actively promoted 
and discussed over the last three years by a wide range of advocacy groups, the 
FCC and CRTC have only recently began to pay close attention to the public 
interest issues at stake. As evidence for Canada, the CRTC “traffic-shaping” 
hearings scheduled for summer 2009 (CRTC Telecom Public Notice CRTC 
2008-19, 2008b). 
Clash of Two Cultures 
 
A third theme that emerges from the history of network development is what can 
be described as a clash of cultures between engineers who built telephone 
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company networks and those who built networks based on packet switching and 
internetworking protocols, culminating in the Internet protocol suite.  
 
Several attributes of early packet-switched networks constituted a clear rejection 
of basic design principles followed by AT&T’s engineers in the creation of the 
local and long-haul telephone networks that served the continental United States 
for many decades. Telephone networks were designed and built to operate in a 
highly centralized fashion, using expensive, “intelligent” components in the 
network itself to link what were essentially dumb terminals, and to do so in a way 
that guaranteed a high degree of reliability.  
 
By contrast, most of the design work on the TCP/IP protocols that began in the 
early 1970s was based on the “end-to-end” principle, according to which the 
communications control functions of a network are, whenever feasible, pushed 
out to “smart” devices and applications at the edges of the network. IP-based 
networks, including the public Internet, are for this reason referred to as “dumb” - 
i.e. the intelligence is at the edges of the network and the Internet protocol itself 
(IP) does not provide for reliable transmission. The end-to-end design has 
significant advantages over the traditional design of the circuit-switched 
telephone network, such as lower capital and operating costs and much greater 
possibilities for innovation. On the other hand, these advantages were only 
achieved by making certain trade-offs: thus, the high quality of service attained 
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by AT&T’s voice networks was sacrificed for the “best effort” standard that is built 
into the public Internet (Clark, Reed & Saltzer, 1984, pp. 277-288). 
  
These differing approaches to network design were reflected in two distinct and 
competing sets of values and attitudes not merely towards technical details, but 
also towards the social and economic applications of these technologies. These 
differences have been encapsulated in the monikers “Netheads” and “Bellheads,” 
terms which appeared in the popular press as long ago as 1996, in a Wired 
magazine article “Netheads vs Bellheads” (Steinberg, 1996, p. 1).4  
 
In broad strokes, Bellheads are the original telephone people. They are 
the engineers and managers who grew up under the watchful eye of Ma 
Bell and who continue to abide by Bell System practices out of respect for 
Her legacy. They believe in solving problems with dependable hardware 
techniques and in rigorous quality control - ideals that form the basis of 
our robust phone system and that are incorporated in the ATM protocol. 
 
Opposed to the Bellheads are the Netheads, the young Turks who 
connected the world's computers to form the Internet. These engineers 
see the telecom industry as one more relic that will be overturned by the 
                                            
4
  The feuding between these two camps went all the way back to the early 1960s, when 
Paul Baran set out to improve on what he mockingly described as Ma Bell’s costly, “gold-plated” 
equipment - a feeling reciprocated by certain AT&T engineers, who felt Baran simply didn’t 
understand good network design (Roland, 2000, p. 827). 
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march of digital computing. The Netheads believe in intelligent software 
rather than brute-force hardware, in flexible and adaptive routing instead 
of fixed traffic control. It is these ideals, after all, that have allowed the 
Internet to grow so quickly and that are incorporated into IP - the Internet 
Protocol. (Steinberg, 1996, p. 1) 
 
This theme subsequently made its way into the scholarly literature, notably in 
Rob Frieden’s 2001 paper, Revenge of the Bellheads: How the Netheads Lost 
Control of the Internet (Frieden, 2001). The general conclusions drawn in these 
two articles, and the date of their publication, are revealing. The date of the 
Wired article, 1996, marked the beginning of both the commercialization and 
mainstreaming of the Internet. The NSFNET had been shut down the previous 
year (April 1995), followed a few months later by the Netscape initial public 
offering (August 1995), widely credited with triggering broad public interest in the 
Internet and the Web for the first time. 
 
No less significantly, 1996 was also the year that the ISO, the International 
Organization for Standardization, and the ITU-T, Telecommunication 
Standardization Sector (which administers telecommunications standards for the 
ITU) finally abandoned their two-decade attempt to develop and implement the 
OSI (Open System Interconnection) standard. This effort, which had wide 
international support from the telecommunications industry, was launched in 
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1977 and, as explained below, shared a general goal with TCP/IP: to create a 
common internetworking platform for computer and telephone networks that were 
otherwise not interoperable. 
 
In his 1996 article, Steinberg framed the cultural battle between the telephone 
company engineers and those committed to the Internet protocol suite in narrow 
technical terms: the attempt by the RBOCs (Regional Bell Operating Companies) 
to introduce a controversial telecommunications technology called ATM 
(asynchronous transfer mode), a packet-switched protocol for data networking 
that has failed to make serious inroads into next-generation networking 
technologies. Steinberg’s narrative was set in the context of a two-day meeting of 
NANOG, the North American Network Operators’ Group, which had drawn senior 
engineering staff from America's largest ISPs: 
 
The battle over whether to adopt ATM or to extend IP is likely to be the 
deciding fight between the Bellheads and the Netheads. The two protocols 
embody very different visions of communications leading to connected 
worlds with different social patterns, commerce, and even politics. In 
extreme terms, think of the difference between the chaotic world of the 
Web and the rigorously controlled, financially lucrative world of 900 
numbers. The first reflects the technology of the Netheads, the second the 
technology of the Bellheads. (Steinberg, 1996, p. 2) 
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From the vantage point of 1996, Steinberg and many of his interviewees took two 
observations for granted. First, the debate over ATM was going to be the main 
point of contention among the engineers responsible for designing the networks 
of the future: “If the two sides agree on anything, it is this: As ATM goes, so goes 
cyberspace” (Steinberg, 1996, p. 2). Second, it was assumed by TCP/IP 
devotees that ATM was an inferior technology, and that the RBOCs were too 
committed to their legacy voice networks to adapt to newer - and better - 
internetworking principles. Opponents of ATM and the telephone company 
culture with which it was associated predicted - more or less correctly - that IP-
based networks would eventually win out over ATM and the assumptions that 
went with it. 
 
Five years after the Wired feature, Prof. Rob Frieden made a persuasive case 
that the clash of two cultures as described by Steinberg in Wired had led to a 
very different and improbable set of outcomes. Frieden’s overall conclusion is 
reflected in the title of his paper: Revenge of the Bellheads: How the Netheads 
Lost Control of the Internet.5  
 
                                            
5
  The five-year period from 1996 to 2001 was marked by prodigious growth of the Internet. 
For example, in October 1996, the month Steinberg’s Wired article was published, there were 
460,000 sites on the Web. By October 2001, when Frieden’s paper was published, the number of 
sites had grown by over 7,000%, to 33 million (Zakon, 2006). 
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As Frieden shows, narrow technical arguments such as that over ATM were 
eclipsed by much broader regulatory, economic and industrial issues. 
Furthermore, the once sharp divergence between the technologies favored by 
Netheads and Bellheads respectively was on its way to extinction, as the onward 
march of digital convergence pushed all forms of network traffic into the IP camp 
- including voice. And most importantly, the large American carriers, including the 
former Baby Bells, were beginning to exercise a high degree of control over 
Internet access and imposing their own corporate view on how the Internet 
should be allowed to develop:  
 
[This] paper identifies commercial developments in the Internet to support 
the view that the Internet has become more hierarchical and more like 
telecommunication networks, i.e., that both markets and technologies 
have converged. The paper concludes that despite such convergence, not 
all stakeholders have adjusted their perspective on regulation and the 
likely scope of governmental oversight. Such failure to adjust creates 
opportunities for stakeholders, well-versed in the telecommunications 
regulatory environment, to exploit this expertise if, as anticipated, Internet 
services become subject to some degree of regulatory oversight as a 
result of technological and marketplace convergence. Telecommunication 
carriers have the resources and wherewithal to dominate the Internet, 
primarily through ownership of most local and long haul transmission 
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conduits and by owning the largest Tier-1 ISPs that control most of the 
broadband backbone facilities providing Internet data transport. 
Additionally the Bellhead culture has required incumbent 
telecommunications service providers to develop superior skills in working 
the regulatory process to their advantage. The paper suggests that 
Bellheads will outmaneuver Netheads particularly if the revenue siphoning 
effect of Internet-mediated services offsets the revenues generated from 
ISP leases of telecommunication transmission capacity. (Frieden, 2001, p. 
3) 
 
Frieden goes on to cast the rise of Bellhead control in terms of a change in the 
Internet’s structure from flat to hierarchical. The practice of peering among ISPs 
was the norm for many years, not only because that was the tradition inherited 
from ARPA and the NSF, but also because “[t]he relatively small number and 
homogeneity of ISPs in terms of size, bandwidth, subscribership and 
geographical coverage made it plausible to assume that traffic flows were 
symmetrical” (Frieden, 2001, p. 9). The sheer growth of the Internet during the 
1990s, along with significant changes in the US telecommunications policy 
framework, meant a growing gap between small, local ISPs and the large, 
national ISPs, many of which were owned by the Baby Bells and their affiliates, 
and which absorbed or put out of business hundreds of their smaller rivals 
(Cukier, 1997).  
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As a consequence, notes Frieden (p.10), business practices changed at both the 
retail and wholesale levels. The biggest Tier-1 networks, “having made the 
largest investments in response to demand, no longer could rely on governments 
for reimbursement” - a compelling reason to move from settlement-free peering 
to paid transit, while at the same time creating private peering points, in part as a 
response to congestion at the older public peering points. Frieden points to three 
major consequences arising from the decision by Tier-1 networks to move to 
private peering: 
 
1) management, governance and control of the Internet has become more 
hierarchical; 
2) Tier-1 ISPs have leveraged their superior bargaining power to assume 
primary control over the Internet; and 
3) As telecommunications service provider incumbents own most of the 
Tier-1 ISPs, the Bellhead culture and mode of operation have become 
dominant. 
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 Chronology 
  
 1962 - Paul Baran publishes first RAND Corp. research on packet switching, funded by 
the US Air Force. 
  
 1969 - First working 4-computer implementation of ARPANET. 
  
 1974 - Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn publish their early work on TCP, the transmission control 
protocol, specifying a method for linking different networks - internetworking - using 
packet-switching technology developed by Paul Baran and Leonard Kleinrock. Later 
expanded to TCP/IP, more accurately the Internet protocol suite. 
  
 1977 - ISO and ITU-T begin work on Open System Interconnection (OSI) standard for 
internetworking, in competition with TCP/IP. 
  
 1982 - Consent decree initiates breakup of AT&T, which is ordered to divest its local 
exchange operations. In 1984, they are spun off into the seven original RBOCs (Regional 
Bell Operating Companies; also known as the Baby Bells). The decree becomes known 
as the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ), supervised by Judge Harold Greene. 
  
 1983 - ARPANET fully converted to run on TCP/IP. 
  
 1986 - NSFNET launched by National Science Foundation, replacing ARPANET as main 
Internet backbone. 
  
 1991 - World Wide Web becomes publicly available on the Internet. NSF lifts restrictions 
on commercial use of the Internet. 
  
 1995 - NSFNET is closed down; a growing number of ISPs provide Internet backbone 
facilities; Netscape IPO creates wide public interest in the Web. 
  
 1996 - The ISO and ITU-T close down development work on the OSI standard; the OSI 
7-layer reference model remains in wide use for teaching. 
  
 
Figure 1. Internet timeline from Zakon, R. H. (2006). Hobbes' Internet Timeline 
v8.2. 
 
 
Rival Solutions to the Problem of Internetworking 
 
Up until the mid-1970s, communications networks around the world were built 
and used mainly by telephone companies, and apart from some data applications 
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like facsimile transmissions (faxes), these networks were optimized for voice 
traffic and operated using circuit switching and analog technology. These latter 
two characteristics were a fundamental part of the prevailing network design, and 
the two areas where emerging data-centric (eventually IP-based) networks 
parted company with their predecessors. Although operators in different regions 
of the world used different and often incompatible signaling technologies, a 
number of systems were developed and maintained for making them 
interoperable, and for permitting international calling. This work was carried out 
by the ITU-T, Telecommunication Standardization Sector, which coordinates 
international standards-setting on behalf of the ITU, International 
Telecommunications Union. The ITU-T continues to be responsible for many 
different telecommunications standards known as “Recommendations” with no 
enforcement power (Noam, 2001, p. 118). 
 
The most important single attribute of legacy voice-centric networks is their 
reliance on circuit switching. When a call is set up between two points on a 
circuit-switched network, a dedicated circuit is opened for that call and that call 
only, and the full bandwidth originally made available is kept in service even if the 
two parties are not communicating. A dedicated circuit used to set up telephone 
calls allocates a fixed amount of bandwidth: 4 kilohertz (kHz) in an analog circuit 
and 64 Kbps in a digital circuit. No other users can share a circuit until the 
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original call is torn down and the network resources are put at the disposal of 
other users. 
 
If the circuit is cut or disrupted, the call is dropped until another dedicated circuit 
is opened. This design limitation offered corresponding benefits for telephone 
subscribers using circuit-switched networks, especially the quality of service 
(QoS) it provides. In Canada and the United States, AT&T and its sister 
companies, notably Bell Canada (owned by AT&T until 1956), built telephone 
systems that achieved notable degrees of reliability in voice quality, uptime and 
the availability of dialtone. 
 
Despite the benefits associated with telephone network QoS, and the well-
entrenched engineering assumptions behind the design of voice-centric 
networks, the 1970s marked the beginning of a growing unease about 
interoperability among many of the world’s telecommunications carriers, 
equipment vendors and standards-setting bodies (Wu, 2007, p. 6). Established 
carriers were faced with many of the same problems that American academic 
and military researchers had begun to address in the 1960s. Chief among these 
telecommunications problems was how to bring order - and interoperability - to 
the scores of networking protocols developed and supported by both national 
governments and private firms, a list that included Appletalk, DECnet and 
NetWare among many others. 
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In broad terms, telecommunications carriers faced three challenges. One, their 
networks though highly reliable, were inefficient and costly, because of their 
reliance on circuit switching. Two, they were purpose-built, optimized for a single 
application - setting up, carrying and tearing down voice telephone calls - and not 
readily adaptable to other applications. Three, the international bodies 
responsible for standards-setting - the CCITT (from the French: Comité 
Consultatif International Téléphonique et Télégraphique), formed in 1956, then 
reconstituted as the ITU-T in 1993 - were notoriously slow at developing and 
approving standards, a major barrier to innovation (ITU World 
Telecommunication Standardization Assembly, 2000). 
 
The established national telephone companies shared a further challenge. They 
were running production networks, not research networks, and provided services 
that hundreds of millions of telephone subscribers depended on every day. Thus, 
any pressure for changes or improvements in areas such as interoperability had 
to be balanced against the need to ensure that dialtone was ever-present. The 
telephone companies also had to find methods to ensure that calls made in one 
country could be terminated in any other country that offered international service 
- a challenge not only technical in nature but financial as well, since settlement 
procedures had to be put in place to ensure carriers were compensated for 
handling traffic on behalf of other carriers. 
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The global network of telephone company networks, termed the PSTN, for public 
switched telephone network, went through many design and standards changes 
at both national and international levels throughout the 20th century, with many 
of the innovations in switching and routing technologies stemming from work 
undertaken at Bell Labs, AT&T’s R&D division. Two of the major engineering 
challenges facing telephone companies and standards-setting bodies were 
addressing systems and signaling protocols. The E.164 addressing scheme was 
developed to provide PSTN subscribers in every participating country with a 
unique code identifying their telephone sets (known in the industry as CPE, 
customer premises equipment).  
 
It was in the area of signaling that the industry made the most significant 
advances in the efficiency and functionality of the PSTN, advances that borrowed 
heavily from the renegades who had developed packet switching and TCP. 
Within three years of the initial work completed by Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn on 
TCP, the CCITT was at work on a radically new method of signaling (beginning in 
1975). Two years later, the ISO launched a development process that would lead 
to two decades of work on the OSI standard. Both of these projects borrowed 
from work on packet switching and digitization. In the case of OSI, the 
development effort was also increasingly seen as a direct competitor to the 
Internet protocol suite (Russell, 2006, p. 53). The competition between the 
Internet protocol suite and OSI was about organizational ethos as much as it was 
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about the technologies themselves - echoing the cultural conflict between 
Netheads and Bellheads. Andrew L. Russell describes the Internet-OSI 
standards war in the following terms: 
 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, OSI enjoyed widespread support from 
national governments, particularly in Western Europe, North America, and 
the Far East. OSI enjoyed this level of support due in part to the strategic 
position of its sponsor, ISO. ISO was an “official” international standards 
body, meaning that it was populated by representatives from national 
governments who, in most cases, acted on behalf of the interests of their 
national telecommunications and computer firms. ISO’s organizational 
culture—concerned with defining and controlling the future of information 
and telecommunication services on behalf of its representatives from 
national governments—resembled contemporary democratic bodies 
insofar as it featured voting, partisan compromises, and rule-making 
behavior designed to protect financial interests. Such processes stand in 
stark contrast to the research and military orientation of the people and 
institutions that developed Internet protocols. (Russell, 2006, pp. 52-53) 
 
The Bellhead standards culture achieved significant successes. In 1980, the 
CCITT finalized the specification for Signaling System #7 (usually referred to as 
SS7), marking a dramatic improvement in functionality over prior telephone 
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signaling protocols, used to open and close voice telephone calls. The SS7 
protocol suite was of great importance to the industry in financial and business 
terms, because the out-of-channel signaling technology that formed the basis for 
SS7 allowed for the creation of most of the enhanced calling features developed 
by telephone companies over the last quarter century. In the coming years, 
however, telephone companies will be facing ever-increasing challenges from 
Internet-based telephony, usually referred to as voice over IP, or VoIP. 
 
 
Figure 2. OSI Layered Model from Black, U. (2000). IP Routing Protocols, 
Appendix A, p. 218. 
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The single most revolutionary feature shared by early versions of the Internet, 
SS7 and OSI was the notion of logical “layers” in a network, which together form 
a protocol “stack.” The rationale for incorporating layers into network design is 
that the resulting structure makes network applications, functions and hardware 
mutually independent, which in turn affords a far greater degree of connectivity 
and interoperability among different kinds of hardware and software. This was 
the primary goal behind the development of protocols for internetworking such as 
that undertaken in the ARPA-funded research that led to the Internet protocol 
suite. Whereas a lack of flexibility was one of the leading disadvantages of 
telecommunications networks optimized for voice, Internet protocols allowed 
applications to request network functions independently of the characteristics of 
the underlying physical network (Keshav, 1997, p. 69). Each protocol layer - 
which are “logical” or abstract, rather than physical - calls for services from the 
layer immediately below and provides services for the layer immediately above. 
 
A layer does not define a single protocol; it defines a data communications 
function that may be performed by any number of protocols. Therefore, each 
layer may contain multiple protocols, each providing a service suitable to the 
function of that layer. The individual layers do not need to know how the layers 
above and below them function; they only need to know how to pass information 
to them. Isolating network communications functions in different layers minimizes 
the impact of technological change on the entire protocol suite. Consequently, 
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new applications can be added without changing the physical network, and new 
network hardware can be installed without rewriting the application software. 
 
Some confusion exists over the TCP/IP nomenclature and the number of layers 
used by the Internet. This confusion arose in part because the OSI reference 
model incorporates a seven-layer design, while the Internet protocol suite 
comprises four layers, which together cover the functions reflected in the OSI 
seven-layer model. The Internet protocol suite layers are: the application layer 
(for example BGP, HTTP, FTP); the transport layer (for example TCP, UDP); the 
Internet or internetworking layer (for example IP) and the data link layer, 
incorporating the physical layer (for example PPP, Ethernet).  
 
In simple terms, TCP ensures reliable end-to-end transport of data packets, 
through functions such as error correction, whereas IP handles the addressing 
and routing of data packets. The Internet Protocol itself enables packets to travel 
by many different routes to their destination, based on the addressing encoded 
into packet headers. It is a connectionless protocol, meaning IP can begin to 
deliver packets before any connection or circuit is established between two 
communicating host computers. And it does so by encapsulating data packets in 
a way that makes them able to traverse networks of almost any type. The 
 64
corresponding disadvantage is that IP is a best-effort delivery method and is not 
considered reliable on its own.6  
 
As the TCP/IP suite was refined through the 1970s and early 1980s, work 
proceeded independently on the OSI protocol suite. Although they were both 
intended to accomplish the same major goals, and both utilized the modular or 
layered stack design, the two approaches differed in one critical respect. The 
TCP/IP suite was intended from the outset to act as a bridging technology that 
would connect existing network protocols, whereas the ultimate purpose of the 
OSI suite was to eliminate internetworking problems by replacing other platforms. 
The development of OSI generated controversy throughout the 1980s, as part of 
the longstanding feud between the TCP/IP community - the Netheads - and the 
engineering community whose affiliations lay with the established 
telecommunications carriers and their standards-setting bodies - the Bellheads.  
 
Those opposed to the deployment of OSI pointed to two particular issues. One 
was the high costs associated with the goal of replacing existing network 
software and hardware on a massive scale. The other concerned the glacial pace 
                                            
6
  It should be noted that for certain kinds of transmissions, TCP is not the preferred 
protocol, particularly for time-sensitive delivery in which the priority is minimizing delays rather 
than error correction. In the transmission of messages like emails, which are not time-sensitive, 
TCP may resend dropped packets and perform other functions that introduce latency. These 
actions do not affect the integrity of the message and will normally not be noticed by the end-
user. By contrast, audio and video streams, which are isochronous transmissions, cannot tolerate 
delays, meaning it is preferable to lose packets rather than have the recipient wait for 
retransmitted packets. In such situations, the network will use an alternative to TCP, such as 
UDP, user datagram protocol. 
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at which the ISO developed specifications. Nevertheless, even though OSI was 
considered by many in the field to be too complicated and to a large extent 
unworkable, it enjoyed widespread governmental support, including the support 
of the US government. Here is how computer scientist Gary C. Kessler describes 
the see-saw battle in An Overview of TCP/IP protocols and the Internet: 
 
 In 1988 ... the DoD and most of the U.S. Government chose to adopt OSI 
protocols. TCP/IP was now viewed as an interim, proprietary solution 
since it ran only on limited hardware platforms and OSI products were only 
a couple of years away. The DoD mandated that all computer 
communications products would have to use OSI protocols by August 
1990 and use of TCP/IP would be phased out. Subsequently, the U.S. 
Government OSI Profile (GOSIP) defined the set of protocols that would 
have to be supported by products sold to the federal government and 
TCP/IP was not included. 
 
Despite this mandate, development of TCP/IP continued during the late 
1980s as the Internet grew. TCP/IP development had always been carried 
out in an open environment (although the size of this open community was 
small due to the small number of ARPA/NSF sites), based upon the creed 
"We reject kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in rough consensus 
and running code." (Dave Clark, M.I.T.) OSI products were still a couple of 
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years away while TCP/IP became, in the minds of many, the real open 
systems interconnection protocol suite. (Kessler, 2007) 
 
By 1994, thanks to intense pressure from the main Internet engineering bodies, 
particularly the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force), and the ISO’s inability to 
move the OSI suite from theory to implementation, “the grand future planned for 
OSI was on the rapid decline” (Russell, 2006, p. 56). As we will see below in 
chapter 3, Russell’s thesis that the bureaucratic innovations of the Internet 
pioneers were as important as their technical achievements does much to 
explain the long, difficult struggle to find workable solutions to Internet 
governance: 
 
The Internet standards community not only introduced technological 
innovations; it also pioneered organizational innovations such as the use 
of electronic mailing lists to build consensus around technical work, a 
process open to all interested stakeholders, and the free and unrestricted 
distribution of standards. (Russell, 2006, p. 56) 
 
Deregulation and Privatization: the Internet Becomes a Business 
 
By 1996, the two-decade attempt by the ISO and the developed world’s 
telephone carriers had ground to a halt, having finally lost the “religious war” 
(Russell, 2006, p. 56) over a global internetworking standard to the proponents of 
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TCP/IP. But thanks to a series of gradual changes that had unfolded in parallel, 
the American carriers in particular were beginning to consolidate their market 
power - and most importantly for our purposes, move into the data networking 
and ISP businesses. These developments were to have a profound effect on the 
next Internet war: that between powerful corporate gatekeepers and proponents 
of a free, open and robust public Internet. The developments in question were of 
three different kinds: 
 
• The adoption by incumbent carriers of packet-switched, layered networks 
for most purposes, including their traditional voice business. 
• The collapse of the content/carrier distinction as part of the deregulatory 
climate that was sweeping the developed world. 
• And the privatization of Internet backbone resources that began in earnest 
with the closing of NSFNET in 1995. 
 
The development of protocol layers in network design had an important long-term 
impact on the behavior of telecommunications carriers. In the pure common 
carrier model of legacy telephone networks, the core application - local and long 
distance voice telephony - is inseparable from the physical facilities carrying the 
application. However, the separation of the physical and data link layers of a 
network from the applications layer means that many services other than 
traditional voice telephony can be offered independently of the underlying 
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physical network and the carrier that controls the physical network. These 
fundamental technical changes would not have had a significant impact - such as 
creating opportunities for leveraging monopoly control of last-mile facilities - 
without equally fundamental changes to the framework for regulating 
telecommunications carriers, in both the US and Canada. 
 
The deregulatory environment in American telecommunications is widely 
associated with passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Yet the policy 
goals associated with deregulation, and the corresponding reliance on market 
forces to generate competition, predate the 1996 Act. A watershed divide in the 
early 1980s brought radical changes to the market for voice telephony and 
related services in the US: the 1982 consent decree that led to the breakup of 
AT&T and the introduction of sanctioned competition into the telephone market 
for the first time in modern US history. A few years later, Canada made its first 
move away from the regulated monopoly model for telephony to the competitive 
model, not through legislation but the decision rendered by the CRTC in 1992 to 
dismantle the long-distance monopoly then enjoyed by Bell Canada and its sister 
incumbents across Canada. In Telecom Decision CRTC 92-12, issued June 12, 
1992, the federally-regulated telephone companies' monopoly in the provision of 
public long-distance voice telecommunication services was ended (CRTC 
Telecom Decision 92-12, 1992). 
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The US telecommunications market was built, like most, on the assumption that 
services such as voice telephony constituted a natural monopoly, making direct 
competition in telecommunications uneconomic, especially in the local loop, 
where transport facilities constitute a “bottleneck.” Since consumers and 
businesses could turn to only one provider for service, and basic telephone 
service was considered essential, that provider - AT&T in the US - had to meet 
several far-reaching requirements.  
 
Services had to be priced on the basis of approved tariffs; AT&T had to meet 
public service obligations, such as making service available at affordable prices 
in high-cost areas; and treat all customers in a non-discriminatory fashion by 
being designated a common carrier, the scope of whose business was restricted 
to transmission. AT&T was also explicitly forbidden from manipulating or in any 
way interfering with the content or payload transmitted by customers over their 
facilities. Nor could AT&T create or disseminate content, or carry on any content-
related business, such as broadcasting or publishing. In exchange for operating 
under these restrictions, AT&T enjoyed not only a monopoly on public 
telecommunications services in the US, but also the right to operate as a 
vertically integrated company combining basic research (Bell Labs), equipment 
manufacturing (Western Electric), and local and long-distance telephony.  
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AT&T’s monopoly was brought to an end in one of the largest and most 
protracted anti-trust suits in US history, initiated by the US Department of Justice 
(DoJ) in 1974 (the year Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn published their first work on a 
protocol for linking packet-switched networks). The suit was settled in 1982 under 
the consent decree approved by Judge Harold Greene, and finally came into 
effect in 1984. AT&T was ordered to divest its local exchange operations, which 
were spun off into the seven original RBOCs also known as the Baby Bells.  
 
Although the DoJ anti-trust suit was launched to punish AT&T for breaking the 
law, the larger rationale included the overarching policy goal of opening the 
American long-distance market to competition. For voice telephony or any 
service running over a public network, meaningful competition requires that new 
entrants be allowed to interconnect with the facilities owned by incumbent 
providers on reasonable terms. The power of incumbents to dictate or influence 
the terms governing interconnection has had a major impact not only on 
competition in the local loop, but also on the evolution of the Internet as a 
hierarchical structure - i.e. the tendency of bandwidth providers to develop 
vertical relationships in which paid transit has gradually replaced unpaid peering. 
As Eli Noam explains, AT&T’s resistance to allowing local interconnection with 
rival firms gave the US government a persuasive argument for forcing the 
telecommunications monopolist to divest its local operations: 
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The government’s main argument for splitting up AT&T was that it was 
inherently incapable of providing its long-distance competitors with equal 
interconnection to its local network. To buttress its case, the Justice 
Department introduced evidence of AT&T’s resistance to competition 
through its unequal interconnection arrangements. Since regulatory 
requirements did not work in the face of AT&T persistence it was 
necessary, the government argued, and the court basically agreed, to split 
off the company’s local operations, which had been the source of its 
bottleneck power. Thus the resistance to interconnection brought down 
the world’s foremost telecommunications provider. (Noam, 2001, p. 37) 
 
Meanwhile, throughout the entire period during which the AT&T suit was being 
litigated, the FCC was carrying on its own proceeding aimed at modernizing 
certain provisions of the 1934 Communications Act. This was the protracted 
series of investigations known as the Computer Inquiries, which began in 1966 
and were divided into three proceedings, designated I, II and III respectively. The 
various orders issued as part of these proceedings were “designed to control the 
physical layer monopoly power that AT&T’s Bell System and its progeny then 
exercised in providing the links over which distant computers could ‘talk’ to each 
other” (Nuechterlein and Weiser, 2007, p.151). In other words, despite important 
differences between them, the FCC and DoJ proceedings shared the general 
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goal of containing the market power of AT&T, and subsequently of the seven 
RBOCs spun off as a consequence of the divestiture. 
 
Nevertheless, the Computer Inquiries had a more proactive purpose, and that 
was to reduce barriers to the growth of the fledgling data processing industry, 
which made growing use of telecommunications networks (Zarkin, 2003, p. 288).  
Given the vested interest AT&T and eventually other carriers had in data 
communications, the Commission’s task was to promote competition in data 
services, while keeping incumbent carriers from exercising undue preference in 
the provision of such services. In 1981, as part of the Computer II orders, the 
Commission established a crucial distinction between conventional services as 
offered by common carriers, with their attendant obligations, and a new class of 
services that were to be exempt from such obligations - dubbed basic and 
enhanced services respectively. The FCC defined a basic service as a pure 
transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually transparent in 
terms of its interaction with customer supplied information - what is normally 
meant by a common carrier transmission service. The Commission then set out a 
contrasting concept it called “enhanced” services, i.e. services, offered over 
common carrier transmission facilities used in interstate communications, which 
involve the processing or alteration of the content of the message in some way 
by a computer (Zarkin, 2003, p. 294). 
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In Canada, a similar distinction has been created in the regulatory framework, 
though for entirely different reasons. Unlike the US, the Canadian 
communications industries are regulated under two entirely separate pieces of 
enabling legislation. The Telecommunications Act (which in 1993 replaced a 
patchwork quilt of statutes and orders) governs the activities of undertakings that 
offer telecommunications services, which includes traditional services like voice 
telephony and non-traditional ones like Internet access. The Broadcasting Act, 
which last underwent a major overhaul in 1991, governs the activities of 
undertakings that offer television, radio and similar services, as well as an 
important category known as broadcasting distribution undertakings, or BDUs. 
Although cable television was not even mentioned in the 1967 version of the 
Broadcasting Act, it came to play a special role in the promotion and protection of 
Canada’s cultural sovereignty.  
 
Although both these statutes are administered, as in the US, by a single 
regulatory tribunal - the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications 
Commission or CRTC - they have very different policy goals. The 
Telecommunications Act is primarily concerned with common carriers and the 
various protections and responsibilities, such as universal service and 
affordability, typically associated with core telecommunications services like 
voice telephony. The Broadcasting Act, on the other hand, spells out a 
broadcasting policy for Canada that is concerned with social goals and the 
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various ways in which broadcasters are expected to contribute the nation’s 
cultural well-being.  
 
Despite major differences in the Canadian and American policy frameworks, both 
nations are now struggling with how to adapt outdated provisions, intended for a 
world of conventional media, to the post-convergence communications culture 
brought about by digital technology. Indeed, on June 4, 2009, in releasing its 
decision on its new media proceeding, the CRTC took the unusual step of asking 
the Federal Court to settle a highly contentious issue involving the interaction of 
the two enabling statutes and the role of ISPs in supporting Canada’s 
broadcasting system. In the review of broadcasting in new media - Broadcasting 
Regulatory Policy CRTC 2009-329, issued June 4, 2009; this is how the 
Commission framed the problem in its decision: 
 
The Commission notes that, pursuant to subsection 4(4) of the 
Broadcasting Act, a telecommunications common carrier, as defined in the 
Telecommunications Act, when acting solely in that capacity, is not subject 
to the Broadcasting Act. Likewise, pursuant to section 4 of the 
Telecommunications Act, that statute does not apply in respect of 
broadcasting by a broadcasting undertaking. The legal issue as to whether 
ISPs are subject to the Broadcasting Act raises fundamental questions 
regarding the distinction, for the purpose of the Broadcasting Act and the 
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Telecommunications Act, between telecommunications common carriers 
and broadcasting undertakings. (CRTC, 2009a, para 68)  
 
The issue raised here by the CRTC is an allusion to the asymmetric treatment of 
telecommunications carriers under Canada’s Telecommunications Act and cable-
TV providers under the Broadcasting Act – a dilemma that has its origins in the 
use of cable providers by federal authorities as gatekeepers to the broadcasting 
system (which allowed the CRTC to mandate preferential treatment of Canadian 
programming, as reflected in tiers of service and must-carry provisions in the 
regulatory framework for broadcasting).  
 
The FCC and Internet Backbone Policy 
 
The three proceedings conducted by the FCC during the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s - known as Computer Inquiry I, Computer Inquiry II and Computer Inquiry 
III respectively - were to have a significant impact on the behavior of 
telecommunications carriers and ISPs (Cannon, 2003, pp. 188, 190, 199). The 
goal of these proceedings was to determine the extent and nature of federal 
regulatory involvement in the converging computer and telecommunications 
industries, in particular, the extent to which common carriers could employ data 
processing techniques in furnishing services and what regulations might be 
required to manage the changing marketplace (Noam, 2001, p. 176). Computer 
Inquiry I, which began in 1966 and wound up in 1971, focused on preventing 
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AT&T from using its dominant market power to discriminate against newly 
emerging service providers. In this Inquiry, the FCC concluded that it was not 
necessary to regulate data processing services. With limited exceptions, carriers 
other than AT&T were permitted to set up a separate subsidiary if they wanted to 
provide data processing services. A consent decree then in force barred AT&T 
from offering any unregulated services or products (Cannon, 2003, pp. 178-9). 
 
Computer Inquiry II, completed in 1980, was significant for the crucial distinction 
it established between what were termed “basic” and “enhanced” services. The 
main challenge for the FCC in this proceeding was how to deal with the rapidly 
expanding market for data services and the desire on the part of AT&T and other 
carriers to offer such services, now known as enhanced services, by contrast 
with the basic services associated with the transmission of information on a 
common carriage basis (which are subject to the Title II provisions of the 1936 
Communications Act). The FCC ruling provided that telecommunications 
companies were allowed to provide enhanced services but only through 
structurally separate subsidiary companies (Noam, 2001, p. 176). While the 
Commission recognized that it was not feasible to bar AT&T, and later the 
divested Bell Operating Companies, from developing enhanced services, it also 
wanted to protect ratepayers from having to subsidize any new, unregulated 
equipment and services. Computer Inquiry II also deregulated customer 
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premises equipment (such as telephone sets and PBXs), allowing purchase from 
other vendors (Cannon, 2003, p. 185). 
 
In Computer Inquiry III (1985 to 1989), the “basic” versus “enhanced” division 
was preserved; but the structural separation requirement (offering enhanced 
services through a subsidiary) was replaced by other protections related to the 
unbundling of network elements, namely comparatively efficient interconnection 
(CEI) and open network architecture (ONA). These obligations, which applied to 
telephone companies only (and not other kinds of carriers, like cable companies), 
were designed to allow competitors to access particular network functions 
(Cannon, 2003, p. 200; Steier, 1986, p. 1). The purpose of the ONA provisions, 
which dealt with network design and policy, was to prevent anti-competitive 
conduct based on the incumbents’ control of local networks, such as the 
imposition of unreasonable access charges imposed on private networks wishing 
to connect to the PSTN. ONA mandated that the carriers provide competitors 
offering enhanced service access to basic communications services on an equal 
basis and at an equal cost to those enjoyed by the carriers' own enhanced 
service subsidiary operations (Noam, 2001, p. 177). The FCC did not, however, 
define standards for the ONA and the onus was on the carriers to define their 
compliance. Carrier’s initial plans were filed with the FCC by 1988 and were 
continually amended afterwards (Olsen & Tebbutt, 1995, p. 3). Additionally, there 
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was some conflict between the FCC inquiries and policies of the Antitrust 
Division of the US Department of Justice. 
 
One goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act was to open the local exchange 
market to competition with a continuation of the policy of ONA. Sections 251 and 
252 of the Act imposed market-opening mechanisms, such as mandatory 
interconnection, unbundling and resale requirements on the ILECs (Noam, 2001, 
pp. 182-3). It was also expected that the Act would push local carriers into 
broadband technologies, with provisions for ensuring competition and 
deployment of advanced communications technologies. The problem was how to 
persuade the ILECs to give up their monopoly on local markets. The solution 
created by the 1996 Act was that the ILECs were permitted to enter the lucrative 
long distance telephone market only when their local markets were opened up to 
CLECs (competitive local exchange carriers).  
 
Thus, by the end of the 1990s, the concept of network unbundling was 
firmly established in the United States. It was adopted by the WTO, and 
the European Union which provided for unbundled local loops by 2001. 
Though unbundling is a significant regulatory intervention, it had become a 
key tool for governments pursuing deregulatory policies. But it was also 
possible to anticipate its reduction in scope if various network elements 
became increasingly competitive. In time, one could expect the unbundled 
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elements to shrivel down to the last and most expensive to enter – the last 
part of call termination on the local loop beyond the switch, or even farther 
downstream to the sub-loop. (Noam, 2001, pp. 183-4) 
 
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was specifically directed at 
periodically examining if broadband enhanced services were being offered at a 
reasonable rate and efficiency to all citizens regardless of their location. This 
section of the Act inquires into whether “advanced telecommunications capability 
is being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion” (Wolf, 
1999, p. 1). Since passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act there have been 
five section 706 Inquiries conducted by the FCC (FCC, 1998b). In the first 706 
inquiry (1998), the FCC asked in its Notice of Inquiry (FCC 98-187) whether it 
would have the authority to monitor peering arrangements and whether it would 
be in the public interest for the Commission to do so: 
 
What can and should the Commission do to preserve efficient peering 
arrangements among Internet companies, especially in the face of 
consolidations of large proprietary gateways? We ask for comment 
whether the Commission should monitor or have authority over peering 
arrangements to assure that the public interest is served. (FCC, 1998b, 
para 79) 
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Further, this first Section 706 Inquiry asked: 
 
Is it unrealistic to expect companies, many of whom have possessed and 
exercised market powers for decades, to behave like the non-network part 
of the Internet industry? Will interconnection occur, naturally or by 
operation of the antitrust laws, among advanced networks…? (FCC, 
1998b, par 82) 
 
Additionally the Commission asked “what, if any, system of regulation might best 
fit the market for advanced telecommunications capability” (FCC, 1998b, para 
80). Many intervenors responded, including America Online, Northern Telecom, 
PSINet and SBC, all opposing federal involvement in peering and transit. One 
incumbent, Bell Atlantic, suggested that the regulator lower barriers for new 
entrants, in particular currently precluded entrants (Cybertelecom, 2007). In its 
second 706 Notice of Inquiry (2000), the FCC did not address the issue of 
Internet backbone peering. This did not prevent the ILECs from warning in their 
responses that there was an impending bandwidth shortage in the Internet 
backbone – in spite of clear evidence that, with the beginning of the “dotcom 
meltdown,” there was a growing bandwidth glut at the backbone level. 
Subsequent Section 706 Reports (Third, Fourth and Fifth Reports) have made 
only brief reference to Internet backbone providers and related regulatory issues. 
 
 81
Telecommunications Services vs Information Services 
 
The regulatory distinction between basic and enhanced services, as created by 
the FCC, while intended to contain incumbent market power, would come to play 
an important role in enhancing such market power, especially in the local loop. 
One reason for this can be found in the provisions written by Congress into the 
1996 Telecommunications Act, which, despite many changes in the marketplace 
in the intervening 15 years, essentially preserved the distinction between basic 
and enhanced services, albeit with a change of terminology: a 
“telecommunications service” became the functional equivalent of a “basic 
service,” while the newly coined “information service” became the functional 
equivalent of “enhanced service.”  
 
The creation of this class of “information services” in 1996 was to have 
unintended consequences that, coinciding with the privatization and 
commercialization of the Internet, severely reduced competition and forced many 
ISPs out of the retail access market. Under provisions of the 1996 Act, 
competition was to be based largely on stimulating intramodal competition - 
competition between ILECs and CLECs, rather than on intermodal competition 
(competition between wireline telephone carriers and new entrants using other 
platforms, such as cable and wireless companies) (Noam, 2001, p. 54 - 59). This 
was a framework designed for the era of dialup access, in a time when 
subscribers could, by making the equivalent of a voice telephone call, connect 
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with any number of independent ISPs, unaffiliated with the incumbent in control 
of the last-mile bottleneck facilities.7 Unfortunately, what worked for dialup was 
entirely unsuited for broadband: 
 
Although Congress took limited steps to ensure competitive parity 
between telephone and cable companies in the provision of voice and 
video services, the real competition between wireline and cable platforms 
arose in a market that hardly existed in 1996: the market for broadband 
Internet access. Because Congress did not foresee that cable and 
telephone companies would compete in this market, it did not set forth a 
clear regulatory framework for that market - let alone contemplate how to 
ensure regulatory parity between these competing platforms.... More 
generally, Congress left in place the arbitrarily compartmentalized 
regulation of the industry reflected in the multiple “Titles” of the [1934] 
Communications Act. (Nuechterlein & Weiser, 2007, p. 73) 
 
The ultimate effect of some three decades of FCC orders, court rulings and 
lawmaking by Congress has been to place both high-speed cable and DSL 
service - by far the two most important residential broadband platforms - both out 
                                            
7
  Title II of the 1934 Act sets out provisions concerning common carriers, and the literature 
accordingly makes reference to “Title II obligations” in discussions touching on the regulation of 
common carriers. In many such discussions, classification as a Title II service is distinguished 
from Title I services, a reference to the general powers accorded the FCC in the 1934 legislation. 
A “Title II service” is thus used synonymously with “telecommunications service,” while “Title I 
service” typically refers to an “information service.” 
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of the reach of regulation and under the control of the largest ILECs and cable 
MSOs. The importance of how broadband services are classified lies in the 
complex set of rules governing interconnection - and in particular, whether a 
provider in offering a service is required to unbundle elements of the physical 
platform that service uses and lease them to competitors. By classifying cable 
and DSL broadband platforms as information services, rather than 
telecommunications services, such interconnection obligations are vacated (see 
Nuechterlein & Weiser, 2007, pp. 186-87). This is particularly relevant in the 
present paper insofar as interconnection obligations do not generally apply to 
bandwidth providers. 
 
There are several schools of thought in the scholarly literature about the role of 
the FCC and Congress in creating a broadband marketplace that in most large 
American cities can be characterized as a duopoly. One of the most persistent 
criticisms of the Act is that it failed to take into account how much the market 
would be changed by the Internet and broadband technology. The FCC has been 
criticized even more sharply for taking an active role in classifying both high-
speed cable and DSL as information services (Noam, 2001, p. 230).These 
regulatory actions have also been linked with the issue of Net Neutrality, which 
has become increasingly prominent over the last three years: 
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From a regulatory perspective, it is worth noting that Neutrality principles 
were never enshrined in law or regulatory practice. However, the Federal 
Communications Commission did rule that the underlying transmission 
components which were required for narrowband Internet service provider 
service were a “telecommunications service” and so subject to regulation 
and had to be made available to all on a non-discriminatory basis. In the 
broadband era, the Federal Communications Commission faced the 
question of how to classify the new cable modem and Digital Subscriber 
line services. The Federal Communications Commission in its Cable 
Modem Order [FCC 2002] declared broadband service over cable to be an 
“information service” and thus exempt from the telecommunications 
regulations imposed in the 1996 Telecommunications Act requiring local 
end-user level competition. In the Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC 
decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Communications 
Commission’s order in 2005 and the FCC swiftly followed with a ruling that 
Digital Subscriber line service was now also an “information service”. The 
US entered a new regime in which no one knows what the legal limits of 
discriminating practices are, thus priming the Net Neutrality debate. (Lehr, 
Peha & Wilkie, 2007, p. 709) 
 
Much of this debate was centred on the degree to which certain aspects of the 
telecommunications market should or should not have been deregulated, and 
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whether the scope of common carriage was unduly narrowed by Congress and 
the FCC. It is worth noting, however, that arguments about deregulation may 
make unwarranted assumptions - as is the case with the 1996 
Telecommunications Act, passed by the US Congress to expand competition 
from the long-distance arena to the local loop. The 1996 Act appeared to have 
been written to accomplish these goals by deregulating the telecommunications 
industry. As Nuechterlein and Weiser argue, however, the Act not only failed in 
its attempt to achieve robust competition, it also created new and even more 
complex levels of regulation: 
 
[T]he 1996 Act advertised itself as the “most deregulatory [law] in history”. 
Anyone who believed that characterization at the time, however, was 
quickly disillusioned. The Act is not at all deregulatory in the 
straightforward sense of “tending to abolish regulation”. To the contrary, it 
adds an entirely new dimension to pre-1996 regulation by creating a broad 
new set of wholesale rules ... to the existing edifice of retail regulation. 
(Nuechterlein & Weiser, 2007, p. 407; emphasis original) 
 
Following this logic, we would argue that the expansion of statutory provisions 
covering transactions at the wholesale level gave an advantage to the ILECs in 
their battle to use control of physical-layer facilities to gain a competitive 
advantage in services offered at the applications layer. That advantage flows not 
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merely from greater financial resources, but also from the much greater degree 
of comfort Bellheads have with regulation and government intervention. This is 
how Rob Frieden describes it: 
 
As much as they might disparage regulation, Bellheads actually have 
benefited far more than they have suffered. Government served as 
guarantor of a stable revenue flow, even when insisting on long 
depreciation schedules and prescribing rates of return. Regulation 
pervades the Bellhead mindset as a necessary evil, but also as a mutually 
beneficial mechanism for both regulator and regulatee. Regulation offers a 
check against some of the most perverse marketplace forces making it 
possible for Bellheads to live in a safe, cautious and unremarkable 
environment. (Frieden, 2001, pp. 5-6) 
 
In other words, incumbent carriers in control of the physical telecommunications 
infrastructure are likely to have competitive advantages, especially over new 
entrants, regardless of the degree to which any particular service offerings are 
subject to regulation. 
 
In the wake of the 1996 Act, the confluence of several developments changed 
the telecommunications marketplace in ways that had a major influence on the 
structure of the Internet and the provision of bandwidth. These were: the lifting of 
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line-of-business restrictions; concentration of ownership among the Baby Bells; 
and the integration of retail and Tier-1 operations.  
 
Under the 1984 divestiture, AT&T was confined to providing long distance 
service, while the RBOCs, which provided local service in their operating 
territories, were explicitly forbidden from getting into the long distance market 
until they proved to the court that they had opened their local territory to full 
competition. The 1996 Act went further in the direction of lifting line-of-business 
restrictions by allowing both long distance providers and the RBOCs to offer 
service bundles that included both local and long distance services. The dramatic 
shift precipitated by the new rules was accompanied by another, equally dramatic 
change in the landscape: over the next decade, the seven original RBOCs and 
AT&T were reduced to just three regional telephone companies through a series 
of mergers, acquisitions and name changes - most of which had occurred by 
2000.8
 
A milestone was reached in late 1999, when Bell Atlantic became the first Baby 
Bell to be granted regulatory approval for offering long distance service in its 
operating territory. Bell Atlantic’s modern history encapsulates two of the major 
                                            
8
  The seven RBOCs were Ameritech, acquired by SBC in 1999; Bell Atlantic, which 
acquired GTE in 2000 and changed its name to Verizon; BellSouth, acquired by AT&T Inc. in 
2006; NYNEX, acquired by Bell Atlantic in 1996; Pacific Telesis, acquired by SBC in 1997; 
Southwestern Bell, which changed its name to SBC in 1995, then acquired AT&T Corp. in 2005 
and changed its name to AT&T Inc.; and US West, acquired by Qwest in 2000. 
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trends of the era: consolidation and integration of retail and wholesale ISP 
businesses. Bell Atlantic was the first of the Baby Bells to acquire one of its sister 
companies - NYNEX, in 1996-97. It then merged in 2000 with GTE, the largest of 
the independent telephone companies (GTE held a controlling interest in BC TEL 
from 1955 to 2004) to become Verizon Communications. Five years later, in 
2005, Verizon announced it was going to acquire long distance company MCI. 
The merger closed on January 6, 2006, in the wake of which the company 
created Verizon Business, a Tier-1 Internet bandwidth provider. Verizon was only 
one of several US carriers during this period that sought to expand from the long 
distance business to become Internet backbone providers. In 1998 alone, this 
group included Qwest, Level 3, ICG, Metromedia, Global Crossing and Williams 
(Noam, 2001, p. 38). 
 
With the expansion of US influence across the Internet bandwidth business, and 
the burgeoning market power of American ISPs, concerns began to grow in the 
late 1990s about the extent to which US domestic regulatory issues may affect 
the welfare of Internet users in other countries. The United States and other 
interested parties have objected, arguing that global Internet interconnection 
markets should not be subject to traditional common carrier measures - and that 
these markets fall outside the scope of WTO (World Trade Organization) and ITU 
rules on dominant carriers. These issues have been addressed instead through 
bilateral antitrust agreements concluded between the US and the EU - e.g., the 
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1995 Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of 
the United States of America regarding the Application of their Competition Laws 
(Ungerer, 2000, p. 22 note 85). 
 
By 1998, authorities such as Hal Varian were already pointing to the 
“balkanization” of the Internet, and to the close connection between technological 
advances, commercialization and a regulatory framework unsuited to the 
intermingling of telephone carriers and Internet resources: 
 
The Internet already has begun to disaggregate into a hierarchy of 
networks based on available bandwidth, financial resources, number of 
Points of Presence and subscribership. This balkanization means that not 
all ISPs will have direct and seamless interconnection with all other ISPs, 
primarily because commercial interests favor disconnection of lesser ISPs 
unless and until they agree to one-way transfer payments upstream to 
larger ISPs. Market pressures have pushed the Internet toward 
balkanization and so far no legislative or regulatory edict has required 
interconnection like that imposed on common carriers. (Varian, 1998, p. 
A22) 
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Three years later, in 2001, Rob Frieden described a community of Internet 
bandwidth providers that had become thoroughly commercialized and 
hierarchical: 
 
What had been a bill and keep arrangement with no transfer payment, 
became one where funds flowed from small ISP to larger ISP. The Internet 
became more hierarchical when peering remained an option only for the 
major Tier-1 ISPs at private peering points, with all other ISPs now 
bearing a financial obligation to compensate Tier-1 ISPs for the use of 
their networks. In essence a traditional financial settlement, metered 
access charge arrangement replaced the previous rough justice 
unmetered regime. The terms and conditions of such settlements, while 
untariffed and blocked from widespread scrutiny by nondisclosure 
agreements, appear quite like a telecommunications service 
arrangement.... Now Tier-1 ISPs operate at the top of a more hierarchical 
pyramid with a larger set of smaller ISPs operating lower in the pecking 
order. The Tier-1 ISPs have consolidated their control of the backbone 
facilities that constitute the Internet and in the process have converted 
former peers into customers of Tier-1 ISP facilities. (Frieden, 2001, pp. 11-
12) 
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The FCC ruled in March 2002 that cable modem broadband service is an 
unregulated information service. As a result, without FCC regulation, cable 
companies were not required to share their broadband networks. In October 
2003 the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth District ruled against the FCC, 
opening up cable modem networks and in March 2004 the court denied an FCC 
request for a rehearing of the case. However, the FCC and National Cable and 
Telecommunications Association (NCTA) were granted a stay of the court’s 
decision pending a request for the Supreme Court to consider the case. In the 
2005 “Brand X” decision, the Supreme Court upheld the original FCC order and 
the FCC swiftly followed with a ruling in August 2005 that digital subscriber line 
service was also now an information service – not a basic service. 
 
Ad Hoc Oversight of the U.S. Backbone Marketplace  
 
The Network Reliability Council was established by the FCC in 1992 following a 
series of major service outages in various local exchange and inter-exchange 
wireline telephone networks. The mandate of the Council was to study the 
causes of serious service outages and develop recommendations to reduce their 
number and effects on consumers. The Council was an advisory body 
comprising a forum of experts from the telecommunications industry, academe 
and consumer organizations, charged with developing measures to enhance 
network reliability. Since 1992, the Council has been convened under a series of 
changing mandates, reflected in its nomenclature: NRIC I through VII.   
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The Council's Charter was revised and its title changed to the Network Reliability 
and Interoperability Council by the FCC in April of 1996, after the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act. The Council was charged with advising the FCC on 
how section 256 of the Telecommunications Act – Coordination for 
Interconnectivity - should be implemented. Section 256 of the new Act required 
the FCC to establish procedures to oversee coordinated network planning by 
telecommunications carriers and other providers of telecommunications service. 
It permits the FCC to participate in the development of public network 
interconnectivity standards by appropriate industry standards-setting bodies. The 
charter for NRIC IV included assessing the impact of the year 2000 date change 
on networks and studying the current status of network reliability.  
 
In January 2000, NRIC expanded the scope of its work to include Internet 
communications. In March 2000, FCC Chairman William Kennard and 
Commissioner Michael Powell announced that James Crowe, President and 
CEO of Level 3 Communications, Inc., would chair the next term of NRIC V. 
NRIC V was to provide the FCC with advice and recommendations on issues of 
reliability, interoperability and security arising in a multi-provider, multi-technology 
environment:  
 
For the first time since the inception of the Network Reliability and 
Interoperability Council (NRIC or the Council), the FCC included in the 
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charter of the Council the mandate to address the unique issues arising 
from the interconnection of circuit-switched and packet-switched networks. 
(Network Reliability and Interoperability Council, 2002b, p. 2) 
 
NRIC V met on a quarterly basis for two years, consulted with over 200 technical 
experts and established four focus groups: one, to continue work relating to the 
year 2000 (Y2K) date rollover on telecommunications networks; two, to evaluate 
the reliability of public telecommunications network services in the United States, 
including the reliability of packet-switched networks; three, to make 
recommendations concerning wireline-spectral compatibility and the 
development of spectrum management in wireline networks and facilitate the 
deployment of digital subscriber line and associated technologies; and four, to 
provide recommendations that when implemented would facilitate and ensure 
interoperability among public data networks.  
 
Stopping short of recommending outright regulation, the Final Report of NRIC V 
Focus Group 4 produced two outputs: a short statement recommending that 
ISPs, especially the largest ISPs, consider, consistent with their business 
practices, publication of their criteria for peering (i.e. the terms and conditions 
under which they would peer with other networks for various types of traffic); and 
an informational paper discussing IP service provider interconnection, peering 
and transit service (Network Reliability and Interoperability Council, 2002c, d). 
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The informational paper detailed considerations that were taken into account in 
releasing the appended recommendation on publishing peering agreements: 
 
In the United States, the decision to connect, how to connect, or to decline 
to connect, is driven by competitive market forces, rather than by 
government regulation. Because of the competitive nature of these 
arrangements, there is no legal obligation to disclose these decisions, 
terms, or to whom one connects. Decisions about which connection 
arrangement: peering, paid peering, or transit, or a hybrid arrangement, 
are determined by the competitive conditions of the market. Peering and 
transit are established pursuant to contracts between the parties. These 
contracts are usually treated as confidential business information. 
However, many would argue that the conditions under which providers are 
willing to enter into discussions regarding such contracts need not, and 
perhaps should not, be treated as confidential information. (Network 
Reliability and Interoperability Council, 2002d) 
 
In an extraordinary letter, Focus Group IV wrote to Jim Crowe, NRIC V 
Chair, recommending that Internet backbones should publish their peering 
policies. While this was merely a recommendation, it is noteworthy that an 
FCC advisory body even considered the subject-matter as falling within its 
jurisdiction. This recommendation was not pursued and subsequent NRIC 
 95
broadband sub-groups have never revisited the topic. In July 2003, under 
a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Homeland 
Security, NRIC began to work in collaboration with the DHS (FCC 
Homeland Security Action Plan, 2003).  
 
Over the last decade, merger proceedings have provided the FCC with further 
opportunities to address backbone-related issues, in particular those where 
approvals have been conditional on carriers divesting themselves of portions of 
their backbone facilities. This issue first came to wide attention with the 
MCI/WorldCom merger, to that date the largest merger in US history, valued at 
US$37 billion. The merger proceedings began in 1997, and ended with MCI 
being required to divest its Internet backbone holdings. WorldCom was allowed 
to retain its backbone holdings, administered through its subsidiary UUNet. The 
MCI backbone facilities were sold off to Cable & Wireless (MCI, WorldCom 
merger gets green light from DoJ, 1998, p. 1). Prior to the closing of the merger 
at the end of the summer of 1998, both WorldCom and MCI disclosed their 
peering criteria in FCC public statements, but the merged company did not share 
such information freely once the regulatory proceeding was completed. 
 
In 1999, following the WorldCom/MCI merger, the newly formed company sought 
approval to merge with Sprint, a deal which, if consummated, would have been 
valued at US$129 billion and made the new company the largest 
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communications company in the US. In this case, however, the Department of 
Justice and the European Union Competition Bureau indicated they would block 
the merger because of the potentially anti-competitive impact of the merger on 
the Internet backbone market. In August 2000 the merger proceedings were 
suspended (Reuters, 2000, p. 1). The US Department of Justice made the 
following statement in connection with the proposed merger: 
 
WorldCom's wholly owned subsidiary, UUNet, was the largest Tier-1 IBP 
by any relevant measure and is already approaching a dominant position 
in the Internet backbone market. Based upon a study conducted in 
February 2000, UUNet 's share of all Internet traffic sent to or received 
from the customers of the 15 largest Internet backbones in the United 
States was 37%, more than twice the share of Sprint, the next-largest 
Tier-1 IBP, which had a 16% share. These 15 backbones represent 
approximately 95% of all U. S. dedicated Internet access revenues. 
UUNet 's and Sprint's 53% combined share of Internet traffic is at least 
five times larger than that of the next-largest backbone provider. (US 
Department of Justice Complaint, 2000) 
 
In reviewing MCI's merger with WorldCom, the FCC had noted that “the 
difficulties new entrants have encountered in connecting with [Internet backbone 
providers] are likely to continue after the merger. Therefore, we conclude that 
 97
peering is likely to remain an issue that warrants monitoring” (FCC, 1998a, par. 
155). The Bell Atlantic/GTE merger proceeding in 2000 was approved by the 
FCC on the condition that GTE spin off its Internet backbone service, which was 
later renamed Genuity. This divestiture was required in order for Bell Atlantic to 
remain in compliance with its Sec. 271 obligations. The merged Bell Atlantic and 
GTE later became Verizon (Labaton, 2000, p. C1). 
 
In 2006, as part of both the AT&T/BellSouth and Verizon/MCI mergers, the firms 
pledged to maintain at least as many open-peering, settlement-free 
arrangements as existed on the day of the merger closing, for a period of three 
years thereafter (Cybertelecom, 2006). They were also required to post their 
peering policies on publicly accessible Web sites for a period of two years. 
During this time the applicants were to post any revisions to their peering policies 
on a timely basis, as they occurred (Wigfield, 2005). 
 
We turn now, in Chapter 3, to a close examination of the international bodies 
involved in various aspects of Internet governance - and the lessons they may 
provide for the issues of interconnection and data reachability. 
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Chapter III. Internet Governance Before and After 
Commercialization 
 
The goal of this chapter is to examine some of the significant events in the 
history of Internet governance, beginning with the implementation of ARPANET, 
and to describe and assess those initiatives that have a bearing on the 
governance of ISP relationships. As explained below, peer-oriented and 
consensus-based oversight characterized technical innovation and standards-
setting during the Internet’s first 25 years. Since the mid 1990s, however, certain 
crucial facets of Internet governance have been compromised by 
commercialization, as well as by conflicts on the world stage over the role of the 
United States in governance.  
 
One of the fundamental problems in the analysis of Internet governance stems 
from widespread disagreement over its definition and scope among scholars, 
activists, incumbent officials and other stakeholders. Jeanette Hofmann of the 
Internet Governance Project addressed this problem in her 2007 paper “Internet 
Governance: A Regulative Idea in Flux”: 
 
Although the term Internet governance has been in use about ten years 
now, there is not yet general consensus on its meaning. First of all, the 
concept ‘governance’ and its relationship to government is unclear; 
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second, it is unclear what extent and form of authority Internet governance 
has and in future should have. The concept became a popular 
catchphrase around the mid-1990s (Kleinwächter 2004a). According to 
William J. Drake, Internet governance proved to be a “heavily contested 
concept…from the very moment it entered into our collective lexicon”. 
(Hofmann, 2007, p. 1) 
 
In order to better understand the complexities of governance in this context, we 
divide the Internet’s history into two periods, the first beginning in 1969 with the 
initial implementation of the ARPANET and ending in the mid-1990s, with the 
second period extending to the present day. The events dividing these two 
periods are central to our analysis, coinciding with the timeline noted by Hofmann 
concerning the use of Internet governance as a “popular catchphrase” from the 
mid-1990s onwards. These events mark a profound shift in the scale, scope and 
global significance of the Internet, and especially in its treatment by regulatory 
and standards setting bodies.9
 
There was no single set of events in the mid-1990s that formed a natural division 
of Internet history into two distinct phases. For ease of exposition, we can 
                                            
9
  One useful metric of Internet growth is the increase over the last 40 years in the number 
of host computers on the Internet (“host” refers to a machine with a registered IP address. 
Statistics from Hobbes Internet Timeline: 1969: 4 hosts; 1979: 188; 1989: 80,000; 1999: 
56,218,000; 2006: 439,286,364 (Zakon, 2006). 
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summarize the changes most relevant to governance in terms of three distinct 
trends: commercialization, privatization and mainstreaming. 
 
Commercialization. This concerns the uses to which early Internet facilities 
were put. Academic goals and content gave way gradually to commercial goals 
and content. This change was already underway in the early 1990s when the 
National Science Foundation relaxed its AUP (acceptable use policy) and 
allowed certain forms of commercial activity on the networks to which it controlled 
access. Commercialization was taking place while NSFNET was still the primary 
national backbone provider. 
 
Privatization. This concerns the ownership and control of Internet facilities. 
Public ownership gave way to private ownership. Privatization took place at the 
same time as commercialization. Infrastructure resources developed with public 
funds were privatized, in large part (though not exclusively) because of the 
shutdown of NSFNET in 1995, as private firms assumed control of backbone 
facilities and peering points. 
 
Mainstreaming. Use and control by a limited professional community of interest 
gave way to mainstream use by the general public. Again, many factors are 
implicated, but the single most important development was undoubtedly the 
introduction of the graphical Web browser in 1993, which provided easy access 
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to many useful applications for consumers with little or no technical expertise 
(although this crucial tool did not come to wide public attention until after the 
Netscape IPO in 1995). Today, 1.6 billion people are considered to be Internet 
“users”. (Internet World Stats, 2009) 
 
Development of the Technical Governing Bodies 
 
The pre-commercial period of Internet development (i.e. up to about 1995) was 
noteworthy for what Russell describes as “innovative” governance, based on 
peer review, open standards, consensus-based decision-making and a 
willingness to implement technical solutions before exhaustive testing (see 
above, chapter 2).10 This governance style is still very much part of the Internet’s 
technical governance, forming part of the philosophy of the Internet Society 
(ISOC), which was created in 1992 by the US authorities to handle most Internet-
related technical oversight functions. ISOC is the organizational home of the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), 
the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) and the Internet Research Task 
Force (IRTF). The IETF is an all-volunteer group of experts that sets the 
underlying technical standards for the Internet. It describes itself as a loosely 
self-organized group of people who make technical and other contributions to the 
engineering and evolution of the Internet and its technologies. Membership in 
                                            
10
  This style of governance was captured in the oft-quoted phrase coined by Internet 
pioneer David D. Clark as part of a 1992 presentation to the IETF: “We reject: kings, presidents 
and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running code.” See Russell, 2006, “Rough 
consensus and running code and the Internet-OSI standards war,” p. 1. 
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IETF working groups is open to anyone who chooses to participate. Its mission is 
described as follows: 
 
The Internet Society (ISOC) is a nonprofit organization founded in 1992 to 
provide leadership in Internet related standards, education, and policy. With 
offices in Washington D.C., USA, and Geneva, Switzerland, it is dedicated 
to ensuring the open development, evolution and use of the Internet for the 
benefit of people throughout the world. 
 
The Internet Society provides leadership in addressing issues that confront 
the future of the Internet, and is the organizational home for the groups 
responsible for Internet infrastructure standards, including the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Internet Architecture Board (IAB). 
(Internet Society, 2009) 
 
Despite the common origins of the various US research and oversight bodies, 
and their shared predilection for peer-oriented governance, the creation of ISOC 
in 1992 marked the beginning of a sharp division of responsibilities into two 
streams. The first of these concerns the technical coordination of routing and 
internetworking standards and protocols, and the various other matters for which 
ISOC is responsible through its constituent bodies, such as the IETF. ISOC’s 
creation did not, of course, signify that the Internet research community was 
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looking at design, policy and management issues for the first time, far from it. 
ISOC’s primary mission since 1992 has been to provide a more formal, legally 
constituted home for the informal working groups whose antecedents stretch 
back to the initial implementation of ARPANET. 
 
The second stream of technical issues that needed continuing oversight relates 
to Internet addressing - the registry or directory function allowing unique 
alphabetical addresses to be resolved as numeric Internet protocol (IP) 
addresses, operating as part of the Domain Name System (DNS). The DNS was 
created in 1983, so that all device addresses on the Internet could be recorded 
authoritatively in one place, using a structure able to scale to global proportions. 
In 1988, Washington created the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to 
look after the DNS. It was more a loose collection of functions than an actual 
organization - and mostly the responsibility of the highly admired Jon Postel, who 
worked alongside Vint Cerf and other Internet pioneers from the early days of 
ARPANET’s development. As explained below, the informal nature of IANA led to 
a power struggle that resulted in the creation in 1998 of ICANN, the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.  
 
While the ISOC engineering bodies have continued to operate with an open, 
peer-oriented approach to standards-setting, and do so on an international scale 
free of direct government control, ICANN has operated under the scrutiny - and 
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veto power - of the US Dept of Commerce, despite ICANN’s mandate to 
represent the interests of Internet stakeholders from around the globe. The 
debates surrounding ICANN’s role have been particularly strident over the course 
of 2009, because the Joint Project Agreement (JPA) entered into by the US Dept 
of Commerce with ICANN was set to expire in September 2009. 
 
ARPANET and After: Managing the Internet  
 
The experimental work that led to the ARPANET arose during the 1960s from a 
vision of interactive computing shared by a small group of researchers that 
included Robert Taylor, J. C. R. Licklider and Leonard Kleinrock, whose work 
was funded by the US Department of Defense through the Information 
Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) of its Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA). Although their work drew heavily on the research conducted by Paul 
Baran and others on packet switching, it was not directly concerned with 
achieving redundancy in a distributed network (a design concept aimed at 
overcoming the problem posed by having single points of failure in a 
communications network).11
 
Instead, the impetus for creating the world’s first operational packet-switched 
network was to foster a sense of community among university-based computer 
                                            
11
  The original ARPANET was built around network nodes in four different locations: UCLA, 
Stanford Research Institute, UC Santa Barbara and the University of Utah. The first permanent 
link was established on November 21, 1969, while the full four-node network was completed on 
December 5 of that year (Zittrain, 2006, pp. 1975, 1989). 
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scientists and allow them to share resources that were scattered across the 
country, in an economical fashion. Those involved were interested in the 
challenge posed by trying to communicate across network links that relied on 
many different operating systems, software languages and hardware devices. By 
Robert Taylor’s account, the immediate project trigger was his own sense of 
frustration at having three computer terminals in his office, each connected to 
networks that couldn’t communicate with one other: 
 
We had in my office three terminals to three different programs that ARPA 
was supporting.... For each of these three terminals, I had three different 
sets of user commands. So if I was talking online with someone at S.D.C. 
and I wanted to talk to someone I knew at Berkeley or M.I.T. about this, I 
had to get up from the S.D.C. terminal, go over and log into the other 
terminal and get in touch with them. 
 
I said, oh, man, it's obvious what to do: If you have these three terminals, 
there ought to be one terminal that goes anywhere you want to go where 
you have interactive computing. That idea is the ARPAnet. (Markoff, 1999, 
p. 53) 
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This observation about the goal of sharing computing resources for a wide range 
of research programs has been made by others involved in the early stages of 
the ARPANET, such as Charles Herzfeld, ARPA director from 1965 to 1967: 
 
The ARPANET was not started to create a Command and Control System 
that would survive a nuclear attack, as many now claim. To build such a 
system was clearly a major military need, but it was not ARPA's mission to 
do this; in fact, we would have been severely criticized had we tried. 
Rather, the ARPANET came out of our frustration that there were only a 
limited number of large, powerful research computers in the country, and 
that many research investigators who should have access to them were 
geographically separated from them. (Bellis, 2009) 
 
What is clear from these first-hand accounts is that the early Internet developed 
as part of a free, open exchange of resources and ideas among a very small 
peer group of researchers. ARPA-supported scientists were funded to do basic 
research, and the mandate of this particular group was to enhance and expand 
time-sharing resources on large, expensive university-based computers. 
Nevertheless, despite the collegial nature of this research, the ARPANET 
collaborators turned their attention to the need for effective coordination and 
management at a very early stage. 
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In April of 1969, several months before completion of the initial network build-out, 
the ARPANET team launched what would arguably become the single most 
effective and important tool for technical coordination of the Internet: the Request 
for Comments (RFC) series. RFCs are the documents used by the engineering 
community in developing standards for the Internet. They had their modest 
beginning on April 7, 1969 with the release of RFC 1, a typewritten document 
prepared by ARPANET researcher Steve Crocker of UCLA and entitled "Host 
Software." Today numbering well over 5,000, they are the principal means 
whereby the IETF, created in 1986, establishes draft, then final specifications for 
Internet protocols and standards. The RFCs operate very much like peer-
reviewed academic journals, in that they are judged on their merits by fellow 
professionals, according to established criteria (not all RFCs are intended to lead 
to a proposed standard). Although the RFCs have become more formal in style 
and must pass muster with the RFC Editorial Board, they have retained much of 
the pragmatic and democratic ethos of the early ARPANET (Crocker, 2009). 
 
There is no better illustration of the common roots of the two principal “streams” 
of Internet governance than the work of computer scientist and Internet pioneer 
Jon Postel. Postel worked in a full-time position as Director of the Computer 
Networks Division at the USC Information Sciences Institute, which had been 
involved in the development of ARPANET from its inception. In 1988, Postel was 
named director of the newly formed Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), 
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although this appointment merely formalized the role he had been playing in 
development of the Internet namespace, or address system, since the early 
1970s. In addition to running IANA, Postel was also the RFC Editor until 1998, 
the year of his death, and in that position wrote or co-authored over 200 RFCs, 
including RFCs 791-793, which defined the basic protocols of the Internet 
protocol suite. He was deeply involved with Internet governance in still other 
respects, including membership in ISOC and the Internet Architecture Board, as 
well as its predecessors. 
 
Despite the prodigious growth of the Internet and Internet-related research during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the work of pioneers like Postel, Cerf and others 
was largely ignored by government regulators and telecommunications standards 
development organizations (SDOs), as well as by commercial interests - at least 
until the World Wide Web provided a mainstream platform for e-commerce and 
mass media content (and private firms began to provide ISP resources in place 
of publicly funded backbones and peering points). This lack of attention can be 
ascribed to several factors. One of these would certainly be the highly 
specialized nature of the research activities on which American computer 
scientists and engineers had focussed their professional attention.  
 
But it was not just the nature of their work that insulated the Internet research 
community from outside scrutiny and allowed them to make such great strides. 
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The growth of this community and its successes were a function of how they 
communicated, not just what they communicated. In its early incarnations, the 
Internet was designed to enable the sharing of resources among co-equals. The 
Internet’s early end-users were not only peers in a professional sense but also 
part of a peer-to-peer system in the technical sense, working on a system 
eminently suited for distributed, packet-switched networks, and for resource 
sharing within a research community. 
 
The National Science Foundation and NSFNET 
 
The National Science Foundation became involved in Internet-related research 
as early as 1979, when NSF representatives met with ARPA scientists and 
university researchers to develop a data communications network for use by 
computer science departments across the country that had no access to 
ARPANET. Then in 1983, the Department of Defense split off parts of ARPANET 
to form MILNET, at which time the NSF assumed most of the financial 
responsibility for ARPANET.  
 
The NSF became even more directly involved in supporting Internet research 
and operations in 1986, when it agreed to fund NSFNET, which became the 
primary national Internet backbone (and four years later, in 1990, it replaced 
ARPANET altogether). Although NSFNET’s initial mandate and capacity were 
quite limited, it would eventually act as a catalyst in the transformation of the 
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Internet into a global, commercially-based infrastructure. NSFNET, which 
operated for nearly a decade (1986 to 1995), underwent changes on several 
dimensions: purpose, acceptable uses, size, transmission capacity and 
architecture. In its position as the primary Internet backbone, NSFNET effectively 
governed users of the network and determined how they were expected to 
behave. 
 
In the year prior to the deployment of NSFNET, the NSF funded the creation of 
five (later six) national supercomputer centers, which were then linked via 
NSFNET to promote resource sharing for academic research. In keeping with 
this academic focus, numerous university campus networks were connected to 
the NSFNET backbone through a series of regional networks (the network 
topology was thus based on a simple three-layer hierarchy). Interconnection was 
by no means confined to American networks. The first international connection to 
ARPANET, with University College, London, dated back to 1973. Similarly, 
NSFNET encouraged IP networks in other countries to interconnect, including 
several of Canada’s regional IP networks in 1988. As the number of 
interconnecting networks and amount of traffic increased, NSFNET underwent 
two major upgrades from its original 56 Kbit/s channel capacity (equivalent to a 
residential dialup modem): it was increased to 1.5 Mbit/s (T1 capacity) in the 
summer of 1988 and again to 45 Mbit/s (T3 capacity) in 1991. 
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NSFNET was in an unusual position as a publicly funded operation whose 
mission ostensibly precluded commercial involvement. For one thing, it was 
obliged to carry out the work of maintaining and operating NSFNET with the help 
of private-sector partners. It had to make arrangements with AT&T to lease the 
long-haul lines it used to carry data, as it did not own the necessary physical 
infrastructure. In 1987, the NSF contracted with a non-profit consortium - Merit 
Network, Inc. - to build and maintain an upgraded network, completed the 
following year. The consortium participants included the State of Michigan and 
several universities, as well as MCI and IBM, whose role in this project would 
later give them an advantage in pursuing Internet-related business as 
privatization took hold. 
 
NSFNET was also in an unusual position regarding its AUP (acceptable use 
policy), a short, relatively simple document that enshrined the network rules of 
governance. Between 1988 and mid-1990, the US government required that all 
NSFNET backbone traffic be part of initiatives whose chief purpose was to 
promote scientific research and other scholarly activities. The AUP’s preamble 
(“General Principle”) read as follows: 
 
NSFNET Backbone services are provided to support open research and 
education in and among US research and instructional institutions, plus 
research arms of for-profit firms when engaged in open scholarly 
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communication and research. Use for other purposes is not acceptable. 
(NSFNET backbone services Acceptable Use Policy, 1992) 
 
Commercial activity was not banned outright; it was a matter of balance and 
priorities. The only two explicitly unacceptable uses were “[u]se for for-profit 
activities, unless covered by the General Principle or as a specifically acceptable 
use;” and “[e]xtensive use for private or personal business.” Networks and 
institutions that could demonstrate compliance with the AUP were granted 
interconnection rights to the backbone (Halabi, 1997, p. 8). This arrangement 
meant considerable economies to groups allowed access. Rather than paying for 
Internet connections, many eligible entities secured government grants that 
covered the costs of interconnection, as well as the development and 
maintenance of network systems. Until 1995, the NSF Connections Program 
provided access funding not only for American colleges and universities, but also 
for organizations such as libraries, museums and public health facilities. 
 
The very year that NSFNET put its AUP into effect, a number of commercial 
activities got underway that signaled important long-term changes in the role of 
both public- and private-sector bodies. In 1988, the US Federal Networking 
Council approved the interconnection of the NSFNET to MCI Mail, the world’s 
first commercial email system. Other commercial electronic email services were 
soon connected, including Telemail and Compuserve. Email would prove to be 
 113
extremely popular and it expanded in conjunction with the rollout of ISP services 
aimed at the general public. Before 1988 was out, three commercial Internet 
service providers (ISPs) had sprung into existence: UUNET, PSINet and 
CERFNET.  
 
As the networks comprising the Internet grew in number, size and volume of 
traffic, changes of a different kind were taking place in the way individual 
networks were interconnected with other networks across the United States. 
Whereas the NSFNET AUP was concerned with the nature and purpose of the 
packets being transmitted, interconnection policy was concerned with the 
physical and organizational arrangements made among individual networks for 
exchanging traffic. Certain provisions of the AUP left room for interpretation, but 
the document did make NSFNET policy on network uses explicit. Interconnection 
policy, on the other hand, did not receive the same attention and was left to the 
market to decide. 
 
The privatization of Internet interconnection facilities was a gradual process that 
unfolded from inside the publicly-funded research establishment, as well as 
among private firms anxious to take advantage of new opportunities. The 
particular issue at stake for many network providers was whether they were 
going to be able to exchange traffic with other networks on a settlement-free 
basis and avoid paying for transit. Two events in 1990 raised concerns about 
 114
how the interconnection market would function once the NSF withdrew its 
support. 
 
The first of these events, a workshop on commercialization and privatization, 
took place in March of 1990 and was co-sponsored by the NSF. A few months 
later, the organizations that won the 1987 bid to upgrade NSFNET to T1 capacity 
(IBM, MCI and Merit Network) created a new firm, incorporated as Advanced 
Network and Services (ANS). The following year, 1991, ANS was given the task 
of building and operating the next incarnation of NSFNET, now upgraded to T3 
capacity and connecting 3,500 networks. NSF’s relationship with IBM and MCI 
created concern among other private-sector firms about which ones would later 
be in a position to replace NSFNET (IBM and MCI each gave $4 million to the 
NSF while acting as contractors). And indeed, when the NSF discontinued 
funding for NSFNET in 1995, it transferred its network operations to ANS. 
A New Architecture: Network Access Points 
 
The challenge facing the stakeholders through the whole transitional period from 
1990 to 1995 was not simply a matter of transferring control of the Internet 
backbone to private sector firms. Two changes took place in the architecture of 
the Internet that made the transition more complicated. First, other providers 
began to offer backbone services as an alternative to NSFNET. Second, the 
explosive growth of IP networks and data traffic created the need for a new 
access architecture. Under the original three-tier hierarchy, campus networks 
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linked to regional networks and regional networks in turn linked to the NSFNET 
backbone. This architecture was soon unable to handle the demands being 
made on it. Moreover, many networks carrying commercial traffic were unable to 
gain access to the Internet as a whole because of the NSF’s AUP. The solution 
was to create network access points, i.e. switching facilities that allowed multiple 
backbone providers to exchange traffic. Thus began many years of wrangling 
over the design and control of access points, compounded by the conflict 
developing over whether interconnection would continue to be free, and if so, on 
what basis. 
 
As early as 1989, the federal government foresaw the need for exchange 
facilities because of the impending closure of ARPANET and the expanded role 
for the NSFNET backbone. To ease this transition, two publicly funded facilities 
were built in that year: the Federal Internet Exchanges located on the East and 
West Coasts respectively (FIX East and FIX West). This initiative was far from a 
lasting or comprehensive solution. By 1991, certain private-sector network 
operators were not merely concerned about NSFNET’s non-commercial policy. 
They were also concerned that, after assuming full control of the primary Internet 
backbone, ANS would begin charging other network operators for access. In 
other words, ANS would require settlement-based interconnections to its Internet 
backbone (Butler, 2000, p.19). One early response to this perceived threat to the 
status quo was the creation of CIX, the Commercial Internet Exchange.  
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The Commercial Internet Exchange began as a non-profit trade association to 
facilitate public commercial interconnection to the Internet. It constituted the first 
attempt to ensure Internet access for commercial networks on a non-commercial 
basis, i.e. its members were required to exchange traffic on a settlement-free 
basis (Halabi, 1997, p. 12). CIX was formed by General Atomics (CERFNET), 
Performance Systems International (PSINet) and UUNET Technologies 
(AlterNet), after the NSF lifted restrictions on commercial uses of the Internet in 
early 1991. The CIX alliance was a reaction to the uncertainties surrounding the 
status of commercial traffic on the Internet. In 1992, as if to underline these 
uncertainties, the US House Subcommittee on Science, Research, and 
Technology, chaired by Representative Rick Boucher, asked the Office of the 
Inspector General to conduct an investigation into whether the NSF was 
authorized to relax its network AUP. An investigation concluded that the NSF did 
in fact have the power to relax the AUP, a finding reflected in an amendment to 
the NSF Authorization Act of 1993. 
 
Under the CIX model, members were required to offer settlement-free, 
multilateral peering, in other words, agree to a peering relationship with all other 
CIX members. CIX attracted a considerable number of participants, many of 
whom had been ineligible for connection to the Internet because they carried 
commercial traffic. In the meantime, however, CIX became embroiled in a 
dispute with ANS, which had initially declined to participate in CIX, insisting it was 
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entitled to provide access on a transit rather than settlement-free basis. Although 
the ANS transit model was highly controversial, the idea of offering numerous 
access points rather than having individual networks connect directly to the 
backbone had been gaining favor as the Internet grew by leaps and bounds. 
ANS did eventually back down and joined CIX on a “trial” basis, after agreeing to 
abide by the rule of settlement-free interconnection. This change of approach on 
the part of ANS came about after the Congressional hearings in 1992 that led to 
the NSF Authorization Act commercial uses amendment (Noam, 2001, p.64). 
 
CIX was not the only alternative to NSFNET to spring up at this time. In 1992, 
Metropolitan Fiber Systems (MFS), a large provider of network services, built a 
network exchange facility in the Washington DC area, known as an MAE, or 
metropolitan area exchange (the acronym was also used to reference a family of 
high-speed, fiber-based switching technologies - metropolitan area Ethernet - 
deployed in such facilities).  
 
The Washington-area MAE, known as MAE-East, attracted many commercial 
networks seeking interconnection while bypassing NSFNET. Similar facilities 
were also built in San Jose and Los Angeles (MAE-West), and eventually in 
Dallas, Texas (MAE-Central). In 1996, four years after the launch of MAE-East, 
MFS acquired UUNET, which had been one of the original founders of CIX. In 
the acquisition of MFS, UUNet was purchased a few months later by WorldCom 
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(which trademarked “MAE”), and went on to become the world’s largest Tier-1 
backbone provider (Butler, 2000, p. 39). In a foreshadowing of issues that would 
be raised in coming years by concentration of ownership in the 
telecommunications market, WorldCom’s proposed merger with Sprint was 
blocked by the Dept of Justice in 1999 on the grounds that UUNet and Sprint’s 
Tier-1 operations would, if combined, account for over 50% of the US backbone 
market and thereby reduce competition in the sector to an unacceptable degree. 
This action by the DoJ was one of the few systematic attempts by an agency of 
the US government to “govern” the Tier-1 market. As the Complaint explained: 
 
WorldCom has attained (primarily through a series of acquisitions) a 
commanding position in the ownership and operation of the ‘backbone’ 
networks that connect the thousands of smaller networks that constitute 
the Internet, and Sprint is WorldCom's largest competitor in that market. 
(US Department of Justice Complaint, 2000) 
 
Commercialization: The NSF Withdraws and Transit Begins 
 
While this flurry of activity was underway in the private sector, the NSF continued 
to make preparations for its eventual withdrawal from the backbone market. In 
May 1993, the NSF issued a solicitation for proposals (NSF 93-52) to build and 
operate four commercial network access points, or NAPs. They were intended to 
achieve the same goal as the interconnection facilities offered by the Federal 
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Internet Exchanges, CIX and the MAEs: allow major networks to interconnect 
with one other as part of an Internet topology that now included many backbones 
other than NSFNET. 
 
Contracts for the NAPs were awarded to four different telecommunications 
companies. As part of its strategy, the NSF provided transition funding for a 
period of one year to regional network operators that wished to connect either 
directly to the NAPs or to providers connected to the NAPs (Halabi, 1997, p. 20). 
Two of the winning firms were RBOCs (Regional Bell Operating Companies): 
Pacific Bell (at one time the largest of the AT&T operating companies), which 
was awarded the contract for the San Francisco NAP; and Ameritech, which was 
awarded the contract for the Chicago NAP, along with Bellcore, formerly Bell 
Communications Research (SBC acquired PacBell in 1997 and merged with 
Ameritech in 1998.) The contract for the New York NAP, physically located in 
Pennsauken, NJ, was awarded to a division of Sprint, which was at the time the 
only major competitor to the incumbent telecommunications companies, along 
with MCI. The contract for the Washington DC access point was awarded to 
Metropolitan Fiber Systems, which was already running the MAE-East exchange 
point - an award that would become especially contentious the following year 
(1996) after MFS acquired UUNET (Halabi, 1997, p. 9). UUNET, with its 
dominant position in the backbone market, like other large ISPs, now had both 
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the incentive and the opportunity to stop peering with other networks, in favor of 
paid transit. 
 
In 1997, UUNET and Sprint announced the formal end to public peering with their 
backbone facilities. Up to this point, ISPs of all sizes had been able to connect 
their networks at public peering points where they were assured of 24/7 access 
to the global Internet. After the closure of NSFNET, most peering points were still 
freely accessible. By 1996, however, many smaller networks faced a dual 
problem. On one hand, they were being asked to pay for transit. On the other 
hand, tremendous increases in traffic volumes were putting a strain on 
interconnection facilities and causing congestion, with associated packet loss 
and increased latency. The idea of providing access points based on mandatory 
multilateral peering had been popular, but most large stakeholders were 
increasingly opting for private bilateral agreements (Blake, 1999, p.15). The 
major problem arising from the closure of NSFNET was not simply the lack of 
financial and technical support, but more importantly, the lack of interconnection 
guidelines for access facilities. As Butler points out, getting access to an 
interconnection point was not the same as getting access to other networks at 
that facility: 
 
It was and still is relatively simple to get a connection to any NAP, but it is 
an entirely different and much more difficult thing to get other networks to 
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peer with you there. There was much debate on this subject just prior to 
and just after the dissolution [of NSFNET], but no agreements were ever 
reached. (Butler, 2000, p.34) 
 
The push for private, bilateral agreements and more paid transit owed a great 
deal to the fact that the four NAPs funded by the NSF were owned and controlled 
by four of the largest American telecommunications carriers - two RBOCs 
(PacBell and Ameritech) and what would become the two largest American 
backbone providers, Sprint and MFS (acquired by WorldCom in 1996). As Eli 
Noam put it: “Such arrangements began in 1995, partly due to the growing 
congestion of the public exchange points, partly due to the desire to bypass 
these exchanges and partly in order to establish control” (Noam, 2001, p.66). 
The largest ISPs were able to exercise control not only because of their sheer 
size and volume of traffic, but also because they owned access points and often 
the circuits needed to gain access to them.   
 
These developments singled the end of open peering as a universal practice. 
Because private peering was feasible for large incumbent providers and not for 
their smaller competitors, the backbone market by the late 1990s was very 
restricted and had high barriers to entry, factors which put smaller ISPs at a 
distinct disadvantage. As Butler observes (writing about the state of the market in 
1999), private peering had become a “good old boys club”: 
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The large providers have established private peering with the other large 
providers and have effectively shut out the smaller providers from the 
“good” bandwidth. The private interconnects that offer faster transit and 
less packet loss can certainly be considered “better” bandwidth than the 
bandwidth at the NAPs, where congestion results in latency and loss. 
 
A smaller ISP could buy transit on discrete circuits from the larger ISPs 
rather than peering at the NAPs but would then have difficulty competing 
as a peer due to this added costs. This allows large ISPs to exclude new 
entrants and smaller players because private interconnects are certainly 
not offered to all comers and are not really based on any publicly 
disclosed criteria. Over time, it is quite possible that this private 
interconnect space will be seen as anti-competitive and ultimately 
collusive due to these factors (Butler, 2000, p. 42). 
 
The Impact of Commercialization on IANA: Old Functions, New 
Problems 
 
Earlier in this chapter, we discussed the “innovative” style of governance typical 
of Internet management in its early days and which has to a large degree been 
carried over in the work of the ISOC technical bodies, such as the IETF. We 
noted that technical research and standards setting was highly collegial and 
based on open, consensus-based decision-making - an ethos captured in David 
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Clark’s phrase “We reject: kings, presidents and voting. We believe in: rough 
consensus and running code” (Clark, 1992). 
 
The work of the IETF and its sister bodies was given a more formal status with 
the creation of ISOC in 1992. One important technical function that was not 
brought under the wing of ISOC at its creation was IANA, the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority. IANA was more a function than a formal organization (e.g. it 
did not have the authority to sign legally binding contracts). Its home was the 
Information Sciences Institute of USC, where much of the early research on 
ARPANET was carried out, under the direction of Jon Postel. Postel and IANA, 
like much of the establishment that sustained ARPANET and its successors, 
worked on contract with the Department of Defense, via DARPA.  
 
Postel, working through IANA, looked after an increasingly complex series of 
Internet-related functions, in close coordination with other technical groups that 
were formed in the wake of ARPANET. The functions for which Postel was 
responsible were centered on the two Internet “namespaces” - the IP numbers 
and domain names that provide the Internet’s globally unique addressing system. 
These responsibilities are closely linked to the work of the IETF in the 
administration and implementation of Internet protocols and standards. In several 
respects, therefore, the IANA functions were and still are inseparable from 
functions for which ISOC is responsible.  
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In other respects, however, IANA has to maintain complex international 
relationships with other bodies, both national and international, whose interests 
are not always aligned with those of IANA. The most important of these are the 
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), to which IANA assigns large blocks of IP 
addresses for use in their respective regions of the globe. As it is responsible for 
the Domain Name System (DNS), formally constituted in 1988, IANA also works 
in close conjunction with national top level domain (TLD) administrators, as well 
as with a number of different organizations that operate the “root nameservers,” 
the set of servers that hold the authoritative record of all the top level domains on 
the Internet (these are of two kinds: the 248 country code top level domains or 
ccTLDs, and the 20 generic TLDs or gTLDs). 
 
As we have seen, the early 1990s was a period in Internet history which saw the 
beginning of inroads by private firms, as well as the first signs of sanctioned 
commercial activities. In a series of events that closely paralleled the activities of 
the NSF in funding NSFNET and related Internet resources, the US government 
decided to outsource certain IANA functions to the private sector, primarily those 
associated with the registration of domain names, which was becoming unwieldy 
(in January 1992, there were 727,000 host computers on the Internet; by January 
1995, there were 4,852,000). This transfer of responsibilities took place in two 
main phases. In 1991, the DoD outsourced registration services to a private 
contractor; shortly thereafter, the military passed responsibility for Internet-related 
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services to the NSF. By this point, as we have seen, the NSF was deeply 
involved in supporting development of the Internet through its relationships with 
private sector service providers. Thus, in 1993, the NSF contracted with three 
firms to run the Internet Network Information Center, known as InterNIC, to 
manage the allocation of Internet addresses.  
 
The firm that would stand to benefit most from this arrangement - and become 
embroiled in controversy as a result - was Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), which 
had already been contracted to provide domain name services for the military 
prior to winning the NSF contract (along with two other high-tech firms). One 
particular provision of the original contract, as noted in the related NSF press 
release dated January 5, 1993, sowed the seeds for what would become a 
tumultuous change in how Internet services were provided, and as a direct result, 
in the creation of ICANN: 
 
Consistent with FNC guidelines on obtaining reasonable cost recovery 
from users of NREN networks, the NSF has determined that the 
INTERNIC Information Services provider may charge users beyond the 
U.S. research and education community for any services provided 
(Estrada 1993).  
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In 1996, one year after the NSF closed down NSFNET, it instructed NSI to begin 
charging for domain name registrations, a reflection of the continuing 
commercialization and growing size of the Internet. The immediate policy issue 
for the US government was that, by providing free registrations, the NSF was 
subsidizing business and other activities which were not within its purview. 
 
Over the next two years, Internet governance went through a wrenching series of 
disputes. They revolved in essence around the clumsy attempts by Washington 
to privatize the handling of domain name registrations and other IANA functions; 
the controversial corporate behavior of NSI, which was handed a monopoly in 
what would become a very lucrative business as registrar for the .com, .net and 
.org TLDs; and the battle that engulfed Jon Postel and the Clinton White House 
in 1997 and continued through 1998, when Postel passed away.  
 
In April of 1997, as a sign of the growing interest being taken by business in the 
World Wide Web, the number of Web sites passed the one million mark (having 
begun with the launch of the very first Web site by CERN in December 1990). 
Before long, one of the most pressing concerns, one that could scarcely have 
been imagined by the Internet pioneers even a decade earlier, was 
“cybersquatting” - registration of a domain name in alleged violation of trademark 
rights. This interest on the part of business, especially large multinational 
corporations, coincided with the shifts in international trading arrangements 
 127
brought about by the creation of the WTO in 1995 - one of the roots of 
globalization, which was symptomatic of the increasingly international nature of 
the Internet and the Web. In the meantime, the introduction of a payment system 
for domain name registration - in itself a relatively small part of the overall activity 
involved in management of the Internet - generated a backlash against not only 
NSI but the NSF as well (for levying what was found by the courts to be an illegal 
tax). NSI was also creating controversy of another kind through its clumsy 
attempts to “filter” names it felt were inappropriate, which led to conflicts over 
First Amendment claims and counter-claims. 
 
Over the course of 1997, as these conflicts unfolded, a number of actors became 
involved that had not previously had a role or interest in Internet governance, in 
particular the DNS and management of other, now controversial IANA functions, 
several of which Postel was still looking after in his role as de facto “head” of 
IANA. One of these groups was the short-lived IAHC or International Ad Hoc 
Committee, which took up the task of developing a new framework for allocating 
and managing domain names. The organization produced an influential 
document known as the Generic Top Level Domain Memorandum of 
Understanding or gTLD-MoU, which was signed by over 200 organizations. 
While the IAHC itself was formally dissolved in May of 1997, it set an important 
precedent: it was the first broad-based organization without ties to either 
government or private sector institutions that played an activist role in promoting 
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solutions to Internet governance based on public interest considerations. Many 
such organizations would follow in its footsteps, especially after the creation of 
ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, in 
September 1998. 
 
ICANN: the Domain Name System and other Conflicts 
 
The About page of the ICANN Web site provides the following introduction to this 
high-profile body, undoubtedly the best known and most controversial body with 
responsibility for Internet-related functions: 
 
To reach another person on the Internet you have to type an address into 
your computer - a name or a number. That address has to be unique so 
computers know where to find each other. ICANN coordinates these 
unique identifiers across the world. Without that coordination we wouldn't 
have one global Internet. (ICANN, 2009) 
 
ICANN was formed in 1998. It is a not-for-profit public-benefit corporation with 
participants from all over the world dedicated to keeping the Internet secure, 
stable and interoperable. It promotes competition and develops policy on the 
Internet’s unique identifiers. ICANN doesn’t control content on the Internet. It 
cannot stop spam and it doesn’t deal with access to the Internet. But through its 
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coordination role of the Internet’s naming system, it does have an important 
impact on the expansion and evolution of the Internet.  
 
According to many scholars, ICANN is a troubled organization that has not lived 
up to widely held expectations of accountability, international representation and 
transparency. Whatever the basis for judging ICANN’s recent achievements, it 
was born in circumstances rife with conflicting interests, at a time of great 
upheaval across the global Internet. In late 1997 and early 1998, Jon Postel 
became embroiled with the Clinton White House over technical and policy 
changes to IANA-related functions. This dispute, along with the problems that 
had developed around the role of NSI and the domain registration process, 
prompted the Clinton administration to issue what would become the basis for a 
new governance framework: the famous Green Paper issued by the US Dept of 
Commerce in January 1998. This document proposed the creation of a private, 
not-for-profit corporation to take over management of key Internet functions, 
notably those performed by IANA (National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, 1998).  
 
Under the heading The Need for Change, the discussion draft listed seven 
compelling factors behind the White House proposals, beginning with the 
“widespread dissatisfaction about the absence of competition in domain name 
registration.” Other factors noted in the document included the growing conflict 
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between trademark holders and domain name holders, and calls for “a more 
formal and robust management structure.” This was an obvious reference to the 
informal style in which Jon Postel had managed IANA since its inception. For all 
that Postel was the object of great admiration among the scientific community 
within which he had worked so effectively, the surge of interest in e-commerce in 
the business community, along with the concerns of policymakers, meant that 
Postel was viewed with increasing suspicion and distrust. 
 
In some respects, ICANN was supposed to operate like the other Internet 
technical bodies, operating on consensus and being internationally 
representative. Furthermore, it was intended to spur competition in the 
registration business. The paper also made it clear that the US government was, 
after a suitable transition period, “seeking to end its role in the domain name 
system.” Very little of this grand design would be implemented in the way it was 
originally conceived - especially in the matter of US dominance as exercised 
through ICANN. It did not bode well that ICANN was created in secret, under an 
arrangement with the Dept of Commerce, which has always had effective control 
over ICANN through the contract made between ICANN and the Department. In 
2003 the Department of Commerce renewed ICANN’s 3-year contract; in August 
of 2006 the contract was renewed again until 2011, subject to annual review 
(McCarthy, 2006). At this writing, the contract - now called the Joint Project 
Agreement (JPA) - is due for its annual renewal in September, and many groups 
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have called for changes that would reduce or eliminate the dominant role played 
by the US government.  
 
The theme of US dominance is a common one in the literature. In his 2004 study, 
Cukier puts the emphasis on US control of the Internet as exercised through the 
technical functions associated with allocating large address blocks: 
 
Due to its role as the first country online because it invented the Internet, 
the US has special control over certain names and numbers. As alluded to 
earlier, the US has a dominant position in the IP address number space in 
the current version of Internet Protocol, version 4. (Cukier, 2004, p. 42) 
 
Writing in 2005, Morgenstern quoted remarks made by Michael Gallagher, the 
then head of the NTIA (National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration), and the official responsible for ICANN under the Bush 
administration. They are reminiscent of other official statements that assert 
plainly the American intention to maintain ultimate control over ICANN and its 
functions: 
 
[T]he United States will continue to work with ICANN.... However, ICANN 
is the “appropriate technical manager of the Internet DNS,” not the final 
word. The United States will “continue to provide oversight so that the 
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Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers maintains its focus 
and meets its core technical mission” ... While the agency recognizes that 
other governments have “public policy and sovereignty concerns” relating 
to the Internet and domain services, Gallagher said, those interests should 
be focused on the ccTLD (country code top level domains). He said that 
the United States is committed to working with the international community 
to address these concerns, bearing in mind the fundamental need to 
ensure stability and security of the Internet’s DNS. (Morgenstern, 2005) 
 
The IANA Function and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) 
 
The technical work of ICANN has been carried over as what is termed the “IANA 
function.” This comprises overall responsibility for global Internet protocol 
address space allocation; top-level domains; domain name system management; 
root server system management functions; and other related administrative 
functions that were originally performed by the US government. ICANN carries 
out these tasks through management of IANA, which still executes the actual 
technical work (Drake & Wilson, 2008, p. 44). ICANN deals with policy through 
three supporting organizations. These are the Generic Names Supporting 
Organization (GNSO); the Country Code Names Supporting Organization 
(ccNSO); and the Address Supporting Organization (ASO). 
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One of the most common observations made about ICANN’s struggle to achieve 
consensus and stability is that it has long failed to draw a clear line between 
purely technical functions and broader policymaking, such as the proposed 
creation of new gTLDs. As Milton Mueller from the Internet Governance Project 
at Syracuse University has described it:  
 
The “IANA function” involves coordination of the root zone of the domain 
name system with 24 hour-a-day/7 days-a-week coverage. It includes 
receiving requests for and making routine updates of the country code top 
level domain (ccTLD) technical and administrative contacts and name 
server information. This function also includes receiving delegation and 
redelegation requests, [and] investigating the circumstances pertinent to 
those requests.... It also involves overall responsibility for delegating 
allocated and unallocated Internet protocol version four (IPv4) and Internet 
protocol version six (IPv6) address space and Autonomous System 
number space. These functions are crucial to the operation of the Internet, 
and their delegation to the ICANN by the US government is what gives the 
ICANN all of its policy leverage over the Internet (Mueller, 2006). 
 
ICANN’s own mission statements, and the huge volume of commentary on 
ICANN, indicate clearly that its role in managing the DNS, and the issues 
attaching to the two principal namespace functions, IP addressing and domain 
 134
names, have dominated public and scholarly debate over Internet governance. 
The DNS is a critical piece of the Internet’s infrastructure. Moreover, Internet and 
Web address names, and even numeric IP addresses, are familiar to end-users, 
even if few realize that the coordination of the DNS to ensure universal 
resolvability is the primary function of ICANN.  
 
IANA allocates IP addresses and Autonomous System routing numbers (ASNs) 
to the five global Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). These are: for Asia, the 
Asia Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC); for North America, the 
American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN); for the EU and Middle East, the 
Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination (RIPE NCC); for Africa, the African 
Network Information Coordination (AfriNIC); and for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the Latin American and Caribbean Network Interconnection 
Coordination (LACNIC) (Medhi & Ramasamy, 2007, p. 301). Each of the five 
global Internet registries is responsible for allocating both IP address blocks and 
autonomous system numbers within their region. 
 
What has received little or no attention in the literature, or public debates about 
ICANN, is its role in the assignment of autonomous system numbers, or ASNs to 
entities such as universities, corporate, governmental, or other enterprises. An 
AS is a collection of IP sub-networks and routers that presents a single border 
gateway routing policy to the global Internet. This fact goes to two very important 
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points in our argument. First, the debates surrounding Internet governance have 
been focussed almost exclusively on the DNS and IANA namespace functions, at 
the expense of understanding the role of ASNs and routing policy in the 
maintenance of a robust global Internet. Second, little is known about ICANN’s 
policy positions on the role that might be played by ASN management in a new 
governance framework for ISP relationships. The ICANN Web site maintains a 
posting of all ASNs as assigned in blocks to the regional authorities. (Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority, 2009). 
 
Governance in a New Light 
 
In the last several years, a number of proposals have been put forward to make 
ICANN more accountable or effective, by changing its structure, requiring it to 
share authority with other bodies or replacing it altogether. To date, it appears 
that no one proposal is likely to hold sway. This assessment is based on two 
factors: one, the deep reluctance of the US government to relinquish control; and 
two, the inability of other organizations to overcome the very difficulties that 
allegedly plague ICANN. The most far-reaching of these have come from the 
United Nations initiative known as the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS). 
 
In December 2001, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 
56/183, which endorsed a two-phase structure for the proposed WSIS, to be 
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organized by the ITU, International Telecommunications Union (Hofmann, 2007, 
p. 14). The first meeting took place in Geneva in December 2003; the second 
phase took place in Tunis in November 2005. One crucial outcome of the first 
phase was the creation of a United Nations Committee to first define “Internet 
governance” and then make recommendations as to which organization should 
have responsibility for implementation (Drake & Wilson, 2008, p. 3). At the WSIS 
in 2006, the focus on Internet governance was perceived by representatives from 
many nations as an issue that had come about because of serious problems in 
ICANN’s management of the DNS. There was widespread dissatisfaction with 
the fact that ICANN is headquartered in California, and governed under US law 
through the MoU with the US Department of Commerce, administered by the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).  
 
In the wake of the WSIS, the ITU decided to enter the fray with ideas of its own 
on how to adjust ICANN’s role and become more involved in management of the 
Internet. The rationale for giving the ITU some responsibility in this area rested 
on the observation that conventional communications traffic and Internet services 
were converging, to the point of becoming indistinguishable. Despite the sound 
logic behind this view, some commentators have expressed skepticism. Some 
(e.g. McCullagh, 2005) have taken the position that the IETF has done an 
adequate job to date in managing Internet standards, whereas the ITU would be 
inclined to impose a centralized, broadcast-type model on the Internet, 
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particularly with respect to content - an outcome that would not be in the best 
interests of consumers or producers of content. Others, such as Oram, concede 
that there is widespread dissatisfaction with ICANN, but view the prospect of ITU 
involvement in either technical or policy matters relating to the Internet as highly 
problematic: 
 
While the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers has 
bumbled many tasks and exceeded its authority on others, its leaders 
have a sense of the fragility of the Internet ecology. The International 
Telecommunications Union, in contrast, is tromping all over the grounds, 
just in the process of mapping it. (Oram, 2003, p. 1) 
 
The shortcomings for which ICANN is blamed should not, in our view, be allowed 
to obscure the very real challenges it faces, along with other important 
stakeholders. For example, while there has been controversy about ICANN’s 
creation of new (official) gTLDs, serious threats to the integrity of the Internet 
have developed because of the creation of alternative, unauthorized root 
systems. When such systems overlap the authoritative global DNS by using the 
unique root information while adding new pseudo-TLDs, there is potential for 
serious long-term harm. A topical example is the Chinese root system, which is 
not available in the IANA root. As Joe Baptista of the Public Root Consortium has 
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pointed out, 300 million people see TLDs that are simply unavailable in the IANA 
root and therefore to the rest of the Internet population (Baptista, 2009).  
 
Whatever the outcome of situations such as the unauthorized Chinese root, 
nothing is likely to stop the perennial debate over American dominance of the 
Internet, particularly through ICANN. On June 26, 2009, news was released that 
entrepreneur, technologist and author Rod Beckstrom had been named ICANN’s 
new Chief Executive Officer and President. In a New York Times article 
published shortly after this announcement, Beckstrom indicated that he sees 
American control of ICANN as both positive and necessary. Entitled New Chief 
Defends U.S. Base for Agency That Manages Web, Beckstrom calls ICANN the 
best guardian of a “single, unified, global Internet.” Beckstrom added that he is 
also opposed to any attempt to “fragment” ICANN by creating an “international 
subsidiary” of the organization (Pfanner, 2009). 
 
In this same article, Pfanner presents the other side of the debate, in the person 
of ICANN critic Viviane Reding, the European Union media and 
telecommunications commissioner: 
 
[Reding] recently called for a severing of Icann’s [sic] links with the U.S. 
government when the current agreement with the Commerce Department 
expires this autumn. Instead, she proposed the creation of a “G-12 for 
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Internet governance” to oversee an independent Icann [sic]. “In the long 
run, it is not defendable that the government department of only one 
country has oversight of an Internet function which is used by hundreds of 
millions of people in countries all over the world,” Ms. Reding said in May. 
(Pfanner, 2009) 
 
An important outcome of the WSIS meetings in 2003 and 2006 was to create a 
greatly heightened awareness of the issues surrounding Internet governance, 
despite the fact that the participants were unable to reach any significant degree 
of consensus on the term “Internet governance” itself. There was general 
agreement on the notion that the Internet governance debate is best conceived 
as a multi-stakeholder forum encouraging trilateralism, i.e. the participation of 
Civil Society representatives alongside commercial interests and United Nations 
member states. The WSIS concluded with the Tunis Agenda document and 
turned over the Internet governance debate to a new body, the Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF), which met in November 2006 (WSIS, n.d.). 
 
In an effort to restore meaningful debate, the Internet Governance Project (IGP), 
housed at Syracuse University, has brought together several scholars with a 
special interest in the IGF and related multi-stakeholder discussion forums. The 
IGP, whose members include Jeanette Hofmann, Milton Mueller, Lee McKnight 
and John Mathiason, published a paper in 2004 Making Sense of Internet 
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Governance: Defining Principles and Norms in a Policy Context, in which they 
proposed a simple yet compelling definition of Internet governance:  
 
… collective action, by governments and/or the private sector operators of 
TCP/IP networks, to establish rules and procedures to enforce public 
policies and resolve disputes that involve multiple jurisdictions. 
(Mathiason, McKnight, Mueller, 2004, p. 4) 
 
Up to this point, efforts at refining the conceptual apparatus for analyzing 
governance issues have remained somewhat vague and abstract, with few 
concrete applications. This is especially true of international forums such as the 
IGF, where national interests often get in the way of substantive discussion, 
despite general agreement that the Internet is an important global resource that 
should be governed in an international setting. Nevertheless, some 
commentators have begun to shift their focus away from the long-standing 
concerns over the DNS, recognizing that a stable global Internet will likely 
depend coming years on other factors, including the traffic engineering practices 
of ISPs. One such commentator is Jonathan Zittrain, who sees international 
oversight of the DNS in a new light: 
 
[T]he focus on the management of domain names among those 
participating in dialogues about Internet governance is … unfortunate. Too 
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much scholarly effort has been devoted to the question of institutional 
governance of this small and shrinking aspect of the Internet landscape. 
(Zittrain, 2006, p. 1979)  
 
One set of issues which has captured increasing attention in the last three or four 
years, especially in North America, concerns Net Neutrality, along with other 
issues related to end-user access and welfare, including the problem of the 
Digital Divide. In the perspective presented here, we argue that connectivity and 
reachability issues in the last mile deserve to be considered alongside 
connectivity and reachability issues at the other end of the bandwidth scale, i.e. 
among Tier-1 networks. In our view, it is now time to see all such bandwidth 
issues within the same frame of reference - and in doing so, shift our energies 
away from the political issues associated with ICANN.  
 
This change of perspective in no way means that we should confine ourselves to 
the strictly national treatment of Net Neutrality, in line with the traditional 
regulatory approach. On the contrary, emerging technologies and business 
practices point in the opposite direction - to the need for global solutions to global 
problems. This notion has captured the attention of numerous commentators, 
such as Richard Collins, writing in The International Journal of Communication. 
In his 2007 paper, part of a collection focussed on Net Neutrality, Collins makes 
reference to the United Nations Cardoso Panel report, which promotes the idea 
 142
that while the substance of politics is fast globalizing, the process of politics is 
not. The report, and Collins, argue for the participation of civil society institutions 
in “global governance” and “global policy networks” (Collins, 2007, p. 15). Exactly 
which civil society organizations and institutions are necessary for an adequate 
discussion of stakeholder interest is being debated at the Internet Governance 
Forum. A similar sentiment is voiced by Goldsmith and Wu, with more explicit 
reference to the Internet: 
 
The bordered Internet does not imply that ... global Internet rules have no 
place, any more than our bordered world implies that there is no place for 
international law. On the contrary, many aspects of the Net will be 
governed on a global scale. (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006, p.164) 
 
The forces of globalization and the inability of national regulatory regimes to keep 
pace with new communications technologies are blurring the boundary lines 
between domestic and international policy issues such as digital rights 
management, privacy, surveillance and p2p filesharing, as well as end-user 
access rights and the use of traffic engineering practices by ISPs. International 
bodies such as the WTO, trade associations such as the RIAA and CRIA, and 
regulatory tribunals such as the FCC and CRTC now share jurisdiction with 
courts and other national agencies in the effort to resolve Internet-related issues 
such as unauthorized file sharing and copyright infringement. Moreover, the long-
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term trends we described at the beginning of this chapter - commercialization 
and privatization - have created a hybrid form of private-sector “governance” that 
allows both retail and wholesale ISPs to act as gatekeepers in ways that may 
have distorted the bandwidth marketplace.  
 
We end this chapter by noting that in 2000, with the all-important distinction 
between a telecommunications service and an information service having been 
enshrined in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the FCC seemed to take a 
hands-off position on the backbone provider market. As explained above in 
chapter 2, the classification of Internet service as an information service meant it 
was exempt from traditional common carriage regulation. In September 2000, the 
FCC’s Office of Plans and Policy issued a working paper by Michael Kende, 
Director of Internet Policy Analysis, entitled The Digital Handshake: Connecting 
Internet Backbones (Kende, 2000). While not a reflection of official policy, the 
paper in question suggested that the FCC would continue to allow market forces 
to dictate interconnection agreements. One of the arguments offered in the paper 
for refraining from regulation was that both domestic and foreign carriers had 
established a presence in the US backbone market, and it would be unwise to 
attempt to impose regulations on transactions involving one or more foreign 
carriers. This rationale speaks directly to the vexing problem noted above, 
namely that the Internet market does not fit neatly into the jurisdictional 
categories once typical of the regulated national telephone monopolies.  
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The paper argued that the FCC should not require that Internet backbones 
provide interconnection, going so far as to suggest that the Commission should 
not even investigate peering and pricing practices in the backbone market. The 
paper did concede that a dominant Internet backbone might engage in anti-
competitive activities, including charging excessive prices for interconnection, 
engaging in predatory pricing, or discriminating in the quality of interconnection 
offered to competitors. It nevertheless concluded that the five nationwide Internet 
backbones constituted a sufficiently competitive market, and, moreover, that any 
reluctance on the part of incumbents to peer with new entrants into the market 
was no cause for concern because the backbones competed with each other for 
transit arrangements. As a result, the backbones would not be able to charge 
extraordinary prices for interconnection. On the basis of these findings, the paper 
concluded that traditional international telecommunications cost-sharing 
settlement was not an appropriate model for the Internet backbone market.  
 
Two weeks after the FCC paper was released, the ITU issued its 
Recommendations at the World Telecom Standardization Assembly in Montreal. 
It approved a Recommendation (D.50) on Internet cost-sharing which appeared 
to open the door to a governance model for Internet interconnection, intended to 
encourage operators to adopt symmetric peering agreements (Johnson, 2000, p. 
5; Jensen, 2005, p. 3). In this forum, as elsewhere, developing countries wanted 
a regulatory approach, whereas Canada, Europe and the United States preferred 
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a pro-market approach. At the Montreal Assembly in 2000, ITU delegates from 
developing countries raised concerns over an international Internet divide and 
the heavy concentration of Internet backbones and content in the United States.  
 
The anti-regulatory position taken by the world’s developed countries at this time 
did not square with the concentration of ownership and incumbent market power 
that characterized both the American and international telecommunications 
markets. Tier-1 backbone providers deserted public exchanges because of the 
technical and financial benefits of private peering. Internet backbone providers 
also began to change their terms of traffic exchange with smaller networks in 
order to recover their infrastructure costs as quickly as possible. These 
developments helped the largest players consolidate their market positions, while 
closing off peering opportunities for smaller operators. And all of this activity in 
the backbone market was paralleled in the retail market structure, where the 
ILECs and largest cable MSOs were successfully leveraging their control of last-
mile facilities. 
 
In the next chapter, we examine the relationship between this hierarchical market 
structure and the growing issues associated with data reachability. 
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Chapter IV. Risks to Reachability 
 
Peering, Interconnection and Market Concentration 
 
In the previous chapter, we examined a development that took place in the 
United States in parallel with the privatization of the Internet backbone: the 
creation and spread of interconnection points whose purpose was to 
accommodate the rapidly growing number of networks forming part of the public 
Internet. Until the early 1990s, interconnection points were relatively few in 
number and accessible to all eligible networks on the basis of free peering. They 
were public and open, i.e. there was no commercial hierarchy that encouraged 
larger networks to dictate the terms of interconnection or to charge for it as transit 
rather than settlement-free peering. 
 
The US government foresaw the need for more substantial interconnection 
facilities by 1989, because of the expanding role being played by the NSFNET 
backbone. Public funds were earmarked for two facilities: the federal Internet 
exchanges located on the East and West coasts respectively (FIX East and FIX 
West). Within two years, however, several network operators had become 
concerned that once the NSF lifted restrictions on commercial uses of the 
Internet, and turned over operation of its backbone to ANS (American Network 
Services), the new operator would require settlement-based interconnections to 
its Internet backbone (Butler, 2000, p.19). An early response to this perceived 
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threat was the creation of CIX, the Commercial Internet Exchange, a non-profit 
trade association formed to ensure Internet access for commercial networks on a 
non-commercial basis (Halabi, 1997, p. 12).  
 
In the midst of these developments, the NSF contracted for the creation of four 
Internet network access points or NAPs: in Washington DC; San Francisco; 
Pennsauken, NJ; and Chicago (Halabi, 1997, p. 9). For a period of one year, 
extending from 1993 through 1994, the NSF subsidized the migration of 
numerous networks to this new architecture, eventually withdrawing its support 
for the network access points, on the understanding that the original goal of 
public peering had been achieved (Halabi, 1997, p. 20). But other factors were by 
then in play that made interconnection complex and contentious. One of the most 
important was the commercial ambitions of large network operators that had 
become involved in supplying infrastructure for the Internet (these operators 
included, for example, the two RBOCs that had won the right to run two of the 
four original NAPs, Pacific Bell and Ameritech). Another crucial factor was the 
product of the Internet’s prodigious growth: mounting problems with traffic 
congestion, with the resulting lost packets, longer latency times and so on.  
 
The need for more dependable delivery across the Internet prompted many ISPs 
to begin looking for alternatives to open peering (Blake, 1999, p. 15). Until this 
point, public peering made the Internet highly accessible because ISPs of all 
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sizes were allowed to interconnect at carrier-neutral network access points and 
metropolitan-area exchanges. This arrangement was not, however, perceived as 
beneficial by large bandwidth providers with many customers to serve. Some 
began to express a preference for exchanging traffic through private peering 
agreements with networks of comparable size, rather than working through a 
system in which their customers were given no more priority than those of 
smaller networks (Blake, 1999, p.15). As Eli Noam explained it: 
 
In contrast to the public interconnection of NAPs and MAEs, the third 
model of Internet interconnection is “private” and bilateral - peering 
agreements between backbone ISPs to exchange traffic among 
themselves or with smaller ISPs. International, national, regional and local 
ISPs exchange packets via peering centers. A service provider that 
connects its network to peering centers agrees to set up its routers so they 
can exchange traffic with routers on peer networks. Such arrangements 
began in 1995, partly due to the growing congestion of the public 
exchange points, partly due to the desire to bypass these exchanges and 
partly in order to establish control. (Noam, 2001, p. 66) 
 
Generally speaking, network operators use peering coordinators to establish and 
manage interconnections with other networks, and often set up steering 
committees to evaluate peering requests. However, because network 
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interconnection agreements are commercial and may contain sensitive 
competitive information, they are usually confidential, making the full scope and 
implications of such arrangements difficult to gauge. Therefore, despite the 
increasing number of peering policies being made available online, a great deal 
of tension has developed around the problem of transparency, or non-
transparency, in peering arrangements around the globe. Peering policies are 
often posted on network Web sites with a bare minimum of information 
concerning the terms that a network seeking connection must comply with. 
William Norton, chief technical officer at Equinix, called peering as “the black art 
of the Internet” because of the obscurity in which it is shrouded – a sentiment 
shared by other peering coordinators in the NANOG (Telecommunication Society 
of Australia Meeting, July 30, 2004). 
 
Before the privatization and commercialization of the Internet began to take hold, 
fledgling networks found free, open peering interconnection advantageous, since 
they were able to scale up in reach and redundancy - and the US government 
encouraged them by providing ample subsidies. In public peering, a network 
connects to a shared exchange point, where in principle it can connect with all of 
the other networks at that point. After the mid-1990s, however, network operators 
began to interconnect not only at public exchange points but at private exchange 
points as well (Blake, 1999, p.15). In private peering, two networks are physically 
connected in a bilateral arrangement. Private peering is also used at the Tier-2 
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and Tier-3 levels to address the geographical problems associated with how 
many networks can communicate with each other – meaning they must connect 
indirectly through a national backbone provider. Tier-3 networks typically do not 
engage in peering since they operate on too small a scale, although they may 
seek out peering arrangements in order to increase efficiency and reduce costs: 
 
The Internet does not have a purely hierarchical structure. It allows for 
flexibility around the basic hierarchical structure. First, two ISP’s may 
exchange their local traffic without sending it all the way up and down the 
hierarchical structure. This “secondary peering” may be efficient in certain 
circumstances. Second, a participant (ISP, content provider, etc.) may be 
the customer of multiple backbones or ISP’s, a practice labeled “multi-
homing”. Third, there exist isolated instances of transit contracts that are 
not pure customer relationships. (Laffont, Marcus, Rey, & Tirole, 2001, p. 
288) 
 
Nevertheless, most Tier-2 or Tier-3 networks that wish to access the rest of the 
global Internet need to pay to transit on a Tier-1 backbone network (Norton, 
2001, p. 2). This is a departure from the circumstances in which most networks 
found themselves prior to widespread commercialization. The original rationale 
for open peering - known as “sender keep all” or SKA - was based on the high 
number of similar-sized networks. But the SKA model is viable only in situations 
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where the traffic exchanged by two networks is balanced (i.e. symmetric) and, as 
one author put it, where “the cost of terminating the traffic is low compared to the 
cost of metering it” (Cukier, 1997, p. 3).  
 
The shift to privatization made the backbone market highly concentrated in a 
short period of time. The record indicates that by November 1997 the four largest 
US-based networks (UUNET, MCI, BBN and Sprint) controlled between 85% and 
95% of total Internet backbone traffic (Cukier, 1997, p. 5). As communication 
across the Internet has come to depend more and more on a small number of 
large backbone providers, concerns have grown that these providers might 
charge prices above fair market value, especially for transit; practice price 
discrimination; or set unfair peering terms. These potential market distortions 
raise the risk that less powerful national backbones, a necessary part of a 
smoothly functioning Internet, may encounter difficulties in maintaining their 
peering agreements with the more powerful backbones. Similarly, start-up 
services may find it difficult to enter the market because they cannot afford to pay 
for transit (Blake, 1999, p.15).  
 
The issues at stake here have become even more problematic with the 
widespread use of non-disclosure agreements as part of peering contracts, since 
smaller stakeholders and new entrants are prevented from seeing what terms 
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other stakeholders have been able to negotiate. In the words of one 
commentator: 
 
The players with the biggest networks get to call the shots. The largest 
and oldest Internet service providers set up direct peering links with one 
another and share the cost. But smaller Internet service providers either 
have to buy their way in to this old boy's club, at an exorbitant price, or 
send their traffic through congested public peering points. (Gareiss, 1999, 
p. 1) 
 
And as Neil Weinberg wrote in Forbes magazine: 
 
[T]he practice [of private peering] is a stark departure from how the 
Internet worked its first three decades, when networks handled one 
another’s data for free under a communal love-in known as “peering”. It 
threatens to balkanize the Net into haves and have-nots (Weinberg, 2000, 
p. 236).  
 
In recent years, a number of contentious social issues related to the Internet has 
captured the attention of many journalists and analysts, even in the mainstream 
press: redefining copyright and intellectual property (an issue receiving a great 
deal of attention in Canada at the time of writing); articulating the legal rights and 
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obligations of cultural consumers; and defining the role and liability of the ISPs 
over whose networks the sharing or “pirating” of content takes place. While these 
are important issues, they may be distracting us from a deeper and more 
pervasive issue: confidential agreements among large bandwidth providers on 
access and interconnection that are undermining the principles on which the 
Internet was built, thereby putting its long-term viability at risk.  
 
Reachability as a Net Neutrality Issue 
 
Over the past several years, international debates on Internet governance have 
focused on two areas. The first of these is Net Neutrality, which for the most part 
concerns broadband subscriber welfare within the regulatory frameworks 
established by national tribunals such as the FCC and CRTC. The second is the 
set of transnational issues associated with the Domain Name System (DNS) and 
its management by ICANN. On the other hand, little attention has been paid to 
the politics of interconnection and the various ways in which data reachability is 
being compromised by large bandwidth providers.  
 
As it turns out, the principle of Net Neutrality as it applies to the behavior of Tier-3 
(i.e. retail) ISPs has a great deal in common with the goal of data reachability as 
it applies to Tier-1 backbone providers. In both cases, the policy and social 
principles at stake spring from widespread concerns about the impact on 
consumer welfare of privatization, concentration of ownership, and regulatory 
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reliance on market forces and managed competition. In both cases, the 
perceived risk is that the ungoverned, unilateral and unpredictable behavior of 
large networks will prevent end-users from enjoying undisturbed access to the 
entire global Internet – that is to say, undisturbed by undue discrimination on the 
part of ISPs supplying access to the Internet on a commercial basis. Moreover, 
many of the traffic management practices applied by ISPs at the retail level that 
may discriminate against particular applications, Web sites or users, are the 
same practices Tier-1 backbone ISPs apply to manipulate or interfere with the 
traffic carried by other ISPs, whether Tier-1 or lower down the hierarchy. Despite 
these apparent similarities, however, Net Neutrality remains a controversial 
concept, one that resists easy definition and stirs vigorous disagreement even 
among its proponents.  
 
Columbia law professor Tim Wu is often credited with introducing the term 
“network neutrality” in academic circles through his paper “Network Neutrality, 
Broadband Discrimination,” written in 2002 (Wu, 2003). Wu’s early formulations 
of the principle emphasized the benefits of a neutral public network, borrowing 
from the end-to-end principle inherent in the design of the Internet, and in a more 
general sense from the obligations associated with acting as a common carrier. 
As the debate on Net Neutrality moved into the public domain (the mainstream 
press paid little attention to the topic before 2006), the idea that ISPs should 
never discriminate became more nuanced and open to interpretation. Wu and 
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others have revised their positions, noting for one thing that the Internet has 
never been entirely neutral. Graham Longford describes Wu’s more recent 
thinking in the following way:  
 
Wu proposes a set of criteria for distinguishing between permissible and 
prohibited forms and grounds of discrimination…. Wu makes a distinction 
between “capacity-based” and “content-based” discrimination. “Capacity 
based” discrimination involves placing limits on the amount of traffic users 
can generate at a given time, without regard to the content of said traffic, 
while “content-based” discrimination involves blocking, degrading, or, 
alternatively, enhancing, users’ access to certain content for commercial 
reasons. (Longford, 2007, p. 46) 
 
In 2006, the debate became more public and vociferous. A large coalition of 
bloggers, educators and consumer-oriented advocacy groups, including Free 
Press, the American Library Association, Consumers Union and MoveOn, 
created a grassroots coalition called the Save the Internet campaign. In the 
space of just two months the coalition collected over a million signatures on a 
petition calling for network neutrality regulations and delivered it to Congress. 
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Support for Net Neutrality in some form has also been voiced by content 
providers such as Google, eBay, Microsoft, Yahoo! and Amazon.12  
 
During this time, a number of American and Canadian incumbent 
telecommunications carriers and cable operators argued against the principle of 
Net Neutrality and especially against the idea of having regulations or legislation 
brought into force that would govern their behavior as ISPs. Some of these firms, 
notably AT&T and Verizon, funded It's our Net and Hands off the Internet, 
dubbed “Astroturf” advocacy groups because, despite accepting money from the 
carriers, they tried to create the appearance of grass-roots support for the 
carriers in their fight against Net Neutrality.  
 
In the last three years, several bills have been introduced in both the US 
Congress and Canadian Parliament with a view to enshrining protections for Net 
Neutrality and residential broadband consumers. One of the most recent such 
bills is the Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2009, introduced in July 2009 by 
Congressman Ed Markey (D-MA), intended to “establish a national broadband 
policy, safeguard consumer rights, spur investment and innovation,” among other 
things. Other bills were introduced as far back as 2006, including COPE, the 
                                            
12
  One of the first systematic analyses of the use of traffic-shaping by an ISP arose from a 
complaint filed in 2007 by Free Press with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
alleging that Comcast Corp. had engaged in discriminatory conduct that violated the FCC’s 
Internet Policy Statement. The FCC Order finding against Comcast was released August 20, 
2008. At this writing, Comcast has filed suit against the FCC in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, contending that the FCC order had no basis in law. 
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Communications Opportunity, Promotion and Enhancement Act of 2006 (HR 
5252), and the Internet Non-Discrimination Act of 2006 (S. 2360). And in an 
unusual move for a state government, New York State has established Net 
Neutrality as a telecommunications standard within its jurisdiction (New York 
Department of State, 2009). 
 
Wu stated in his 2003 paper that regulations governing Internet access networks 
must allow broadband operators to make reasonable tradeoffs between the 
requirements of different applications. This challenge to ISPs, and their critics, 
has complicated the neutrality debate, since it rests on the assumption that there 
are some intrusive actions made necessary by good network management 
practices, while there are others, based for example on undue preference, which 
should be forbidden: 
 
[B]roadband operators should have full freedom to “police what they own” 
(the local network) while restrictions based on inter-network indicia should 
be viewed with suspicion.... [T]he concept of a total ban on network 
discrimination is counterproductive. Rather, we need distinguish between 
forbidden grounds of discrimination, those that distort secondary 
markets, and permissible grounds, those necessary to network 
administration and harm to the network. (Wu, 2003, pp. 168, 170) 
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Most of the attention paid to the Net Neutrality debate has been garnered in 
Canada and the United States, for reasons related to telecommunications 
infrastructure, digital convergence, and vertical and horizontal integration.  
These issues are reflected in recent attempts by regulators to provide operational 
distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable ISP practices, as in the CRTC 
proceeding conducted in 2009 on ISP traffic management (CRTC, 2008b). The 
Commission has been examining the behavior and role of Canada’s ISPs in 
several proceedings, including that concerning broadcasting in new media 
(CRTC, 2009a).13 For several years now, engineers have been trying in a 
parallel effort to gauge the effects of technical and policy decisions made by 
network operators. Many such decisions have a direct impact on the reachability 
of Internet service, i.e. the ability of a network to establish and maintain 
connectivity so that traffic is successfully transmitted. Network engineers use the 
term “path robustness” to refer to persistence of connectivity between networks, 
a critical consideration in the arguments presented in this research.  
 
In 2003, for example, an analysis was presented to an IEEE workshop (Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) on Internet applications in which the 
authors attempted to gauge the impact of interconnection failures. The authors 
                                            
13
  As part of its findings in the June 4 new media broadcasting decision (Broadcasting 
Regulatory Policy CRTC 2009-329), the CRTC elected to refer to the Federal Court of Appeal 
“the question of whether ISPs, when they provide access to broadcasting content, are 
broadcasting undertakings within the meaning of the Broadcasting Act and are thus subject to the 
New Media Exemption Order” (para 69). The Commission filed its reference on July 28, 2009. 
The court’s decision, if affirmative, could bring significant changes to how ISPs are regulated in 
Canada. 
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reported on observations made during one week of Internet activity using BGP 
tables14 from three different, internationally well-connected locations. They 
defined reachability “as a measure of path robustness over time, and thus as a 
significant measure of the general quality of the infrastructure” (Salido, Nakahara 
& Wang, 2003, p. 1). The authors were interested in analyzing the end-user’s 
experience of the Internet as a function of the reachability or quality of 
connections between the end-user and other locations on the Internet. The study 
concluded that single, relatively small incidences of networks failing to 
interconnect had major repercussions for Internet reachability and thus for end-
users: 
 
While overall trends are very stable, it is important to point out that 
individual incidents were responsible for a good deal of the major 
observed reductions in reachability. While small in percentage, these 
incidents are significant in the sense that they affected mostly Internet 
service providers and telecom companies. (Salido, Nakahara, Wang, 
2003, p. 8) 
 
Moreover, while the authors acknowledged that reasons for unreachability 
included misconfiguration and human error, they wrote a section entitled Policy 
                                            
14
  A routing table at a node provides a look up entry for each destination by identifying an 
outgoing link/interface or path. (Medhi & Ramasamy, 2007, p. 59) Also see page 24. 
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Effects, in which they noted that arbitrary network policies also have 
repercussions for the end-user: 
 
Border Gateway Protocol assumes that the Internet is an arbitrarily 
interconnected set of autonomous systems. Hence, it allows each AS to 
independently formulate its own routing policies, and it allows these to 
override distance metrics in favor of policy concerns. BGP regards issues 
such as, which routes to accept from a neighbor and the preference with 
which those routes should be treated, as a local decision based on its 
routing policy. An important part of this routing policy is to decide which 
set of paths should be advertised to each BGP neighbor. The decision on 
which routes to accept from and advertise to various BGP neighbors, has 
a profound impact on what traffic crosses a network, and hence affects 
reachability.... [T]herefore, routing policy plays an important role in 
reachability determination. (Salido, Nakahara & Wang, 2003, p. 8) 
 
More recently, researchers at the University of Washington’s Department of 
Computer Science and Engineering have been using a software system dubbed 
Hubble to track reachability problems. Hubble monitors Internet transmission 
activity on a continuous basis to identify situations in which routes exist to a given 
destination but traffic is unable to reach the destination in question. For purposes 
of this project, reachability is defined as follows: 
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Global reachability - when every address is reachable from every other 
address - is the most basic goal of the Internet. It was specified as a top 
priority in the original design of the Internet protocols, ahead of high 
performance or good quality of service, with the philosophy that “there is 
only one failure, and it is complete partition”. (Anderson, Katz-Bassett, 
Krishnamurthy & Madhyastha, 2008, p. 1) 
 
As we have seen from recent policy and legislative initiatives in Canada and the 
US, it is no easy task to reconcile the interests of end-users with those of the 
ISPs that supply them with last-mile bandwidth. This problem is compounded by 
concentration of ownership in the ISP business, which confers significant market 
power on the industry leaders. In Canada, where 500 companies are counted as 
Internet access providers, the top five companies captured 76% of total access 
revenues in 2008, namely, Bell Canada, TELUS Communications Corp, Rogers 
Communications Inc., Vidéotron Ltd., and Shaw Cablesystems G.P. and their 
affiliates (CRTC, 2009b, pp. 213, 214). Some traffic management practices are 
intended to improve the overall quality of service on a network, by reducing spam 
and malware, as well as protecting end-users from aggressive actions like 
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks. 
 
But as testimony at the CRTC’s 2009 proceeding on ISP practices has shown, 
there is a fine line between this kind of initiative and ISP efforts to block or reduce 
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certain kinds of traffic in order to reduce what they allege is otherwise 
unmanageable congestion. Many of the large ISPs claim that they interfere with 
certain transmissions in order to improve the quality of service for customers – 
even though such actions inevitably mean that some customers will experience 
an unwanted failure in reachability as a result.   
 
The problem of data unreachability, which now extends from the last mile to the 
Tier-1 level, is compounded by other factors, chief among these being the wall of 
secrecy behind which ISPs operate. Moreover, as we now discuss in detail, ISPs 
have access to an ever-expanding set of tools with which to manage traffic – and 
thus more ways to put data reachability at risk. 
 
Traffic Management Practices Affecting Reachability 
 
The traffic management practices of concern to us in this paper are packet 
filtering, traffic-shaping, autonomous system or AS list filtering, and de-peering. 
We begin with a brief definition of each: 
 
• Packet filtering, sometimes termed “blackholing,” refers to the rejection of 
a single IP address or a number of IP addresses (McPherson, Sangli & 
White, 2005, p. 84, 185). 
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• Traffic-shaping is the imposition of a delay to a set of packets according 
to some convention or policy established or agreed to by a network 
operator. 
• Autonomous system (AS) list filtering is the suppression of certain 
routing options by removing one or more AS numbers from the routing 
path (Keshav, 1997, p. 342). 
• De-peering is the action of severing the physical interconnection between 
two peered networks or autonomous systems, such that no traffic can flow 
from one to the other. 
 
These practices are not the sole means by which network operators can 
precipitate data unreachability. But they are significant in that they scale from the 
barely detectable dropping of packets, all the way to severing major network 
connections, with the potential to disrupt thousands or even millions of end-
users.  
Packet Filtering 
 
Filtering packets was introduced as a traffic management practice relatively early 
in the history of the modern Internet. One of the first major vendors to make 
equipment explicitly designed to manipulate data routing was Cisco Systems, 
which began promoting this idea in 1999:  
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In 1999, Cisco Systems issued a technical white paper, which described a 
new router that the company planned to sell to cable broadband 
providers.... In plain English, the broadband provider could inspect the 
packets flowing to and from a customer, and decide which packets would 
go through faster and more reliably, and which would slow down or be 
lost. Its engineering purpose was to improve quality of service. However, it 
could readily be used to make it harder for individual users to receive 
information that they want to subscribe to, and easier for them to receive 
information from sites preferred by the provider—for example, the 
provider’s own site, or sites of those who pay the cable operator for using 
this function to help “encourage” users to adopt their services. There are 
no reports of broadband providers using these capabilities systematically. 
But occasional events, such as when Canada’s second largest 
telecommunications company blocked access for all its subscribers and 
those of smaller Internet service providers that relied on its network to the 
website of the Telecommunications Workers Union in 2005, suggest that 
the concern is far from imaginary. (Benkler, 2006, p. 147) 
 
Cisco’s interest in developing and selling networking equipment that can manage 
data traffic has continued over the last decade: 
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Moreover, prioritizing and inspecting traffic (for security reasons) were 
important tools for building new equipment markets working from the 
router out through the rest of the network. Cisco, for example, is buying 
into service application companies that feature traffic prioritization and 
security schemes based on capabilities installed in Cisco routers. 
(Aronson & Cowhey, 2009, p. 114) 
 
Benkler’s reference above to the TELUS dispute indicates the extent of the harm 
that can be caused when an ISP blocks a single IP address. In 2005, when 
TELUS was in the midst of a labor dispute with the Telecommunications Workers 
Union, the company blocked public access to the union’s Web site by filtering out 
the IP address of the server on which the site was hosted. In doing so, it also 
blocked “more than six hundred additional websites hosted at the same IP 
address and cut off entire communities from the controversial content” (Geist, 
2005). Researchers at Harvard, Cambridge and the University of Toronto’s 
OpenNet Initiative later found that TELUS had actually blocked access to 766 
unrelated sites (OpenNet Initiative Bulletin 010, 2005).  
 
In May 2009, the state of Minnesota Alcohol and Gambling Enforcement Division 
of the Department of Public Safety invoked the Interstate Wire Act of 1961 to 
block access to online gambling by issuing to 11 ISPs, including Comcast, Qwest 
and Sprint, the names and IP addresses of nearly 200 gambling sites, requesting 
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that they be blocked so that end-users in the state could not access them 
(Walsh, 2009, p. A1). John Levine, a NANOG engineer, noted how the IP filtering 
would occur in response to a query on the listserv: 
 
Notwithstanding the legality of such an order, how would one operationally 
enforce that order? Answer: The order has a list of IP addresses, so I 
expect the ISPs will just block those IPs in routers somewhere. (Levine, 
2009) 
 
According to an “issue brief” posted online at the time by NETCompetition.org, 
there was no sustainable rationale for this action by the Minnesota authorities, 
legally or ethically speaking: 
 
[T]he aggressive move by Minnesota’s Alcohol and Gambling 
Enforcement Division ... marks an unprecedented erosion of net neutrality. 
Savetheinternet.com, an outspoken net neutrality organization, has said 
“net neutrality means no discrimination. Net Neutrality prevents internet 
providers from blocking, speeding up or slowing down web content based 
on its source, ownership or destination.” Under this conception, AGED’s 
move smacks of infraction by blocking Minnesota internet customers from 
accessing certain websites or “destinations,” which at this point includes 
the 200 online poker sites. Of the nearly 200 sites, only 44 even accept 
 167
U.S. players. Until a Minnesota statute makes playing online poker an 
explicit crime, these companies are having their web traffic disabled for 
what can only be deemed no legal reason. The Minnesota AGED simply 
has no leg to stand on. (NETCompetition, 2009) 
 
Traffic-shaping 
 
Although the emphasis in this chapter is on the practices of ISP businesses 
owned by telephone carriers, as opposed to cable MSOs, traffic-shaping is 
practised by all major ISPs, regardless of the technical platform in question. The 
difficulties created for end-users by traffic-shaping are compounded by the 
oligopolistic structure of the ISP industry in both Canada and North America. Few 
consumers have an access option other than their incumbent telephone carrier or 
cable supplier. Furthermore, despite attempts by the CRTC to create viable 
conditions for resellers, Bell Canada does its traffic-shaping at the wholesale 
level, meaning that all DSL resellers in Ontario and Quebec that depend on Bell’s 
GAS (Gateway Access Service) are unable to offer a truly competitive service, 
free of intrusive practices like traffic-shaping (see below for comments on related 
CRTC proceedings).  
 
Until recently, concerns with quality of service (QoS) were largely confined to the 
business sector. As part of their agreements with business customers, especially 
large ones or those with a significant Web presence, ISPs provide guarantees 
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about service defined by such parameters as low latency, high through-put and 
low cost. When QoS terms apply, the ISP in question is contractually expected to 
meter usage and set transport priorities for particular kinds of data. Traffic-
shaping provides a means for controlling the volume of traffic being sent through 
a network in a given period of time by imposing delays on traffic so that the traffic 
conforms to some predetermined network flow constraint. QoS may be practised 
intradomain (within the AS or network) or interdomain (between ASes or 
networks). Here again, the argument is complicated by the difficulties of 
determining whether a particular traffic management practice is, in some 
objective sense, “intrusive” or contributes to better overall service. As Eli Noam 
writes: 
 
Given the option, many customers could well select lower technical quality 
if the price is right. Millions of users prefer a jalopy to a Rolls-Royce. 
 
To complicate things still further, one must recognize that quality to users 
is not a static concept but a relation between performance and 
requirements. Since the latter are shifting, what constitutes good quality is 
a moving target. What was good enough yesterday may not be enough 
today, and not just because we tend to take past luxuries soon for granted 
but also because past standards move from being merely convenient to 
being vital…. By becoming increasingly dependent on high-tech 
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communications flows, advanced societies also put themselves at risk. In 
consequence, demands on service quality increase because failure 
becomes unacceptable. (Noam, 2001, p. 203) 
 
Traffic-shaping and Net Neutrality have become the subject of public debate in 
Canada, as well as a growing preoccupation for Canada’s national regulator, the 
CRTC. In 2007, CRTC chairman Konrad von Finckenstein touched on Net 
Neutrality in his address to the Broadcasting Invitational Summit, as he did again 
in 2008 at the Canadian Telecom Summit (von Finckenstein, 2008). At about the 
same time, traffic-shaping practices became the subject of a Part VII complaint 
filed with the CRTC in April 2008 by the Canadian Association of Internet 
Providers (CAIP) against Bell Canada, requesting that the Commission order Bell 
Canada to cease and desist from using traffic-shaping of its wholesale ADSL 
service known as the GAS, Gateway Access Service (CRTC, 2008a). On 
November 20, 2008 the CTRC issued its decision regarding the CAIP complaint. 
Although the Commission denied CAIP’s application, it did so after deciding that 
the issue of traffic-shaping (and related traffic management practices) should be 
examined in a full public inquiry. Thus, on the same day that it released its CAIP 
decision, the CRTC issued a “Notice of consultation and hearing to review the 
Internet traffic management practices of Internet service providers” (Telecom 
Public Notice CRTC 2008-19; CRTC, 2008b).  
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In the summer 2009, the CRTC held public hearings as part of its proceeding on 
traffic management practices. Michael Geist took a critical stance on the use of 
traffic-shaping and similar practices by Canada’s largest broadband ISPs: 
 
I think that the consumer groups rightly focused on who should bear the 
burden of demonstrating that DPI and other Internet traffic controls are 
consistent with current Canadian law. The groups argued that these are 
prima facie violations of Section 36 of the Telecommunications Act and 
that the onus therefore should fall on the carriers to show that there is a 
serious problem, the solution minimally impairs users' rights, and is 
proportional to harm…. Unfortunately, the questions that followed suggest 
that the CRTC Commissioners started these hearings having accepted the 
carriers' claims that congestion is a problem and that inhibiting the use of 
deep packet inspection could result in increased consumer costs for 
Internet access. (Geist, 2009a) 
 
One of the issues that surfaced during the hearings was the CAIP complaint and 
whether, as a practical matter, Bell Canada in particular was technically able to 
refrain from traffic-shaping at the wholesale level (i.e. as part of its wholesale 
Gateway Access Service, or GAS). During questioning by Commissioner Denton 
on the last day of the hearing (July 14, 2009b), Bell representatives indicated that 
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they were obliged to treat all DSL resellers in exactly the same fashion in respect 
of wholesale provisioning: 
 
6774 [MR. DANIELS] Our problems are, number one, that we can't 
distinguish in our network between the various different wholesale 
providers. We can distinguish all wholesale but we can't make a 
distinction, Oh! Execulink is managing it correctly, someone else isn't. 
 
6775  COMMISSIONER DENTON: Why is that? Could not the code be 
written whereby the origin could be distinguished? Is this just a software 
problem in terms of recognition of these sources of traffic? 
 
6776  MR. CONDON: It is a protocol problem, Commissioner. The 
tunnelling that is used is dynamic. 
 
6777  COMMISSIONER DENTON: Say that again. The tunnelling...? 
 
6778  MR. CONDON: The tunnel IDs are dynamic. We can't tell the 
difference between them. 
 
6779  COMMISSIONER DENTON: Tunnel IDs are dynamic and therefore 
they can be spoofed or hidden or just basically anonymized? 
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6780  MR. CONDON: No, that is not what I meant, Commissioner. I wasn't 
suggesting anything of that nature. I was just suggesting that at that level 
of the network they are not identified, they are not a permanent identifier 
to, say, Execulink. 
 
6781  COMMISSIONER DENTON: Okay. (CRTC, 2009b) 
 
The CRTC proceedings dealing with traffic-shaping and other network 
engineering issues have focussed attention on the use of deep packet inspection 
technologies by both telephone carriers and cable companies in their wholesale 
and retail provisioning. In digital networks, data and increasingly voice 
communications are broken up into discrete packets that travel along 
independent routes between point of origin and destination where these 
fragments are then reassembled into the original whole message ("packet-
based"). Not only is there no longer a dedicated analog circuit, but individual 
packets from the same communication may take completely different paths to 
their destination. To intercept or eavesdrop, “packet-sniffing” or “deep-packet 
inspection” hardware is employed: 
 
Sandvine Inc., of Waterloo, Ontario, combines its DPI technology with 
equipment that lets Internet-service providers offer individual users more 
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finely tuned subscription packages. The company made headlines last 
year when it supplied Comcast Corp. with the ability to identify and block 
certain types of traffic shared between users - a high-profile case that led 
to sanctions on Comcast by the Federal Communications Commission. 
Sandvine's earnings and stock price plunged after the incident. 
 
A Comcast spokeswoman says the company has since adopted a 
program that manages network traffic by the capacity used by subscribers, 
rather than by the type of traffic. Sandvine, which provided Comcast's 
redesigned network-management system, has begun diversifying beyond 
the U.S. cable market, according to Tom Donnelly, a co-founder and 
executive vice president. 
 
More-powerful routers from companies like Cisco Systems Inc. often have 
DPI baked in. A Cisco spokesman says that in most cases the equipment 
is for enhanced Internet-security. (Rhoads, 2009, p. B6) 
 
AS Path Filtering & De-peering 
 
As explained earlier in this paper, peering is the voluntary, settlement-free 
exchange of traffic between two global networks. Peering presupposes that both 
parties are benefitting from the arrangement; if one or both networks believe they 
are no longer realizing a net benefit, they may decide to de-peer. A network may 
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wish to de-peer with another because it believes the other network is profiting 
unfairly from the free interconnection. This situation typically arises when the 
traffic ratio between the two peers becomes asymmetric, meaning costs are not 
being shared fairly. De-peering may also be precipitated by an abuse of the 
service connection, network instability, repeated routing leaks or one party’s 
unwillingness to provide more peering capacity. In some cases, a network may 
wish to de-peer in order to peer with a different, more successful global 
bandwidth entity.  
 
De-peering can be viewed as an extension of retail network management 
practices that include packet filtering and traffic-shaping. De-peering involves 
breaking the path between backbone networks by unplugging physical 
connections. Although it usually accompanies the severing of such a connection, 
autonomous system number (ASN) filtering is a separate operation from de-
peering. AS path filtering occurs when network A disallows any data traffic from 
network B that must pass through intermediate networks. The incident described 
below, which took place in March 2008 at York University, details the effects of 
unreachability that can result from a network de-peering.  
 
An instructor using the on-campus network, for which commercial Internet 
connectivity was supplied by Cogent, attempted to reach a particular Web site 
located in Europe that was important to his research. After repeated attempts, he 
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was still unable to reach the site, which he had never had difficulty reaching in 
the past. He contacted York’s Information Technology department. Staff were 
mystified as to the cause of the connectivity failure. When the instructor went 
home, however, he encountered no problem reaching the Web site in question. 
Several days later, the IT staff involved discovered that York’s transit supplier, 
Cogent, had discontinued its peering relationship with the European Tier-1 
network, TeliaSonera, the bandwidth provider for the site the instructor had been 
trying to reach. The instructor was able to reach the Web site in question from his 
home, because Rogers, which supplied his Internet access, had a stable 
relationship with TeliaSonera through its upstream network providers. 
 
Because Cogent did not take any steps to inform York University of the dispute 
and loss of connectivity, IT staff had to open a trouble ticket with Cogent in order 
to have the incident and its origins explained (Paterson, 2008). Cogent’s actions, 
or failure to act, resulted in an outage that affected a significant section of the 
Internet: 
 
[T]he list of impacted networks is too long to be included here, but they 
include a wide range of commercial, educational and government clients. 
On the Telia side, the victims include the Swedish Defense Data Agency, 
the Finnish State Computer Center, and broadband customers in St. 
Petersburg. With regard to Cogent, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
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Delaware, Kansas State University and Reuters America were all 
collateral damage. (Zmijewski, 2008a) 
 
De-peering in itself is not typically a sufficient condition to cause data 
unreachability – unless the de-peering is accompanied by another step, 
Autonomous System or AS path filtering. When one AS sees incoming traffic that 
has either originated from the offending AS or has that AS number in its routing 
path, it simply disallows all the related data traffic. To one high-level network, the 
other network simply does not exist (Halabi, 1997, p. 171). Here is how one 
commentator described the Cogent-TeliaSonera dispute and its implications: 
 
Cogent is one of the five largest networks in the world in terms of the 
number of peers with which it works and more than 95% of Cogent's traffic 
goes across private peering connections. The peering dispute between 
Cogent and TeliaSonera left many networks in the U. S. and Europe 
unable to connect with one another. Renesys, which tracks Internet 
routing, had some additional details on the impact of the dispute. Renesys 
said many networks were unable to simply route around the impasse, 
perhaps because one party (probably Cogent) had taken steps to block 
alternate traffic paths. Their analysis found that 2,383 TeliaSonera 
network prefixes could not reach Cogent at all, while 1,573 Cogent 
network prefixes were completely cut off from TeliaSonera. The impact 
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was most widely felt in Europe, but more than 1,900 U.S. network 
segments were affected as well. What was surprising was that networks in 
the U.S. were actually cut off from each another given that a largely U.S. 
provider was de-peering with a largely Swedish one…. Renesys noted 
that Flag and SingTel discontinued peering shortly after the Cogent- 
TeliaSonera peering was restored in late March, but were allowing 
customers to find one another via alternate routes. (Miller, 2008a, p. 1) 
 
In cases where a de-peering is not accompanied by AS path filtering (as with 
Flag and SingTel in the quotation above), a network operator can take steps to 
mitigate its impact by looking for alternative routing possibilities for customers 
affected by suspension of service. Whether or not such alternatives exist, many 
commentators believe that ISPs should make their customers aware that a de-
peering has occurred:  
 
…[I]t is possible for providers to provide subscribers with information 
about the nature of the services being provided. Subscribers need to be 
aware of whether they are receiving oblivious transport, and if not, how the 
service affects their traffic. (Aboba & Davies, 2007, p. 3) 
 
A strategy open to ISPs that wish to minimize the impact of loss of connectivity to 
one upstream bandwidth supplier is redundancy, i.e. arranging for connectivity 
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with two or more suppliers. These topologies are known as dual-homing 
(connectivity via two upstream suppliers) and multi-homing (connectivity via more 
than two upstream suppliers). This form of redundancy raises costs significantly, 
and also requires that network operators follow certain technical procedures 
concerning the allocation of numeric IP addresses.15  
 
While present-day de-peering incidents tend to be abrupt and unpredictable, de-
peering was carried out as a systematic business strategy in the 1990s, as 
Internet resources became privatized. Earlier, bandwidth providers had operated 
under open peering policies. As private bandwidth providers entered the game, 
however, they were lured by the profits and market share to be gained by 
systematic de-peering – charging erstwhile peers for interconnection privileges 
and for carrying their traffic. This trend tipped the scales against open peering, 
until it finally collapsed with MFS’s (later Worldcom) 1996 purchase of UUNET. 
UUNET announced that smaller networks with whom it had previously peered 
would have to start paying to connect to its backbone. New, bilateral transit 
agreements would have to be negotiated that transformed peers into customers 
(Cukier, 1997). 
 
                                            
15
  Typically, purchasers of transit bandwidth use “provider-dependent” IP addresses. If an 
ISP that purchases transit wishes to be dual- or multi-homed, it must obtain provider-independent 
IP addresses in one or more blocks from their regional Internet registry, in a process similar to 
how AS numbers are obtained (McPherson, Sangli & White, 2005, p. 43). Under this formula, 
provider-independent IP addresses are advertised through more than one upstream transit 
bandwidth provider (McPherson, Sangli & White, 2005, p. 56). In principle, these strategies make 
the entire Internet reachable from two or more completely separate sources. 
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UUnet said it would stop peering with small carriers; they would have to 
pay. Sprint and AT&T followed suit within months. The modern Net began 
to emerge. Titans swap traffic free and charge others; those who can’t pay 
take the back roads of unreliable public exchanges. (Weinberg, 2000, p. 
236) 
 
Twelve entities - including GeoNet Communications Inc., NetRail and Whole 
Earth Networks - balked at paying monthly interconnection fees in the tens of 
thousands of dollars to UUNET. After a barrage of negative publicity, however, 
UUNET agreed to grandfather its prior peering agreements. UUNET insisted that 
entities seeking peering had to sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) as well 
as a peering agreement. Other bandwidth providers, such as MCI and Sprint, 
followed UUNET’s lead and began operating under non-disclosure agreements. 
As backbone providers were bought out by larger stakeholders, market 
consolidation decreased the number of backbones and widened the margin 
between Tier-1 providers and others (Blake, 1999, p. 15). This shift in the 
marketplace was notable for another reason, namely that the backbone business 
was becoming a desirable line of business for facilities-based 
telecommunications carriers.  
 
Bolt, Beranek and Newman (later BBN Technologies) pioneered many Internet 
technologies, having been involved in the earliest stages of development work on 
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ARPANET. During the 1980s, BBN became one of the first private firms to 
operate an ISP division, known as BBN Planet. In 1997, GTE, a company with a 
long history of aggressive acquisitions in telecommunications, bought BBN 
Planet.16 The following year, the newly acquired company informed two firms 
with which it had peering agreements - Exodus and AboveNet - that it would no 
longer peer with them. Although this decision was not officially made public, it 
was openly discussed on the North American Network Operators Group listserv 
(Butler, 2000, p. 47). The dispute that broke out between Exodus and BBN 
Planet (GTE Internetworking), dubbed the “peering wars of 1998,” were 
symptomatic of the radical changes brought about by the privatization of 
backbone facilities (Fusco, 2000, p. 1). The peering wars led to major 
connectivity outages in 1998.  
 
Meanwhile, Tier-1 backbone providers pursued the strategy of peering with fewer 
entities by converting peers into transit customers. By 2000, the practice of de-
peering had expanded from a method for changing or discontinuing a business 
relationship, to a much more aggressive style of competition. Thus, in March 
2000, when PSINet severed its peering relationship with Exodus, Exodus CEO 
Ellen Hancock commented publicly that, in addition to making her company a 
transit customer, PSINet was taking the unusual step of refusing to exchange 
traffic at public points (Fusco, 2000, p. 1). Her comments indicated that PSINet’s 
                                            
16
  In June 2000, GTE merged with Bell Atlantic to form Verizon Communications. 
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owners, not content with the initial de-peering, had also begun to apply active 
filtering of AS numbers, effectively making other networks invisible.  
 
PSINet at this time enjoyed considerable market power, having been a major 
participant in the commercialization of the Internet. In 1991 the company 
acquired or merged with other ISPs and began expanding in Europe, while also 
investing heavily in fiberoptic technology. PSINet’s goal was to become a single-
source provider of emerging communications technologies. Despite some 
pioneering achievements and ambitious plans, however, the company was never 
profitable. PSINet’s over-expansion left it vulnerable to more sophisticated 
competitors in the Internet service market. Its crippling debt load finally forced the 
company to file for bankruptcy protection in June, 2001, along with four of its 
subsidiaries. Cable & Wireless, which had stopped peering with PSINet and was 
charging for transit, was unable to collect fees it was owed during PSINet’s 
bankruptcy proceedings. In another sign of changing times, C&W responded by 
cutting off its interconnection with PSINet for four days (Burton, 2001, p. 1). 
 
Numerous other incidents took place in the following years which demonstrated 
that free-market competition and privatization were having adverse effects on 
data reachability.  
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In 2002, AOL Transit Data Network (ATDN) and Cogent Communications de-
peered (Noguchi, 2002, p. 1). Cogent was at that time a three-year-old firm 
offering a single service: high-speed Internet access to customers such as 
schools, universities and some 6,000 other large bandwidth users. Cogent lost 
the peer connection it had maintained with ATDN in December 2002, after the 
business relationship between the two companies soured. ATDN’s decision was 
prompted by a cost-benefit analysis which revealed that Cogent was delivering 
three times more data onto ATDN's network than it was carrying back to its own 
customers. The extent of this asymmetry in their traffic exchanges was having an 
unacceptable impact on ATDN’s profitability.  
 
In 2003, state-owned France Télécom (Wanadoo) & Proxad (now called “Free”) 
de-peered in a dispute over size, capacity and congestion at peering points (Le 
Bouder, 2003, p. 1). In 2005, France Télécom severed all links between its 
network and that of its largest competitor, Cogent, in a dispute over Cogent’s 
rapid growth on the continent (Jürgen & Smith, 2005). As a result, all parties 
linked via Cogent, including a number of German customers, were unable to 
reach a majority of France Télécom’s customers. France Télécom accused 
Cogent of having violated its peering policy after Cogent retaliated by filtering all 
France Télécom IP addresses – another example of how de-peering was 
escalating into more aggressive and damaging corporate behavior. 
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Level 3 Communications, one of the world’s largest bandwidth providers and a 
Tier-1 operator, has been involved in several disputes over the years with 
peering partners. In 2005, Level 3 Communications and Cogent Communications 
de-peered after Level 3 maintained it was carrying the bulk of the traffic in its deal 
with Cogent and thus providing free capacity (Brown, Hepner & Popescu, 2009, 
p. 14). As Level 3 spokeswoman Jennifer Daumler suggested, the arrangement 
was not commercially viable (Cowley, 2005). Three days into the standoff Level 3 
backed down and restored its peering connection to Cogent (Ricknäs, 2008). 
 
Several years earlier, in 1998, Level 3 had entered into an agreement with XO 
Communications to collaborate on development of a fiberoptic network. 
Subsequently, XO Communications agreed to purchase transit services from 
Level 3 that reduced its position as a full peer. In 2007, after a long-standing 
dispute between the two companies over their mutual rights and obligations, the 
court found in favor of XO Communications, forcing Level 3 to abide by the 
original agreement. Despite the contentious nature of their legal battle, neither of 
the two firms resorted to de-peering and no network outages took place as a 
result (XO wins ruling against Level 3 Communications, 2007, p. 1). 
 
In 2008 Cogent Communications & TeliaSonera de-peered (Brown, Hepner & 
Popescu, 2009, p. 14). Telia made the following statement in a letter to its 
customers:  
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Cogent has decided not to exchange traffic directly with TeliaSonera’s 
AS1299 or indirectly with AS1299 through a third-party provider. As a result, 
Cogent has partitioned the Internet and disrupted the flow of traffic between 
Cogent and TeliaSonera customers (Malik, 2008).  
 
According to an article that appeared in PC World, the conflict with TeliaSonera 
developed over the cost for upgrading a peering point in the US (Ricknäs, 2008). 
This de-peering affected Northern and Central Europe, served by Telia, and the 
United States and Canada, served by Cogent (Brown, Hepner & Popescu, 2009, 
p. 16). This de-peering affected York University, among many customers. As one 
commentator noted about the effects of this de-peering: 
 
This is the way the Internet works and sometimes doesn't work. If the 
businesses that run the show don't play nice with one another, their 
customers can pay the price of being cut off from parts of the 'net.... The 
Cogent/Telia tiff has been going on for 4 days now and only they can 
resolve their differences. The rest of the world can only hope for full 
connectivity to be restored. (Zmijewski, 2008a) 
 
In 2008 Sprint Nextel and Cogent Communications de-peered, in what at the 
time of writing was the most recent high-level de-peering (Brown, Hepner & 
Popescu, 2009, p. 14). As one commentator wrote at the time: 
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At the heart of it, peering disputes are really loud business negotiations, 
and angry customers can be used as leverage by either side. This one will 
end as they always do, with one side agreeing to pay up or manage their 
traffic differently. (Miller, 2008b) 
 
MPLS: Expanding the Scope of Traffic Management  
 
Like the other network engineering tools and protocols just described, 
multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) is a technology used by network operators 
to manage data traffic. However, MPLS is in a class by itself and, as we shall 
see, has far-reaching implications for the Internet’s open architecture.  
 
MPLS is employed extensively in the core of global backbone networks to 
separate different types of traffic into distinct logical layers running on the IP 
infrastructure. In an MPLS-based network, incoming packets are assigned a 
“label.” Packets are then forwarded along a label switch path (LSP) and each 
label switch router (LSR) makes forwarding decisions based solely on the 
contents of the label. At each hop, the LSR strips off the existing label and 
applies a new label, which tells the next routing hop how to forward the packet 
(DeGeest, 2001). MPLS represents a significant change in TCP/IP architectures 
because it effectively replaces IP routing – in other words, packet forwarding 
decisions are no longer based on fields in the IP header and routing table, but on 
labels that are attached to packets (Medhi & Ramasamy, 2007, p. 614). 
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The protocols supporting MPLS networking have been in development since the 
end of the 1990s, and by late 2002, MPLS networks were becoming widely 
implemented in Internet backbone networks (King-Guillaume, 2003; Guofeng, 
Hong, & Yi, 2004).17 In recent years network operators have been migrating 
MPLS from private networks to the public Internet, giving a broad new meaning 
to the concept of the Internet “cloud.” This trend means that end-user networks 
are becoming more closely entwined with and governed by the backbone 
network’s traffic control system. 
 
MPLS is especially attractive in the transmission of audio and video data, or what 
is known as isochronous data transmission, because such transmissions are 
sensitive to latency or time delays, unlike traffic that is not isochronous, such as 
email transfers. AT&T's U-verse and Verizon’s FiOS services are prominent 
examples of commercial networks that serve high-bandwidth video content and 
have MPLS networks at their backbone to maintain quality of service (Perez, 
2008). Video, especially in high definition formats, has to be transmitted at very 
high bitrates in order to preserve quality. This goal is difficult to achieve over the 
Internet because even if both the content originator and content consumer use 
the same network, the packets they exchange typically have to traverse 
intervening networks. Thus, although data packets may get priority service while 
                                            
17
  The original patent application for the “MPLS packet” was filed on December 29, 2003 
and the patent was assigned to AT&T Intellectual Property I, LP, Reno, Nevada, on October 11, 
2008 (US Fed News, 2008). 
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traversing the sending network, they may lose their priority level before reaching 
their intended destination. Some commentators see this as an important shift in 
underlying assumptions about the Internet and how it functions: “... Internet TV 
services will require sophisticated monitoring and feedback software running in 
the video servers in order to respond quickly to changing quality of service” 
(Jamie, 2009; Hunter, 2006b, p. 32). In addition to a physical topology of routers 
and other hardware for interconnection, networks have a logical topology. 
Different routing software establishes the logical topology in different ways. For 
some backbone networks the core of the network (IP) has been replaced by 
MPLS, as represented in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. MPLS logical topology. Adapted from: Passmore, D. (2004, November 
2). “Strategic Networking Overview: Major Trends in Broadband Networking”. In 
Proceedings of Next Generation Networks. Boston, MA. p. 24. 
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The most controversial aspect of MPLS deployments concerns its potential use 
at the edge of the Internet, i.e. close to end-users, last-mile ISPs and ISP 
upstream bandwidth providers. Although the use of deep packet inspection (DPI) 
technologies is not dependent on the accompanying use of MPLS, these 
technologies are being incorporated more and more into network platforms that 
also use MPLS. To take one recent illustration: 
 
XO Communications today unveiled a service that uses deep packet 
inspection (DPI) at the edge of its network to tell enterprise customers how 
their applications are performing over their Multi-Protocol Label Switching 
(MPLS) networks. The applications performance management service 
uses Fluke’s Visual Uptime Select probes that sit on the customers’ 
premises at the edge of XO’s wide area network and use DPI to examine 
each packet in real time and identify what it is carrying.... (Wilson, 2009) 
 
Traffic engineering, QoS policies, and practices such as filtering and de-peering, 
may eventually create network interoperability issues that will change the nature 
of the Internet. Traffic prioritization or traffic-shaping is a leading concern in the 
larger debate about data reachability and the concept of a neutral network. In 
theory, traffic engineering for a neutral network should ensure as a best practice 
that data is reachable, although there is much debate within the engineering 
community as to what constitutes an appropriately neutral network. 
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Chapter V. Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
The preceding chapters offered a detailed analysis of a little studied but growing 
set of risks to the long-term sustainability of the global public Internet. We 
identified sustainability in terms of “data reachability” – the principle that any end-
user on the Internet can transmit data to any other end-user without encountering 
arbitrary actions on the part of an intervening network operator that might block 
or degrade transmission of the data in question.  
 
We identified risks to reachability in terms of several network engineering 
practices whose purpose is to manipulate data traffic: packet filtering, traffic-
shaping and AS path filtering, along with the concurrent use of MPLS. The policy 
and business challenge here is that these practices are perceived in different and 
often contradictory ways by the ISPs that implement them and the customers 
who are subjected to them (although few retail customers would be able to 
identify the technical reasons for a disruption in their service). We suggested that 
while it is not strictly a network management tool, de-peering – the physical 
severance of connectivity between two Tier-1 networks – should be grouped with 
the other traffic interventions, since de-peerings are also based on unilateral 
decisions taken by network operators and have similar end results, namely, 
disruptions in reachability. 
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Lessons of History 
 
In order to better understand the long-term implications of these developments, 
we devoted much of this study to the historical development of the Internet.  
 
First, we wished to explain why the privatization of Internet resources (bandwidth, 
interconnection points, etc.), and the commercialization of Internet-related 
activities (as seen in the rise of e-commerce), eventually created a crisis of 
international governance and, in Canada and the US, a crisis of national 
regulation as well. Historically, we attributed this crisis to the clash of two 
cultures: the entrenched Bellhead culture that typified AT&T and other monopoly 
telephone carriers; and the Nethead culture that typified the community of 
engineers and computer scientists who created the Internet.  
 
The Bellheads, who had long relied on closed, circuit-switched networks 
optimized for voice telephony, were unable to develop new networking models 
that could match the innovative possibilities of packet-switching and the Internet 
protocol suite. A two-decade protocol war, running from the mid-1970s to the 
mid-1990s, culminated in a decisive victory for TCP/IP over the Open System 
Interconnection (OSI) model that telephone monopolies and standards-setting 
bodies had struggled to implement. The Internet community carried the day by 
creating an open platform that would prove exceptionally resilient, scalable and 
adaptable to new technologies.  
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Even as the open Nethead culture prevailed in the mid-1990s, allowing for 
prodigious achievements such as the World Wide Web, the Bellheads – and Bell 
companies – had been steadily co-opting the Internet technologies they once 
vigorously opposed. Ironically, the system of governance that served the Internet 
bodies so well left a vacuum that the telecommunications carriers were well 
equipped and eager to fill, thanks to their extensive experience as supplicants 
before the FCC. The peer-oriented approach taken by the Netheads was ill-
suited to the world of traditional regulation. 
 
Internet governance was further altered by the confluence of several important 
events falling into the three-year period from 1995 to 1998: the creation of the 
WTO and the international push for deregulation; withdrawal of the NSF’s 
support for Internet-related activities; passage of the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act and the thwarted efforts to introduce more competition into the marketplace; 
concentration of ownership that ultimately reduced the original seven Baby Bells 
(plus AT&T) to three incumbent carriers; the mainstreaming and 
commercialization of the Web; and the creation of ICANN in 1998. Many of these 
events had a direct relationship to the changes taking place in the Internet 
backbone market – particularly consolidation and the dominant role of American-
based carriers.  
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The larger point here is that the whole concept of Internet governance became 
deeply fractured by the events of the mid-1990s. On the national level, the FCC 
and CRTC inherited regulatory frameworks that were ill-equipped for managing 
the social and economic ramifications of digital communications technologies, 
increasingly identified with the computer browser interface and the Web (the 
flurry of regulatory activity in 2009, including the CRTC’s June 4 call for a 
national digital strategy, suggests just how unmanageable the Internet has been 
under regulations crafted for telecommunications carriers and broadcasters). On 
the international level, governance has not fared much better – with the notable 
exception of the technical governance provided by the ISOC-led groups that 
continue to manage Internet protocols, architecture, security and a wide range of 
other issues.  
 
This crisis in governance formed the backdrop to the narrower set of issues we 
have concentrated on in this study: the technical and business behaviors of 
bandwidth providers. 
 
In our discussions of the role played in recent years by the Tier-1 networks, we 
noted that the business relationships they enter into are problematic in two 
fundamental ways. First, these relationships are not subject to outside scrutiny 
on the part of any governing body with public-interest or fiduciary responsibilities. 
The second problem is that of transparency. The Tier-1 networks and their 
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customers operate in near-total secrecy, behind the non-disclosure agreements 
that have become routine in the industry, a practice that compounds their lack of 
accountability to any disinterested third party. The result is that the largest 
providers – and for that matter many smaller ISPs as well – can operate with 
impunity, making overly restrictive or harmful traffic management practices, along 
with de-peering incidents, more likely.  
 
At this writing, many groups in the United States, and to a much lesser extent 
Canada, are engaged in a lively debate about the social and economic benefits 
of broadband access to the Internet. Generally speaking, for organizations which 
are concerned with the welfare of residential end-users, a robust and sustainable 
public Internet must be fast, affordable and ubiquitous. While our perspective is 
not inconsistent with these aims, the notion of data reachability shifts the 
emphasis to a slightly different set of concerns. To be sure, the use of traffic-
shaping received a thorough airing before the CRTC in 2009, and is likely to 
come under close scrutiny at the FCC, under newly appointed chair Julius 
Genachowski. Nevertheless, our surmise is that for most end users, the sheer 
ability to reach any and every address on the global Internet is a remote 
abstraction, compared to a) being able to get broadband, b) being able to afford 
it, and c) having some assurance that once a message or request is sent to a 
particular address, the response time will be reasonably consonant with the 
network throughput the end-user has become accustomed to. 
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To the extent that attention has been paid to reachability in popular and 
academic discussions, the concept has been framed in terms of the risk of 
brownouts and other wide-area losses of service quality. It has been carefully 
positioned by the incumbent ISPs (e.g. in the July 2009 public hearings before 
the CRTC) as the unwanted yet potentially uncontrollable consequence of limited 
network capacity and rising demand on the part of subscribers for bandwidth-
intensive content, especially video. This scenario, as the ISPs would have it, is 
compounded by the allegedly overwhelming costs of capital expenditures to 
upgrade middle- and last-mile capacity; and the profligate use, by a small 
number of customers, of peer-to-peer platforms like BitTorrent to facilitate the 
downloading of very large files. This framing of events forms the backdrop to 
current public discussions of what traffic-shaping is and why it is necessary.  
 
The result of careful positioning by the incumbent ISPs is that reachability is 
almost universally treated as a capacity issue rather than as a connectivity issue. 
This distinction has important implications for scholarship, public policy and 
advocacy. Regardless of the degree to which capacity issues are addressed by 
policymakers and regulators, no amount of available bandwidth will keep the 
global Internet functioning properly if smaller ISPs and end-users must tolerate 
practices whose intention is to degrade connectivity, if not cut it off entirely.  
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In addition to moving the emphasis from capacity to connectivity, we have also 
emphasized the importance of a shift in perspective away from naming (along 
with the much disputed role of ICANN), in favor of a more concentrated focus on 
the engineering and policy issues related to Internet routing. We do not mean to 
imply that naming issues are not worthy of serious attention, especially given that 
the DNS root has already been put in jeopardy by actions such as attempts to 
partition off parts of the Internet by the government of China. Nevertheless, we 
contend that routing deserves more attention, precisely because it goes largely 
unnoticed outside the Internet engineering community, and yet has been 
undergoing changes that may gradually compromise the end-to-end principle. 
 
Disclosure as an Instrument of Reform 
 
The question, then, is - can anything to be done to alleviate the problems 
described in this study? 
 
The first step is to be clear that accountability (to a higher authority) and 
disclosure (of technical and business practices) are separate and distinct issues. 
The Internet’s problems are international problems and it is tempting to look to 
established international institutions for relief. To begin with, ICANN is poorly 
positioned to play any role, directly or indirectly, in addressing the business 
practices that affect routing and data reachability. Aside from the scope of its 
legal mandate, ICANN is embroiled in controversy on several fronts – and at this 
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writing it appears that the US government, through the Department of 
Commerce, will insist on maintaining effective control over ICANN’s activities 
upon expiry of the Joint Project Agreement on September 30, 2009. If that is 
indeed the outcome, the renewal is likely to further undermine ICANN’s credibility 
among stakeholders in the Internet community.  
 
At the same time, the tenor of WSIS and IGF discussions in the past lends little 
credence to the prospect that the United Nations or one of its bodies, particularly 
the ITU, might be an appropriate forum for management of international peering 
agreements (an IGF meeting is scheduled for November 2009 in Egypt). For their 
part, the ISOC technical bodies have done an exemplary job of technical 
governance. On the other hand, they have no mandate to govern or control the 
business terms under which Internet resources are used by ISPs or other firms. 
 
Two further distinctions apply here. First, technical practices (such as whether a 
network uses multi-homing) are not the same as business practices (such as 
how much a network pays for multi-homing); and they will certainly be treated in 
very different ways in any process of reform. Second, the rights and 
responsibilities of a Tier-2 or Tier-3 network are quite different from those of a 
residential end-user, which are different in turn from those of business customers 
of lower-tier ISPs. Nevertheless, what they all have in common may begin to 
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offer insights into how reachability can be promoted as a goal among Internet 
stakeholders.  
 
We believe that focussing on disclosure is the best way to approach the issues 
attaching to reachability. There are several compelling reasons for this. All point 
to a set of goals related to increased understanding and awareness of what 
reachability is, why it is important, and how risks should be classified and 
assessed. 
 
First, the information needed to make routing and reachability more secure is of a 
kind that many vendors already provide to their customers. Second, making large 
multinational ISPs accountable presupposes a hierarchical structure and trade-
offs that would rival WTO agreements in their complexity. Pressuring ISPs for 
disclosure, on the other hand, is a distributed task that can be shared among 
many stakeholders. Third, disclosure, unlike accountability, is not an all-or-
nothing solution; it can be achieved in very small, incremental stages. Fourth, 
disclosure – or rather non-disclosure – of crucial operating information (such as 
what traffic management practices are in use) has become an issue at all levels 
of the bandwidth hierarchy, from the last mile to the Tier-1 networks. Fifth, 
stakeholders, advocacy groups and end-users have much to gain from 
understanding that ample bandwidth alone, i.e. network “speed,” is not a 
sufficient condition of robust Internet access. Although it is certainly very 
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important, especially in Canada and the United States, that targets for typical 
last-mile bandwidth be set far higher than they are today, it is equally important 
that policymakers place interconnection and interconnection disclosures on the 
same footing as bandwidth – especially since bandwidth is increasingly treated 
as an undifferentiated commodity. 
 
There are many problems arising from what is not disclosed about peering 
agreements, beginning with those entered into by Tier-1 providers. Any entity 
that peers or interconnects in any way with a Tier-1 network must sign a non-
disclosure agreement, under which interconnection and peering arrangements 
can be cancelled on little notice by larger networks. Moreover, Tier-1 providers 
and other large networks meet regularly to discuss engineering issues - in 
private. This ingrained resistance to public disclosure encourages arbitrage; 
tends to favor transit over peering, despite the technical and public-interest 
advantages of peering; and solidifies the market power of the largest ISPs. 
 
Although this is not a treatise on contract law, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that when any firm purchases bandwidth from an ISP, that party should have the 
right to know not merely what throughput can be sustained, but also how 
upstream interconnection arrangements will affect their real-world connectivity. 
Ideally, ISPs should also be required to communicate full and timely information 
on de-peerings to their downstream users, to minimize any harmful impact on 
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data reachability. Clearly such requirements would apply in quite different ways 
to a) Tier-1 operators and their peering arrangements; b) Tier-2 and Tier-3 ISPs 
that purchase transit for some or all of their bandwidth needs; and c) residential 
end-users. Nevertheless, ISPs should generally bear a responsibility for 
identifying – at least to their customers - all those networks with which they peer 
or from which they purchase transit. Being in possession of this information is 
indispensable if individual ISPs, especially smaller ones, are to have a sense of 
both control and responsibility over their Internet connectivity. 
 
It is also clear that national regulators could extend these obligations still further, 
to include, for example, a framework to ensure that networks meeting certain 
minimum criteria could not be refused a peering arrangement by an upper-tier 
network, with the onus on the larger network to demonstrate that any refusal was 
not anti-competitive. On the other hand, there is in existence a wide range of 
contract models in use by businesses of all types that incorporate a service level 
agreement (SLA), with appropriate stipulations as to quality of service (QoS). 
Guarantees related to factors such as uptime are almost exclusively found in 
business-to-business contracts, since they are much more costly than best-effort 
retail arrangements. But at the very least, they provide a huge body of practical 
experience in the provision of connectivity.  
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It must be recognized that many barriers stand in the way of implementing 
disclosure practices, even at the national level, under the auspices of an existing 
regulatory framework. Let us mention two. First, there is a substantial difference 
between disclosing information about connectivity to a customer on a confidential 
basis, and disclosing information publicly about connectivity arrangements and 
traffic management practices. Second, in both the Canadian and American 
jurisdictions, the retail broadband business has been deregulated. This would 
suggest that the CRTC and FCC would normally find it extremely difficult to re-
regulate residential broadband with a view to reining in anti-competitive practices.  
 
The relationship between market power and the ability of ISPs to hide their terms 
of trade even from their own customers has become a hallmark of the incumbent 
residential broadband providers in Canada and the US. Indeed, one of the most 
significant features of the CRTC’s ISP hearings, held from July 6 to July 14, 
2009, was the sheer amount of information about traffic management practices 
that was discussed – and how much of it had been withheld from customers by 
Canada’s incumbent broadband ISPs. Michael Geist was among those who 
found that disclosure of terms and practices by Canada’s broadband providers 
leaves a great deal to be desired:  
 
Each day brought new and surprising revelations about how little ISPs tell 
their customers about their traffic management practices. By far the most 
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egregious was Rogers, which admitted that it charges tiered pricing for 
faster upload speeds but that all tiers were throttled to the same speed 
when using P2P. In other words, the Extreme subscriber who pays $59.99 
per month and is promised fast upload speeds (1 Mbps) actually gets the 
same upload speed as the Express subscriber who pays $46.99 per 
month and is promised upload speeds of 512 kbps. There were similar 
stories from many other ISPs, who disclosed actual speeds that bring P2P 
down to a virtual crawl. Disclosure has improved over the past year as the 
issue has gained prominence, but there clearly is a long way to go. (Geist, 
2009b, emphasis added) 
 
A close reading of the transcripts for the seven days of public hearings indicates 
not only how much information is not disclosed to Canadians about their Internet 
access, but also how difficult it is even for the Commission to get complete, 
intelligible answers to the most basic questions about traffic management 
practices. As discussed above in Chapter IV, one of the most pressing issues 
about broadband in Canada concerns whether the Commission needs to 
intervene in the DSL wholesale market to ensure that resellers are not put at a 
serious competitive disadvantage by the actions of incumbent Bell Canada. 
During the July hearing, Bell officials were questioned closely about why the 
company’s Gateway Access Service (GAS) is configured in such a way that all 
the resellers in Ontario and Quebec that depend on it are forced to have their 
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own customers’ data traffic-shaped, in lockstep with Bell’s retail Sympatico 
customers.  
 
This issue first came to light in 2008, and fittingly enough it did so because of a 
failure of disclosure on Bell’s part – i.e., a failure to disclose that it was traffic-
shaping downstream to its wholesale customers. This revelation became the 
subject of a complaint by the Canadian Association of Internet Providers that is 
still unresolved. But the merits of that particular complaint aside, the July public 
hearings have raised new questions about the role of incumbent networks in a 
competitive broadband market, and in particular about both the origins and 
effects of the kind of traffic-shaping being practised by Bell. On the basis of 
certain comments made at the hearings (which provide only indirect evidence), 
we hypothesize that Bell may have deployed MPLS in its networks in such a way 
as to make it impossible for any of its GAS resellers to offer access to its 
customers without traffic-shaping as a way to achieve market differentiation. At 
one point in his questioning of Bell, Commissioner Denton was trying to 
understand whether there were any circumstances in which the resellers would 
be able to offer access to their customers and either do their own traffic-shaping, 
or refrain from it, at their option: 
 
6793   COMMISSIONER DENTON: Well, if they wanted to spend the Cap-
Ex, would they be prevented from doing so by your rules? 
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6794   MR. DANIELS: In terms of if they have their own DPI equipment? 
 
6795   COMMISSIONER DENTON: Yes. If they wanted to go ahead and 
make the investments to conform to reasonable requirements, what would 
prevent them from doing so? 
 
6796   MR. DANIELS: Nothing would prevent them, but the truth is we 
wouldn't -- today, as I say, every single one of them would have to do 
exactly that investment exactly the same way for it to be reliable, and 
what's the point of that to ask them all to do that when we're doing it for 
them? 
 
6797   They can't -- this is the key, they're coming to you and saying, I 
want to be able to distinguish my traffic and have different ways of going 
about doing it better, equally reasonable. 
 
6798   They can do that if they buy HSA, they can do that if they unbundle 
loop, but if they're on a shared GAS network where their traffic is going to 
impact our retail customers and being priced accordingly, then they can't 
have a different solution, they'd have to have the exact same solution as 
us and every single one of them would have to have that exact same 
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solution as us because we can't distinguish between one ISP who does it 
and another one who says they're going to do it but they didn't. 
 
6799   COMMISSIONER DENTON: Well, we'll watch that statement -- 
hold that statement for the future. (CRTC, 2009b) 
 
In our view, when competition in a broadband market is almost entirely 
dependent on resale of access by non-facilities-based ISPs, it is not good public 
policy to allow the incumbent to undermine market differentiation, especially by 
means of service features that provoke customer dissatisfaction and frustration. 
Looking ahead, however, we sense that a more useful and intriguing challenge 
lies in trying to determine whether the deployment of MPLS is now occurring this 
close to the edges of the Internet, in this kind of delicate competitive relationship.  
 
And if that turns out to be the case, it would certainly be worthwhile exploring 
whether the use of MPLS has any anti-competitive ramifications for downstream 
users, and whether such ramifications are or are not technically avoidable.  
 
The answers to questions such as these will require a combination of continuing 
scholarly research, informed public interest advocacy and enlightened 
policymaking. In the meantime, we will, paraphrasing Commissioner Denton, 
hold these tasks for the future. 
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Appendix A – IXmaps 
IXmaps is an interactive tool under development that will permit Internet users to 
see the route that their Internet data packets take across North America. When 
the user enters a destination URL in their browser they see in an adjacent 
window, a map of North America on which the packets’ routes will be displayed. 
Each ‘exchange point’ or ‘carrier hotel’ along that route is displayed in Google 
Earth as a labeled highlighted icon. When the icon is clicked, a balloon appears 
containing an HTML document with information about that interchange point and 
the building where it is physically located. This includes a photo of the building, 
its ownership, ISPs and other facilities within it and known links or alliances 
among the building owners, clients, and government or corporate entities. 
Examples are the building at 151 Front Street, Toronto or the multi-story tower 
called One Wilshire in Los Angeles. Clickable icons are color-coded and an 
overlay with a legend is shown which contains a brief summary of the route and 
exchange points traversed. In the Google Earth ‘Places panel’, an ordered list of 
traceroute hops with IP addresses and AS numbers is shown. 
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IXmaps employs a unique traceroute visualization from the user's system to the 
destination (displayed in Google Earth) and presents unique information about 
Internet exchange points transited along the way. These developments are being 
implemented with funding from the SSHRC ITST program. IXmaps is part of the 
New Transparency Project at the Faculty of Information, University of Toronto. 
The project team consists of Dr. David J. Phillips, Associate Professor and Chair 
of Doctoral Studies, Faculty of Information and Dr. Andrew Clement, Professor, 
Faculty of Information and Coordinator, Information Policy Research Program as 
well as Nancy Paterson, PhD candidate Communication & Culture, YorkU and 
Associate Professor, Ontario College of Art & Design. 
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Appendix B – Tier-1 Networks 
 
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia - 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier_1_network 
 
Jump to: navigation, search 
This article may contain original research or unverified claims. Please improve 
the article by adding references. See the talk page for details. (July 2008) 
 
A Tier-1 Network is an IP network (typically but not necessarily an Internet 
Service Provider) which connects to the entire Internet solely via Settlement Free 
Interconnection, also known as settlement free peering. 
 
Contents: 
1. Definition 
2. Politics 
3. Routing issues 
4. Marketing issues 
5. Global issues 
6. Telecom Providers Tier-1 & 2 
7. See also 
8. References 
 
Definition 
Although there is no authority which has defined the "tiers" of Internet networks, 
the most common definition is: 
•  A network that can reach every other network on the Internet without 
purchasing IP transit or paying settlements.(1) 
By this definition, a Tier-1 Network is a Transit-Free network. But not all Transit-
Free Networks are Tier-1 Networks. It is possible to become transit free by 
paying for peering or agreeing to settlements. 
It is trivial to objectively prove (or disprove) a network is transit free. The fourteen 
(14) networks listed below, and only those fourteen, are transit free (as of July 
2008). The most widely quoted source is Renesys Corporation, but the base 
information to prove the claim is publicly accessible from many locations, such as 
the RIPE RIS database, the Oregon Route Views servers, the Packet Clearing 
House, and others. 
 
It is impossible for an outside authority to confirm that a network is not paying 
settlements of any type because such business agreements are frequently not 
public information, or even covered under a Non-Disclosure Agreement. The 
information presented here is the best collective knowledge of the Internet 
peering community. There is little disagreement amongst the community itself, 
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even though there is no quotable source for the information. (For clarity, here we 
will define the "peering community" as the set of peering coordinators for 
networks which are present at Internet Exchanges on at least two continents.) 
It is commonly believed [citation?] that observing this definition strictly would 
result in every network being disqualified. For instance, many large telephone 
companies who are also Tier-1 Networks buy, sell, or swap fiber amongst 
themselves. Even if it were possible to list every transaction, it is not possible to 
know if some of those transactions were required for or in payment of a peering 
connection. 
As a result, the term Tier-1 Network is used in the industry to mean a network 
with no overt settlements. An overt settlement would be a monetary charge for 
the amount, direction, or type of traffic sent between networks. 
Common definitions of Tier-2 and Tier-3 networks: 
•  Tier-2 - A network that peers with some networks, but still purchases IP 
transit or pays settlements to reach at least some portion of the Internet. 
•  Tier-3 - A network that solely purchases transit from other networks to 
reach the Internet. 
 
Politics 
There are many reasons why networking professionals use the "Tier Hierarchy" 
to describe networks, but the most important one is better understanding of a 
particular network's political and economic motivations in relationship to how and 
with whom it peers. 
By definition, a Tier-1 network does not purchase IP transit from any other 
network or pay settlements to any other network to reach any other portion of the 
Internet. Therefore, in order to be a Tier-1, a network must peer with every other 
Tier-1 network. A new network cannot become a Tier-1 without the implicit 
approval of every other Tier-1 network, since any one network's refusal to peer 
with it will prevent the new network from being considered a Tier-1. 
 
Routing issues 
Because a Tier-1 does not have any alternate transit paths, Internet traffic 
between any two Tier-1 networks is critically dependent on the peering 
relationship. If two Tier-1 networks arrive at an impasse and discontinue peering 
with each other (usually in a unilateral decision by one side), single-homed 
customers of each network will not be able to reach the customers of the other 
network. This effectively "partitions" the Internet, so that one portion cannot talk 
to another portion, which has happened several times during the history of the 
Internet. Those portions of the Internet typically remain partitioned until one side 
purchases transit (thus losing its "Tier-1" status), or until the collective pain of the 
outage and/or threat of litigation motivates the two networks to resume voluntary 
peering. 
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It is important to remark here that Tier-2 (and lower) ISPs and their customers 
are normally unaffected by these partitions because they can have traffic with 
more than one tier-1 provider. 
 
Marketing issues 
Because there is no formal definition or authoritative body which determines who 
is and is not a Tier-1, the term is often misused as a marketing slogan rather than 
an accurate technical description of a network. Frequent misconceptions of the 
"tier hierarchy" include: 
•  Tier-1 networks are closer to the "center" of the Internet.  
 In reality, Tier-1 networks usually have only a small number of peers 
(typically only other Tier-1s and very large Tier-2s), while Tier-2 networks are 
motivated to peer with many other Tier-2 and end-user networks. Thus a Tier-2 
network with good peering is frequently much "closer" to most end-users or 
content than a Tier-1. 
•  Tier-1 networks by definition offer "better" quality Internet connectivity.  
 By definition, there are networks which Tier-1 networks have only one 
path to, and if they lose that path, they have no "backup transit" which would 
preserve their full connectivity. 
 Some Tier-2 networks are significantly larger than some Tier-1 networks, 
and are often able to provide more or better connectivity. 
•  Tier-2 networks are "resellers" of Tier-1 networks.  
 Only Tier-3 networks (who provide Internet access) are true "resellers", 
while many large Tier-2 networks peer with the majority or even vast majority of 
the Internet directly except for a small portion of the Internet which is reached via 
a transit provider. 
 
Because the "tier" ranking system is used in marketing and sales, a long-held 
though generally misguided view among customers is that they should "only 
purchase from a Tier-1". Because of this, many networks claim to be Tier-1 even 
though they are not, while honest networks may lose business to those who only 
wish to purchase from a Tier-1. The frequent misuse of the term has led to a 
corruption of the meaning, whereby almost every network claims to be a Tier-1 
even though it is not. The issue is further complicated by the almost universal 
use of non-disclosure agreements among Tier-1 networks, which prevent the 
disclosure of details regarding their settlement-free interconnections. 
Some of the incorrect measurements which are commonly cited include numbers 
of routers, route miles of fiber optic cable, or number of customers using a 
particular network. These are all valid ways to measure the size, scope, capacity, 
and importance of a network, but they have no direct relationship to Tier-1 status. 
Another common area of debate is whether it is possible to become a Tier-1 
through the purchase of "paid peering", or settlement-based interconnections, 
whereby a network "buys" the status of Tier-1 rather than achieving it through 
settlement-free means. While this may simulate the routing behaviors of a Tier-1 
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network, it does not simulate the financial or political peering motivations, and is 
thus considered by most Peering Coordinators to not be a true Tier-1 for most 
discussions. 
 
Global issues 
See also: Internet Exchange Point 
A common point of contention among people discussing Tier-1 networks is the 
concept of a "regional Tier-1". A regional Tier-1 network is a network which is not 
transit free globally, but which maintains many of the classic behaviors and 
motivations of a Tier-1 network within a specific region. 
A typical scenario for this behavior involves a network that was the incumbent 
telecommunications company in a specific country or region, usually tied to some 
level of government-supported monopoly. Within their specific countries or 
regions of origin, these networks maintain peering policies which mimic those of 
Tier-1 networks (such as lack of openness to new peering relationships and 
having existing peering with every other major network in that region). However, 
this network may then extend to another country, region, or continent outside of 
its core region of operations, where it may purchase transit or peer openly like a 
Tier-2 network. 
 
A commonly cited example of these behaviors involves the incumbent carriers 
within Australia, who will not peer with new networks in Australia under any 
circumstances, but who will extend their networks to the United States and peer 
openly with many networks. Less extreme examples of much less restrictive 
peering requirements being set for regions in which a network peers, but does 
not sell services or have a significant market share, are relatively common 
among many networks, not just "regional Tier-1"s. 
While the classification of "regional Tier-1" does hold some merit for 
understanding the peering motivations of such a network within different regions, 
these networks do not meet the requirements of a true global Tier-1 because 
they are not transit free globally. 
 
Telecom Providers Tier-1 & 2 
The original Internet backbone was the ARPANET. It was replaced in 1989 by 
the NSFNET backbone. This was similar to a Tier-1 backbone. The Internet 
could be defined as anything able to send datagrams to this backbone. 
When the Internet went private, a new network architecture based on 
decentralized routing (EGP/BGP) was developed. The Tier-1 ISPs and the peer 
connections made the NSFNET redundant and later obsolete. On April 30, 1995, 
the NSFNET backbone was shut down. 
Currently, Tier-1 ISPs form the closest thing to a backbone. 
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This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this 
article by adding reliable references (ideally, using inline citations). Unsourced 
material may be challenged and removed. (March 2008) 
 
The following 10 networks are believed to be Tier-1 Networks (i.e. they do not 
have an overt settlement on any peering link with any other network) by the 
overwhelming majority of the peering community. 
 
 
Name AS#   Sept, 2007 (2) 
(3) degree 
Peering policy 
AT&T 7018 1382 AT&T Peering policy 
Global Crossing 
(GBLX) 
3549 499                      Peering policy (2003)    
Level 3(L3) 3356   
NTT Communications 
(Verio)(AS2914 was 
originally TLGnet; 
merged in 1999 after 
assets were bought) 
2914  254        NTT Communications 
Routing Policy 
Qwest 209 828 North America; Intl 
Sprint 1239 880  
Tata Communications 
(formerly Teleglobe) 
6453   
Verizon Business 
formerly UUNET 
701 1452 Verizon UUNET 
Peering 
SAVVIS 3561   
TeliaSonera 
International Carrier 
1299      TSIC Peering Policy     
 
Most Tier-1 networks are headquartered in the United States, except for Global 
Crossing, which is headquartered in Hamilton, Bermuda, TeliaSonera which is 
headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden and NTT, which purchased the US 
network Verio to become a Tier-1 Network and is headquartered in Tokyo, 
Japan. (NTT is partially owned by the Japanese government.) 
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The following networks were Tier-1 Networks and may still be, but there is some 
question in the community as to whether they are now paying settlements to one 
or more of their peers. 
 
Name AS# Sept, 2007 (2) 
(3) degree 
Peering policy 
AOL Transit Data 
Network (ATDN)    
1668  ATDN Peering Policy 
 
 
The following networks are Transit-Free Networks, even though they have 
settlement based or paid peering with one or more other networks:   
    
Name AS# Sept, 2007 (2) 
(3) degree 
Settlement Peer 
AboveNet 6461                           Sprint/AS1239 
Cogent 
Communications 
174                   Sprint/AS1239 & 
possibly Level 3 
Communications 
(L3)/AS3356 
XO Communications 2828  Sprint/AS1239 & Level 
3 (L3)/AS3356 
 
 
 
Due to the marketing considerations mentioned above, many people mistakenly 
believe that other networks are Tier-1 when they are not. Because of this, many 
online resources and forums incorrectly list several non-qualifying networks as 
Tier-1. 
 
Below is a list of some of these Tier-2 networks which are often listed as Tier-1, 
along with their upstream providers: 
 
•  Allstream/AS15290 (Verizon Business/ AS701 transit, AT&T/ AS7018 
transit, Level 3 Communications (L3)/ AS3356 transit) 
•  British Telecom/ AS5400 (Global Crossing (GBLX)/ AS549 transit, Level 3 
Communications (L3)/ AS 356 transit, Sprint Nextel Corporation/AS1239 transit) 
•  Cable and Wireless/ AS273 (Level 3 Communications (L3)/ AS 356, 
SAVVIS/ AS561 transit) 
•  Deutsche Telekom/ AS320 (Sprint Nextel Corporation/ AS 239 transit) 
•  France Telecom/ AS511 aka OpenTransit (Sprint Nextel Corporation/ 
AS1239 transit) 
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•  Hurricane Electric/ AS6939 (Global Crossing (GBLX)/ AS3549 transit, 
TeliaSonera/ AS1299 transit) 
•  PCCWGlobal/ AS3491 (Global Crossing (GBLX)/ AS3549 transit) 
•  Tele2/ AS1257 (Sprint Nextel Corporation/ AS1239 transit) 
•  Time Warner Telecom/ AS4323 (Sprint Nextel Corporation/ AS1239 
transit) 
•  Tiscali International Network (TINet)/ AS3257 (Sprint Nextel Corporation/ 
AS1239 transit; Verizon Business (AS701) transit) 
 
See also 
•  Tier-2 network 
•  Peering 
•  Internet transit 
•  Network access point 
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Appendix C – Sample Weekly Routing Table Report 
 
North American Network Operators Group 
Date Prev | Date Next | Date Index | Thread Index | Author Index | Historical  
 
Weekly Routing Table Report 
Date:  Sat, 13 Jun 2009 04:11:14 +1000 (EST) 
From:  Routing Analysis Role Account <cscora@apnic.net> 
To: apops@apops.net, nanog@nanog.org, routing-wg@ripe.net, 
afnog@afnog.org, ausnog@ausnog.net, sanog@sanog.org 
Reply-to: pfs@cisco.com 
Subject: Weekly Routing Table Report 
 
This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet 
Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan. 
Daily listings are sent to bgp-stats@lists.apnic.net 
For historical data, please see http://thyme.apnic.net. 
If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith <pfs@cisco.com>. 
 
Routing Table Report   04:00 +10GMT Sat 13 Jun, 2009 
 
Report Website:     http://thyme.apnic.net 
Detailed Analysis:  http://thyme.apnic.net/current/ 
 
 
Analysis Summary 
---------------- 
 
BGP routing table entries examined:     287824 
Prefixes after maximum aggregation:     137147 
Deaggregation factor:       2.10 
Unique aggregates announced to Internet:    142799 
Total ASs present in the [global] Internet Routing Table:  31449 
Prefixes per ASN:        9.15 
Origin-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:  27360 
Origin ASes announcing only one prefix:     13306 
Transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:   4089 
Transit-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:  96 
Average AS path length visible in the Internet Routing Table:  3.6 
Max AS path length visible:      29 
Max AS path prepend of ASN ( 3816)     22 
Prefixes from unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table:  500 
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Unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table:    147 
Number of 32-bit ASNs allocated by the RIRs:    181 
Prefixes from 32-bit ASNs in the Routing Table:   49 
Special use prefixes present in the Routing Table:   0 
Prefixes being announced from unallocated address space:  829 
Number of addresses announced to Internet:    2050857808 
Equivalent to 112 /8s, 235 /16s and 239 /24s 
Percentage of available address space announced:   55.3 
Percentage of allocated address space announced:                64.0 
Percentage of available address space allocated:                 86.4 
Percentage of address space in use by end-sites:                 77.4 
Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations:  142267 
 
APNIC Region Analysis Summary 
----------------------------- 
 
Prefixes being announced by APNIC Region ASes:   68490 
Total APNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation:   24490 
APNIC Deaggregation factor:      2.80 
Prefixes being announced from the APNIC address blocks:  67896 
Unique aggregates announced from the APNIC address blocks: 30776 
APNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table:  3655 
APNIC Prefixes per ASN:       18.53 
APNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix:    997 
APNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 518 
Average APNIC Region AS path length visible:    3.5 
 Max APNIC Region AS path length visible:    18 
Number of APNIC addresses announced to Internet:   453620336 
Equivalent to 21 /8s, 241 /16s and 36 /24s 
Percentage of available APNIC address space announced:  84.5 
 
APNIC AS Blocks        4608-4864, 7467-7722, 9216-10239, 17408-18431 
(pre-ERX allocations)  23552-24575, 37888-38911, 45056-46079 
APNIC Address Blocks    58/8,  59/8,  60/8,  61/8, 110/8, 111/8, 112/8, 
                       113/8, 114/8, 115/8, 116/8, 117/8, 118/8, 119/8, 
                       120/8, 121/8, 122/8, 123/8, 124/8, 125/8, 126/8, 
                       180/8, 183/8, 202/8, 203/8, 210/8, 211/8, 218/8, 
                       219/8, 220/8, 221/8, 222/8 
 
ARIN Region Analysis Summary 
---------------------------- 
 
Prefixes being announced by ARIN Region ASes:   123257 
Total ARIN prefixes after maximum aggregation:   65969 
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ARIN Deaggregation factor:      1.87 
Prefixes being announced from the ARIN address blocks:  124046 
Unique aggregates announced from the ARIN address blocks: 51834 
ARIN Region origin ASs present in the Internet Routing Table: 13033 
ARIN Prefixes per ASN:       9.52 
ARIN Region origin ASs announcing only one prefix:   4995 
ARIN Region transit ASs present in the Internet Routing Table:  1276 
Average ARIN Region AS path length visible:    3.3 
Max ARIN Region AS path length visible:    24 
Number of ARIN addresses announced to Internet:   1009227328 
Equivalent to 21 /8s, 6 /16s and 109 /24s 
Percentage of available ARIN address space announced:  194.0 
 
ARIN AS Blocks         1-1876, 1902-2042, 2044-2046, 2048-2106 
(pre-ERX allocations)  2138-2584, 2615-2772, 2823-2829, 2880-3153 
                       3354-4607, 4865-5119, 5632-6655, 6912-7466 
                       7723-8191, 10240-12287, 13312-15359, 16384-17407 
                       18432-20479, 21504-23551, 25600-26591, 
                       26624-27647, 29696-30719, 31744-33791 
                       35840-36863, 39936-40959, 46080-47103 
  53248-55295 
ARIN Address Blocks     24/8,  63/8,  64/8,  65/8,  66/8,  67/8,  68/8, 
                        69/8,  70/8,  71/8,  72/8,  73/8,  74/8,  75/8, 
                        76/8,  96/8,  97/8,  98/8,  99/8, 108/8, 173/8, 
                       174/8, 184/8, 199/8, 204/8, 205/8, 206/8, 207/8, 
                       208/8, 209/8, 216/8, 
 
RIPE Region Analysis Summary 
---------------------------- 
 
Prefixes being announced by RIPE Region ASes:   65736 
Total RIPE prefixes after maximum aggregation:   38944 
RIPE Deaggregation factor:      1.69 
Prefixes being announced from the RIPE address blocks:  64869 
Unique aggregates announced from the RIPE address blocks: 43770 
RIPE Region origin ASs present in the Internet Routing Table:  13116 
RIPE Prefixes per ASN:       4.95 
RIPE Region origin ASs announcing only one prefix:   6865 
RIPE Region transit ASs present in the Internet Routing Table:  1966 
Average RIPE Region AS path length visible:    4.0 
Max RIPE Region AS path length visible:    28 
Number of RIPE addresses announced to Internet:   482559648 
Equivalent to 21 /8s, 221 /16s and 2 /24s 
Percentage of available RIPE address space announced:  102.7 
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RIPE AS Blocks         1877-1901, 2043, 2047, 2107-2136, 2585-2614 
(pre-ERX allocations)  2773-2822, 2830-2879, 3154-3353, 5377-5631 
                       6656-6911, 8192-9215, 12288-13311, 15360-16383 
                       20480-21503, 24576-25599, 28672-29695 
                       30720-31743, 33792-35839, 38912-39935 
                       40960-45055, 47104-52223 
RIPE Address Blocks     62/8,  77/8,  78/8,  79/8,  80/8,  81/8,  82/8, 
                        83/8,  84/8,  85/8,  86/8,  87/8,  88/8,  89/8, 
                        90/8,  91/8,  92/8,  93/8,  94/8,  95/8, 109/8, 
                       178/8, 193/8, 194/8, 195/8, 212/8, 213/8, 217/8, 
 
LACNIC Region Analysis Summary 
------------------------------ 
 
Prefixes being announced by LACNIC Region ASes:   23862 
Total LACNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation:   5946 
LACNIC Deaggregation factor:      4.01 
Prefixes being announced from the LACNIC address blocks:  23726 
Unique aggregates announced from the LACNIC address blocks: 13297 
LACNIC Region origin ASs present in the Internet Routing Table: 1119 
LACNIC Prefixes per ASN:       21.20 
LACNIC Region origin ASs announcing only one prefix:  361 
LACNIC Region transit ASs present in the Internet Routing Table: 184 
Average LACNIC Region AS path length visible:   4.0 
Max LACNIC Region AS path length visible:    29 
Number of LACNIC addresses announced to Internet:   71622272 
Equivalent to 3 /8s, 50 /16s and 72 /24s 
Percentage of available LACNIC address space announced:  71.2 
 
LACNIC AS Blocks       26592-26623, 27648-28671, plus ERX transfers 
LACNIC Address Blocks  186/8, 187/8, 189/8, 190/8, 200/8, 201/8, 
 
AfriNIC Region Analysis Summary 
------------------------------- 
 
Prefixes being announced by AfriNIC Region ASes:   6035 
Total AfriNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation:   1453 
AfriNIC Deaggregation factor:      4.15 
Prefixes being announced from the AfriNIC address blocks:  6445 
Unique aggregates announced from the AfriNIC address blocks: 2468 
AfriNIC Region origin ASs present in the Internet Routing Table: 296 
AfriNIC Prefixes per ASN:       21.77 
AfriNIC Region origin ASs announcing only one prefix:  88 
 218
AfriNIC Region transit ASs present in the Internet Routing Table: 59 
Average AfriNIC Region AS path length visible:    3.8 
Max AfriNIC Region AS path length visible:    15 
Number of AfriNIC addresses announced to Internet:   19460608 
Equivalent to 0 /8s, 187 /16s and 219 /24s 
Percentage of available AfriNIC address space announced:  58.0 
 
AfriNIC AS Blocks      36864-37887 & ERX transfers 
AfriNIC Address Blocks  41/8, 197/8, 
 
APNIC Region per AS prefix count summary 
---------------------------------------- 
 
ASN 
 
No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg   Description 
4766 1709 6931 402 Korea Telecom 
(KIX) 
17488 1600 130 101 Hathway IP Over 
Cable Internet 
4755 1251 362 128 TATA 
Communications 
formerly 
9583 1100 87 549 Sify Limited 
4134 892 16925 377 CHINANET-
BACKBONE 
7545 793 198 101 TPG Internet Pty 
Ltd 
23577 780 34 664 Korea Telecom 
(ATM-MPLS) 
18101 751 216 30 Reliance Infocom 
Ltd Internet 
24560 714 230 174 Bharti Airtel Ltd. 
9829 683 572 18 BSNL National 
Internet Backbone 
 
 
Complete listing at http://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-APNIC
 
 
 
 
 
ARIN Region per AS prefix count summary 
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--------------------------------------- 
 
ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 
6389 4290 3647 324 bellsouth.net, inc. 
4323 1863 1035 376 Time Warner 
Telecom 
1785 1687 717 138 PaeTec 
Communications, 
Inc. 
20115 1627 1447 733 Charter 
Communications 
7018 1506 5924 1042 AT&T WorldNet 
Services 
6478 1375 305 476 AT&T Worldnet 
Services 
2386 1264 683 918 AT&T Data 
Communications 
Serv 
3356 1204 10980 452 Level 3 
Communications, 
LLC 
11492 1114 208 12 Cable One 
18566 1062 296 10 Covad 
Communications 
 
Complete listing at http://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-ARIN
 
 
RIPE Region per AS prefix count summary 
--------------------------------------- 
 
ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 
3292 454 1902 392 TDC Tele Danmark 
12479 450 578 6 Uni2 Autonomous 
System 
702 43 1861 347 UUNET - 
Commercial IP 
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service 
30890 413 87 193 Evolva Telecom 
35805 358 24 4 United Telecom of 
Georgia 
8866 351 109 21 Bulgarian 
Telecommunication 
C 
 3301 344              1684    307 TeliaNet Sweden 
 3215 343            3041      108 France Telecom 
Transpac 
 3320 338              7066   296 Deutsche Telekom 
AG 
 9121 319              1442 25 TTnet Autonomous 
System 
 
Complete listing at http://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-RIPE
 
LACNIC Region per AS prefix count summary 
----------------------------------------- 
 
ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 
8151 1466 2879 233 UniNet S.A. de C.V. 
10620 906 206 115 TVCABLE 
BOGOTA 
22047  591 302 14 VTR PUNTO NET 
S.A. 
7303 56 298 85 Telecom Argentina 
Stet-France 
28573 538 563 35 NET Servicos de 
Comunicao S.A 
11830 486 292 54 Instituto 
Costarricense de El 
6471 443 96 32 ENTEL CHILE S.A. 
11172 443 102 70 Servicios Alestra 
S.A de C.V 
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 7738 404 794 28 Telecomunicacoes 
da Bahia S.A 
 3816 363 188 81 Empresa Nacional 
de Telecomun 
 
Complete listing at http://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-LACNIC
 
AfriNIC Region per AS prefix count summary 
------------------------------------------ 
 
ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 
8452 981 188 7 TEDATA 
24863 884 82 40 LINKdotNET AS 
number 
20858 324 34 5 EgyNet 
 3741 277 856 237 The Internet 
Solution 
 2018 243 215 143 Tertiary Education 
Network 
 6713 160 151 12 Itissalat Al-
MAGHRIB 
33783 152 10 8 EEPAD TISP 
TELECOM & 
INTERNET 
29571 139 15 8 Ci Telecom 
Autonomous 
system 
 5536 123 8 9 Internet Egypt 
Network 
 5713 115 507 66 Telkom SA Ltd 
 
Complete listing at http://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-AFRINIC
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Global Per AS prefix count summary 
---------------------------------- 
 
ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 
6389 4290 3647 324 bellsouth.net, inc. 
 4323 1863 1035 376 Time Warner 
Telecom 
 4766 1709 6931 402 Korea Telecom 
(KIX) 
 1785 1687 717 138 PaeTec 
Communications, 
Inc. 
20115 1627 1447 733 Charter 
Communications 
17488 1600 130 101 Hathway IP Over 
Cable Interne 
 7018 1506 5924 1042 AT&T WorldNet 
Services 
 8151 1466 2879 233 UniNet S.A. de C.V. 
 6478 1375 305 476 AT&T Worldnet 
Services 
 2386 1264 683 918 AT&T Data 
Communications 
Serv 
 
Complete listing at http://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet
 
 
Global Per AS Maximum Aggr summary 
---------------------------------- 
 
ASN No of nets Net 
Savings 
Description 
1785 1687 1549 PaeTec Communications, Inc. 
17488 1600 1499 Hathway IP Over Cable Interne 
 4323 1863 1487 Time Warner Telecom 
 4766 1709 1307 Korea Telecom (KIX) 
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 8151 1466 1233 UniNet S.A. de C.V. 
 4755 1251 1123 TATA Communications formerly 
11492 1114 1102 Cable One 
18566 1062 1052 Covad Communications 
22773 1062 996 Cox Communications, Inc. 
 8452 981 974 TEDATA 
 
Complete listing at http://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-CIDRnet
 
List of Unregistered Origin ASNs (Global) 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Bad AS Designation Network Transit AS Description 
16927 UNALLOCATED 12.0.252.0/23 7018 AT&T WorldNet 
Service 
15132 UNALLOCATED 12.9.150.0/24 7018 AT&T WorldNet 
Service 
32567 UNALLOCATED 12.14.170.0/24 7018 AT&T WorldNet 
Service 
13746 UNALLOCATED 12.24.56.0/24 7018 AT&T WorldNet 
Service 
32567 UNALLOCATED 12.25.107.0/24 7018 AT&T WorldNet 
Service 
26973 UNALLOCATED 12.39.152.0/24 7018 AT&T WorldNet 
Servic 
26973 UNALLOCATED 12.39.154.0/23 7018 AT&T WorldNet 
Service 
26973 UNALLOCATED 12.39.159.0/24 7018 AT&T WorldNet 
Service 
32326 UNALLOCATED 12.40.49.0/24 7018 AT&T WorldNet 
Servic 
25639 UNALLOCATED 12.41.169.0/24 7018 AT&T WorldNet 
Service 
 
Complete listing at http://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-badAS
 
Advertised Unallocated Addresses 
-------------------------------- 
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Network Origin AS Description 
41.223.112.0/22 5713      Telkom SA Ltd 
41.223.176.0/22 36981 >>UNKNOWN<< 
41.223.188.0/24 22351 Intelsat 
41.223.189.0/24 26452 Local Communications 
Networks 
62.61.220.0/24 24974 Tachyon Europe BV - 
Wireless 
62.61.221.0/24 24974  Tachyon Europe BV - 
Wireless 
63.140.213.0/24 22555 Universal Talkware 
Corporatio 
63.143.251.0/24 22555 Universal Talkware 
Corporatio 
64.31.32.0/19 11955 ServiceCo LLC - Road 
Runner 
64.31.59.0/24 7017 ServiceCo LLC - Road 
Runner 
 
Complete listing at http://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-add-IANA
 
Number of prefixes announced per prefix length (Global) 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
/1:0 /2:0        /3:0        /4:0        /5:0        /6:0       
 /7:0        /8:19       /9:10      /10:20      /11:58      /12:166     
/13:348     /14:601     /15:1154    /16:10514   /17:4723    /18:8087     
/19:16903   /20:20163   /21:19974   /22:25876   /23:25740   /24:150868   
/25:863     /26:1030    /27:538     /28:148     /29:8       /30:5       
/31:0       /32:8 
 
Advertised prefixes smaller than registry allocations 
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
ASN No of nets Total ann. Description 
6389 2796 4290 bellsouth.net, inc. 
4766 140 1709 Korea Telecom (KIX) 
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17488 1313 1600 Hathway IP Over Cable 
Interne 
1785 1163 1687 PaeTec Communications, 
Inc. 
11492 1044 1114 Cable One 
18566 1043 1062 Covad Communications 
 2386 977 1264 AT&T Data 
Communications Serv 
 4323 953 1863 Time Warner Telecom 
 9583 951 1100 Sify Limited 
 8452 914 981  TEDATA 
 
Complete listing at http://thyme.apnic.net/current/data/sXXas-nos
 
Number of /24s announced per /8 block (Global) 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
4:13 8:206 12:2245 13:10 15:19 16:2       
17:4 20:36 24:1081 32:52 34:2 38:571     
40:97 41:1701 43:1 44:2 47:22 52:4       
55:2 56:3 57:24 58:570 59:640 60:459     
61:1073 62:1107 63:2013  64:3718 65:2384 66:3622   
67:1623 68:824 69:2643 70:557 71:174 72:1676   
73:2 74:1572 75:169 76:311 77:849 78:549     
79:353 80:971 81:833 82:560 83:434 84:634     
85:1030 86:397 87:650 88:354 89:1445 90:57     
91:2312 92:344 93:1055 94:1228 95:1031 96:140     
97:217 98:245 99:22 109:1 110:143 111:9       
112:136 113:125 114:256 115:326 116:1163 117:530     
 118:288 119:692 120:145 121:754 122:1031 123:694     
 124:994 125:1336 128:224 129:236 130:127 131:408     
 132:74 133:9 134:186 135:38 136:224 137:153     
 138:161 139:78 140:433 141:119 142:385 143:345     
 144:362 145:48 146:380 147:164 148:519 149:233     
 150:177 151:190 152:147 153:141 154:2 155:276     
 156:170 157:302 158:115 159:312 160:284 161:151     
 162:271 163:169 164:482 165:502 166:275 167:359     
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 168:674 169:164 170:471 171:39 172:10 173:287     
 174:226 178:1 180:1 183:1 186:22 187:96     
 188:22 189:432 190:2745 192:5780 193:4256 194:3307   
 195:2696 196:1101 198:3598 199:3360 200:5086 201:1278   
 202:7900 203:8170 204:3879 205:2153 206:2441 207:2731   
 208:3883 209:3400 210:2681 211:1122 212:1604 213:1657   
 214:80 215:31 216:4534 217:1306 218:387 219:443     
 220:1223 221:488 222:304        
 
End of report 
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1. Introduction 
 
This memo discusses when it is appropriate to register and utilize an Autonomous System (AS), 
and lists criteria for such.  Autonomous systems are the unit of routing policy in the modern world 
of exterior routing, and are specifically applicable to protocols like EGP (Exterior Gateway 
Protocol, now at historical status; see [EGP]), BGP (Border Gateway Protocol, the current de 
facto standard for inter-AS routing; see [BGP-4]), and IDRP (The OSI Inter-Domain Routing 
Protocol, which the Internet is expected to adopt when BGP becomes obsolete; see [IDRP]). It 
should be noted that the IDRP equivalent of an AS is the RDI, or Routing Domain Identifier. 
 
2. Motivation 
 
This memo is aimed at network operators and service providers who need to understand under 
what circumstances they should make use of an AS.  It is expected that the reader is familiar with 
routing protocols and will be someone who configures and operates Internet networks.  
Unfortunately, there is a great deal of confusion in how autonomous systems should be used 
today; this memo attempts to clear up some of this confusion, as well as acting as a simple guide 
to today's exterior routing. 
 
3. Definitions 
 
This document refers to the term "prefix" throughout. In the current classless Internet (see 
[CIDR]), a block of class A, B, or C networks may be referred to by merely a prefix and a mask, 
so long as such a block of networks begins and ends on a power-of-two boundary. For example, 
the networks: 
 
        192.168.0.0/24 
        192.168.1.0/24 
        192.168.2.0/24 
        192.168.3.0/24 
 
can be simply referred to as: 
 
        192.168.0.0/22 
 
The term "prefix" as it is used here is equivalent to "CIDR block", and in simple terms may be 
thought of as a group of one or more networks. We use the term "network" to mean classful 
network, or "A, B, C network". 
 
The definition of AS has been unclear and ambiguous for some time. [BGP-4] states: 
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The classic definition of an Autonomous System is a set of routers under a single technical 
administration, using an interior gateway protocol and common metrics to route packets within the 
AS, and using an exterior gateway protocol to route packets to other autonomous systems. Since 
this classic definition was developed, it has become common for a single AS to use several 
interior gateway protocols and sometimes several sets of metrics within an AS.  The use of the 
term Autonomous System here stresses the fact that, even when multiple IGPs and metrics are 
used, the administration of an AS appears to other autonomous systems to have a single 
coherent interior routing plan and presents a consistent picture of what networks are reachable 
through it. 
 
To rephrase succinctly: 
 
An AS is a connected group of one or more IP prefixes run by one or more network operators 
which has a SINGLE and CLEARLY DEFINED routing policy. 
 
Routing policy here is defined as how routing decisions are made in the Internet today.  It is the 
exchange of routing information between autonomous systems that is subject to routing policies. 
Consider the case of two autonomous systems, X and Y exchanging routing information: 
 
                NET1 ......  ASX  <--->  ASY  ....... NET2 
 
ASX knows how to reach a prefix called NET1.  It does not matter whether NET1 belongs to ASX 
or to some other AS which exchanges routing information with ASX, either directly or indirectly; 
we just assume that ASX knows how to direct packets towards NET1.  Likewise ASY knows how 
to reach NET2. 
 
In order for traffic from NET2 to NET1 to flow between ASX and ASY, ASX has to announce 
NET1 to ASY using an exterior routing protocol; this means that ASX is willing to accept traffic 
directed to NET1 from ASY. Policy comes into play when ASX decides to announce NET1 to 
ASY. 
 
For traffic to flow, ASY has to accept this routing information and use it.  It is ASY's privilege to 
either use or disregard the information that it receives from ASX about NET1's reachability. ASY 
might decide not to use this information if it does not want to send traffic to NET1 at all or if it 
considers another route more appropriate to reach NET1. 
 
In order for traffic in the direction of NET1 to flow between ASX and ASY, ASX must announce 
that route to ASY and ASY must accept it from ASX: 
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                    resulting packet flow towards NET1 
                  <<=================================== 
                                    | 
                                    | 
                     announce NET1  |  accept NET1 
                    --------------> + -------------> 
                                    | 
                        AS X        |    AS Y 
                                    | 
                     <------------- + <-------------- 
                       accept NET2  |  announce NET2 
                                    | 
                                    | 
                   resulting packet flow towards NET2 
                   ===================================>> 
 
Ideally, though seldom practically, the announcement and acceptance policies of ASX and ASY 
are symmetrical. 
 
In order for traffic towards NET2 to flow, announcement and acceptance of NET2 must be in 
place (mirror image of NET1). For almost all applications connectivity in just one direction is not 
useful at all. It should be noted that, in more complex topologies than this example, traffic from 
NET1 to NET2 may not necessarily take the same path as traffic from NET2 to NET1; this is 
called asymmetrical routing.  Asymmetrical routing is not inherently bad, but can often cause 
performance problems for higher level protocols, such as TCP, and should be used with caution 
and only when necessary. However, assymetric routing may be a requirement for mobile hosts 
and inherently asymmetric siutation, such a satelite download and a modem upload connection. 
 
Policies are not configured for each prefix separately but for groups of prefixes.  These groups of 
prefixes are autonomous systems. 
 
An AS has a globally unique number (sometimes referred to as an ASN, or Autonomous System 
Number) associated with it; this number is used in both the exchange of exterior routing 
information (between neighboring autonomous systems), and as an identifier of the AS itself. 
 
In routing terms, an AS will normally use one or more interior gateway protocols (IGPs) when 
exchanging reachability information within its own AS. See "IGP Issues". 
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4. Common errors in allocating autonomous systems 
 
The term AS is often confused or even misused as a convenient way of grouping together a set of 
prefixes which belong under the same administrative umbrella, even if within that group of 
prefixes there are various different routing policies. Without exception, an AS must have only one 
routing policy. 
 
It is essential that careful consideration and coordination be applied during the creation of an AS. 
Using an AS merely for the sake of having an AS is to be avoided, as is the worst-case scenario 
of one AS per classful network (the IDEAL situation is to have one prefix, containing many longer 
prefixes, per AS). This may mean that some re-engineering may be required in order to apply the 
criteria and guidelines for creation and allocation of an AS that we list below; nevertheless, doing 
so is probably the only way to implement the desired routing policy. 
 
If you are currently engineering an AS, careful thought should be taken to register appropriately 
sized CIDR blocks with your registration authority in order to minimize the number of advertised 
prefixes from your AS.  In the perfect world that number can, and should, be as low as one. 
 
Some router implementations use an AS number as a form of tagging to identify interior as well 
as exterior routing processes.  This tag does not need to be unique unless routing information is 
indeed exchanged with other autonomous systems. See "IGP Issues". 
 
5. Criteria for the decision -- do I need an AS? 
 
 
   *    Exchange of external routing information 
 
An AS must be used for exchanging external routing information with other autonomous systems 
through an exterior routing protocol. The current recommended exterior routing protocol is BGP, 
the Border Gateway Protocol. However, the exchange of external routing information alone does 
not constitute the need for an AS. See "Sample Cases" below. 
 
   *    Many prefixes, one AS 
 
As a general rule, one should try to place as many prefixes as possible within a given AS, 
provided all of them conform to the same routing policy. 
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   *    Unique routing policy 
 
An AS is only needed when you have a routing policy which is different from that of your border 
gateway peers. Here routing policy refers to how the rest of the Internet makes routing decisions 
based on information from your AS. See "Sample Cases" below to see exactly when this criteria 
will apply. 
 
5.1 Sample Cases 
 
 
   *    Single-homed site, single prefix 
 
A separate AS is not needed; the prefix should be placed in an AS of the provider. The site's 
prefix has exactly the same routing policy as the other customers of the site's service provider, 
and there is no need to make any distinction in routing information. 
 
This idea may at first seem slightly alien to some, but it highlights the clear distinction in the use 
of the AS number as a representation of routing policy as opposed to some form of administrative 
use. 
 
In some situations, a single site, or piece of a site, may find it necessary to have a policy different 
from that of its provider, or the rest of the site. In such an instance, a separate AS must be 
created for the affected prefixes. This situation is rare and should almost never happen. Very few 
stub sites require different routing policies than their parents. Because the AS is the unit of policy, 
however, this sometimes occurs. 
 
   *    Single-homed site, multiple prefixes 
 
Again, a separate AS is not needed; the prefixes should be placed in an AS of the site's provider. 
 
   *    Multi-homed site 
 
Here multi-homed is taken to mean a prefix or group of prefixes which connects to more than one 
service provider (i.e. more than one AS with its own routing policy). It does not mean a network 
multi-homed running an IGP for the purposes of resilience. 
 
An AS is required; the site's prefixes should be part of a single AS, distinct from the autonomous 
systems of its service providers. This allows the customer the ability to have a different 
representation of policy and preference among the different service providers. 
 
 
 
 
Hawkinson & Bates        Best Current Practice                  [Page 6] 
 233
 
RFC 1930            Guidelines for creation of an AS          March 1996 
 
 
This is ALMOST THE ONLY case where a network operator should create its own AS number. In 
this case, the site should ensure that it has the necessary facilities to run appropriate routing 
protocols, such as BGP4. 
 
5.2 Other factors 
 
 
 
   *    Topology 
 
Routing policy decisions such as geography, AUP (Acceptable Use Policy) compliance and 
network topology can influence decisions of AS creation. However, all too often these are done 
without consideration of whether or not an AS is needed in terms of adding additional information 
for routing policy decisions by the rest of the Internet. Careful consideration should be taken when 
basing AS creation on these type of criteria. 
 
   *    Transition / "future-proofing" 
 
Often a site will be connected to a single service provider but has plans to connect to another at 
some point in the future. This is not enough of a reason to create an AS before you really need it.  
The AS number space is finite and the limited amount of re-engineering needed when you 
connect to another service provider should be considered as a natural step in transition. 
 
   *    History 
 
AS number application forms have historically made no reference to routing policy. All too often 
autonomous systems have been created purely because it was seen as "part of the process" of 
connecting to the Internet. The document should be used as a reference from future application 
forms to show clearly when an AS is needed. 
 
6. Speculation 
 
 
1) If provider A and provider B have a large presence in a geographical area (or other routing 
domain), and many customers are multi-homed between them, it makes sense for all of those 
customers to be placed within the same AS. However, it is noted that case should only be looked 
at if practical to do so and fully coordinated between customers and service providers involved. 
 
2) Sites should not be forced to place themselves in a separate AS just so that someone else 
(externally) can make AS-based policy decisions. Nevertheless, it may occasionally be necessary 
to split up an AS or a prefix into two autonomous systems for policy reasons. 
 
 
 
 
Hawkinson & Bates        Best Current Practice                  [Page 7] 
 234
 
RFC 1930            Guidelines for creation of an AS          March 1996 
 
 
Those making external policy may request the network operators make such AS changes, but the 
final decision is up to those network operators who manage the prefixes in question, as well as 
the autonomous systems containing them. This is, of course, a trade off -- it will not always be 
possible to implement all desired routing policies. 
 
7. One prefix, one origin AS 
 
 
Generally, a prefix can should belong to only one AS. This is a direct consequence of the fact that 
at each point in the Internet there can be exactly one routing policy for traffic destined to each 
prefix. In the case of an prefix which is used in neighbor peering between two autonomous 
systems, a conscious decision should be made as to which AS this prefix actually resides in. 
 
With the introduction of aggregation it should be noted that a prefix may be represented as 
residing in more than one AS, however, this is very much the exception rather than the rule. This 
happens when aggregating using the AS_SET attribute in BGP, wherein the concept of origin is 
lost. In some cases the origin AS is lost altogether if there is a less specific aggregate 
announcement setting the ATOMIC_AGGREGATE attribute. 
 
8. IGP Issues 
 
As stated above, many router vendors require an identifier for tagging their IGP processes. 
However, this tag does not need to be globally unique. In practice this information is never seen 
by exterior routing protocols. If already running an exterior routing protocol, it is perfectly 
reasonable to use your AS number as an IGP tag; if you do not, choosing from the private use 
range is also acceptable (see "Reserved AS Numbers"). Merely running an IGP is not grounds for 
registration of an AS number. 
 
With the advent of BGP4 it becomes necessary to use an IGP that can carry classless routes. 
Examples include OSPF [OSPF] and ISIS [ISIS]. 
 
9. AS Space exhaustion 
 
The AS number space is a finite amount of address space. It is currently defined as a 16 bit 
integer and hence limited to 65535 unique AS numbers. At the time of writing some 5,100 
autonomous systems have been allocated and a little under 600 autonomous systems are 
actively routed in the global Internet. It is clear that this growth needs to be continually monitored. 
However, if the criteria applied above are adhered to, then there is no immediate danger of AS 
space exhaustion. It is expected that IDRP will be deployed before this becomes an issue. IDRP 
does not have a fixed limit on the size of an RDI. 
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10. Reserved AS Numbers 
 
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has reserved the following block of AS numbers 
for private use (not to be advertised on the global Internet): 
 
                           64512 through 65535 
 
11. Security Considerations 
 
There are few security concerns regarding the selection of autonomous systems. AS number to 
owner mappings are public knowledge (in WHOIS), and attempting to change that would serve 
only to confuse those people attempting to route IP traffic on the Internet. 
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